Suchergebnisse

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered numerous assumptions about the drivers of Russian foreign policy, posing a fundamental challenge to the Russia studies community. Against this backdrop, the article centers on the imperative to reflect how we think and examine Russian foreign policy amid considerable transformations in the country's international as well as domestic realities. This contribution does so by reviewing and critically reassessing past accomplishments and shortcomings within the field of Russian foreign policy research, evaluating their pertinence in a post-2022 context. Focusing on the scholarly work done with regard to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the study demonstrates that the literature suffers from the inertial tendency of offering old answers to new questions, suggesting potential avenues for further scholarly work on this topic.

Why have relations between Russia and the West experienced such a dramatic downturn despite already hitting what seemed to be rock bottom in 2014? The dissociation model offers a novel approach to analyse the conflict between the two sides and its tragic development. According to this approach, Russia#s dissociation from the pan-European social order contributed to the outbreak of hostilities in 2014 and to Russia's war of aggression in February 2022. Signs of Russia's dissociation - intentional distancing from the core rules and norms of this order - were evident long before the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but the developments that followed marked a culmination of this process. The paper asserts that during the dissociation process, the foregrounding of ideational factors as opposed to material factors aggravated tensions and contributed to the radicalisation of relations between Russia and the West. Specifically, the study demonstrates how the fallout of institutional breakdown precluded management of the territorial security conflicts, resulted in the securitisation of the energy sector and overall polarisation of the relationship, and accelerated Russia's authoritarian turn, preventing any attempt to repair bilateral and multilateral relations with the West after 2014.

The Ukraine crisis of 2014 marked the culmination of Russia's dissociation from the Paris Charter-based European order, and from the global liberal order more generally. Processes of dissociation—defined as intentional distancing from the core rules and norms of institutions—occur relatively often and may even become an increasingly dominant feature of world politics as de-globalization advances. However, this phenomenon has rarely been tackled in academic research. In particular, it remains unclear what the driving forces of dissociation are and whether tensions between "leavers" and "remainers" in this process are destined to increase. This paper aims to address this issue by analyzing the justifications employed by the Russian government in the process of dissociation from the Paris Charter-based European security order before 2014, differentiating between material and ideational dimensions. The study demonstrates how the order that was once seen as a common project was ultimately perceived by Russia as a mechanism of subjugation by the West, which led to Moscow's departure from it.

AbstractRussia's attack on Ukraine has not only shaken the foundations of the European security order, but will also have long-term repercussions on the future of international relations. While Ukraine is enjoying universal backing from Western states, Russia has received at least rhetorical support from its "strategic partner" China. Influential voices have cited this constellation as proof of a new global confrontation between democratic and authoritarian camps. Amidst the current "sea change" in German foreign and defense policy, calls are mounting to make this assumed systemic confrontation its new baseline. In this brief article, we aim to sketch a more complex picture of the Sino-Russian partnership, as revealed by the war in Ukraine. Based on an analysis of Chinese and Russian official statements and expert commentaries published since shortly before the beginning of the war, we find that it is fundamentally shaped by three factors: a partial and short-term overlap of interests, an underdeveloped normative basis further challenged by Russia's belligerent behavior, and a pronounced reactivity towards US security agency. Accordingly, closer Sino- Russian alignment is not based on ideological fraternity or a symptom of renewed systemic bipolarity in global politics. Viewing it as such is also a bad guideline for practical policy, as it ignores the differences in both countries' attitudes towards the status quo of global order, and risks pushing them closer together in further challenges against it.

As the military standoff over Ukraine continues, both sides have attempted to mobilize international support for their respective positions. While Kiev has received in­creasingly robust NATO backing, Russia has turned to its "strategic partner" China. A recently published joint Sino-Russian statement has fueled speculation that Beijing could weigh in on Moscow's side and perhaps even lead to the resurgence of competition between ideo­logical blocs in world politics. However, diverging interests on Ukraine limit such co­operation in the short term. A long-term align­ment between both sides is a more serious possibility, but can still be influenced by Western policy choices.

For the first time in its history, the Republic of Moldova has voted for an openly pro-Western president. De­spite facing domestic and international difficulties, the newly elected Moldovan head of state Maia Sandu could manage to solve dire economic problems at home, while securing the support of both Russia and the European Union. This could have longstanding consequences for both the country itself and for all the other states of the common EU-Russian neighborhood.

Spätestens seit der Krim-Krise 2014 liegen die Beziehungen zwischen Russland und dem Westen im Argen. Diese neue Phase der Spaltung und Konfrontation beschert allen Seiten hohe Kosten und keine Lösungen. Mithilfe eines Dissoziationsmodells entschlüsseln die Autoren die Dynamik des Konflikts und entwickeln ein Konzept, unter welchen Normen und mit welchen Institutionen eine neue Koexistenz geordnet werden könnte.

Spätestens seit der Krim-Krise 2014 liegen die Beziehungen zwischen Russland und dem Westen im Argen. Diese neue Phase der Spaltung und Konfrontation beschert allen Seiten hohe Kosten und keine Lösungen. Mithilfe eines Dissoziationsmodells entschlüsseln die Autoren die Dynamik des Konflikts und entwickeln ein Konzept, unter welchen Normen und mit welchen Institutionen eine neue Koexistenz geordnet werden könnte.