Suchergebnisse

Analyzing the performance of international organizations (IOs) in a comparative manner is of high importance. Yet IOs differ remarkably, which renders comparisons difficult. This article examines IO output productivity as an important precondition for IOs to have effects on their members (outcome) and on the ground (impact). We distinguish between the number and volume of IO policy outputs and measure both productivity components for ninety-eight IOs. Drawing on Easton's system theory, we derive several hypotheses on how input, throughput, and feedback loop factors impact output productivity and examine them with quantitative methods. This reveals that input matters as IOs with more member states are likely to have broader meeting agendas and a higher number of items on the negotiation agenda, which furthers the output productivity of IOs. Throughput matters as well as. Whereas IOs with high meeting frequencies give delegates more opportunities to negotiate and pass policies, which increases the number and volume of outputs, the access of non-state actors to negotiations slows down the decision-making process, which reduces IO output productivity. Finally, with respect to the feedback loop, this article shows that transparent decision-making exerts an accountability pressure on delegates, which has a positive effect on IO output productivity.

The performance of individual international organizations (IOs) has received considerable scholarly attention, not in the least because their importance for global governance. This paper adds to this body of work by adopting genuine comparative lenses. Based on a novel survey, it assesses the attributed performance of 49 IOs over two important dimensions: problem-solving effectiveness and legitimacy of outputs. This reveals variation between IOs with respect to both components. We derive hypotheses from international cooperation and IO design. The quantitative analysis reveals that except deliberative diplomatic practices many factors increasing attributed legitimacy differ from the ones increasing the attributed problem-solving effectiveness. Most notably, autonomous secretariats increase the problem-solving effectiveness attributed to IOs. Legitimacy attributions increase when IOs are regional instead of global in nature and when non-state actors have access to IO decision-making.

AbstractInternational organizations (IOs) constitute key arenas in which states discuss common issues. Such debates are central prerequisites for taking qualitatively good decisions. Yet researchers have not examined how IOs foster discussion through their institutional provisions. We conduct a factor analysis of institutional rules of 114 IOs which reveals that two ideal types how IOs seek to induce discussion exist: The first type creates room for debate in the negotiation stage of the policy cycle. In contrast, the second type gives member states a strong say in the agenda-setting, thereby facilitating debate. Why do IOs opt for either strategy? A limited policy scope, heterogeneity among actors, and diplomatic socialization increase the probability that IOs place emphasis on debate during negotiations, while a high number of members is the main reason for IOs to promote debate during agenda-setting. These choices reflect the strive of IOs to balance extensive debate with speedy decision-making.

International organizations (IOs) constitute key arenas in which states discuss common issues. Such debates are central prerequisites for taking qualitatively good decisions. Yet researchers have not examined how IOs foster discussion through their institutional provisions. We conduct a factor analysis of institutional rules of 114 IOs which reveals that two ideal types how IOs seek to induce discussion exist: The first type creates room for debate in the negotiation stage of the policy cycle. In contrast, the second type gives member states a strong say in the agenda-setting, thereby facilitating debate. Why do IOs opt for either strategy? A limited policy scope, heterogeneity among actors, and diplomatic socialization increase the probability that IOs place emphasis on debate during negotiations, while a high number of members is the main reason for IOs to promote debate during agenda-setting. These choices reflect the strive of IOs to balance extensive debate with speedy decision-making.

International norms and rules are created in international negotiations. A comprehensive survey shows that the satisfaction with negotiation outcomes varies between delegates, states and International Organizations (IOs), which is important as it has potential ramifications for state compliance and the effectiveness of the international rules and norms. This paper investigates which role individual, country and IO features and their interactions play for satisfaction with international negotiation outcomes. Drawing on approaches of international negotiation and cooperation, hypotheses on individual, country and IO features are specified and examined empirically with a multilevel analysis. This reveals that especially individual and IO level features impact outcome satisfaction. Outcome satisfaction increases if delegates put in much work in negotiations and can conduct them flexibly and if IOs are small in size, and have institutional designs that seek to foster debates. The paper also shows that there are cross-level interaction effects. Most notably, the positive effect of flexibility on high outcome satisfaction is less pronounced when negotiations are more strongly characterized by bargaining dynamics. Vice-versa, when IOs are prone to arguing dynamics all actors become more satisfied.

AbstractInternational norms and rules are created in international negotiations. A comprehensive survey shows that the satisfaction with negotiation outcomes varies between delegates, states and International Organizations (IOs), which is important as it has potential ramifications for state compliance and the effectiveness of the international rules and norms. This paper investigates which role individual, country and IO features and their interactions play for satisfaction with international negotiation outcomes. Drawing on approaches of international negotiation and cooperation, hypotheses on individual, country and IO features are specified and examined empirically with a multilevel analysis. This reveals that especially individual and IO level features impact outcome satisfaction. Outcome satisfaction increases if delegates put in much work in negotiations and can conduct them flexibly and if IOs are small in size, and have institutional designs that seek to foster debates. The paper also shows that there are cross-level interaction effects. Most notably, the positive effect of flexibility on high outcome satisfaction is less pronounced when negotiations are more strongly characterized by bargaining dynamics. Vice-versa, when IOs are prone to arguing dynamics all actors become more satisfied.

Abstract:Whether we look at constitutions of states or founding treaties of International Organisations (IO), it is striking that many rules on interaction between delegates create room for deliberation, whilst simultaneously limiting the time for discussion. While the latter speeds up decision making, it risks reducing its quality and legitimacy by hampering the exchange and contestation of information and ideas. How are these competing elements balanced in IOs? Do IOs differ in this respect, and if so, how and why? The article draws on a unique and novel dataset and assesses variation in the extent to which institutional design fosters or inhibits diplomatic deliberation in more than 110 diverse IOs. To this end, the article uses a combination of theories of functionalism, rational choice institutionalism and liberal approaches on variation, fit, and mismatch of deliberative institutional design within and across IOs. The hypotheses are analysed with quantitative methods. The article shows that diplomatic deliberative institutional design elements are the most pronounced when IOs are small in size, deal in high politics, and are regional in character.

Whether we look at constitutions of states or founding treaties of International Organisations (IO), it is striking that many rules on interaction between delegates create room for deliberation, whilst simultaneously limiting the time for discussion. While the latter speeds up decision making, it risks reducing its quality and legitimacy by hampering the exchange and contestation of information and ideas. How are these competing elements balanced in IOs? Do IOs differ in this respect, and if so, how and why? The article draws on a unique and novel dataset and assesses variation in the extent to which institutional design fosters or inhibits diplomatic deliberation in more than 110 diverse IOs. To this end, the article uses a combination of theories of functionalism, rational choice institutionalism and liberal approaches on variation, fit, and mismatch of deliberative institutional design within and across IOs. The hypotheses are analysed with quantitative methods. The article shows that diplomatic deliberative institutional design elements are the most pronounced when IOs are small in size, deal in high politics, and are regional in character.