Suchergebnisse

The results of a survey of private forest owners on adoption of a number of current programs, that include biodiversity protection to some degree, are presented. Adoption amounts to 22% for all the programs jointly, and is shown to depend on economic, social and ethical motives, with significant crowding-out between the economic and ethical motives, but not with social motives. Adoption of each program is strongly negatively correlated to each other. Nearly no respondent adopted the Natura 2000 program. The results constitute a test of the " reputational crowding-out " theory of Bénabou and Tirole (2006)

The results of a survey of private forest owners on adoption of a number of current programs, that include biodiversity protection to some degree, are presented. Adoption amounts to 22% for all the programs jointly, and is shown to depend on economic, social and ethical motives, with significant crowding-out between the economic and ethical motives, but not with social motives. Adoption of each program is strongly negatively correlated to each other. Nearly no respondent adopted the Natura 2000 program. The results constitute a test of the " reputational crowding-out " theory of Bénabou and Tirole (2006)

The results of a survey of private forest owners on adoption of a number of current programs, that include biodiversity protection to some degree, are presented. Adoption amounts to 22% for all the programs jointly, and is shown to depend on economic, social and ethical motives, with significant crowding-out between the economic and ethical motives, but not with social motives. Adoption of each program is strongly negatively correlated to each other. Nearly no respondent adopted the Natura 2000 program. The results constitute a test of the " reputational crowding-out " theory of Bénabou and Tirole (2006)

The results of a survey of private forest owners on adoption of a number of current programs, that include biodiversity protection to some degree, are presented. Adoption amounts to 22% for all the programs jointly, and is shown to depend on economic, social and ethical motives, with significant crowding-out between the economic and ethical motives, but not with social motives. Adoption of each program is strongly negatively correlated to each other. Nearly no respondent adopted the Natura 2000 program. The results constitute a test of the " reputational crowding-out " theory of Bénabou and Tirole (2006)

A survey of private forest owners on adoption of the Natura 2000 charter has been designed to allow respondents to state motives for non-adoption. These motives fall into five main categories: Economic, Compatibility with own practices, Control over one's property, Information and " no motive ". Using a mixed logit model, we can show that owners of properties at least in part in N2000, significantly evoke the Control motive more often than the other owners; that is not the case of the other motives. Owners who are convinced their properties have a remarkable feature are significantly less likely to evoke the Control motive. We argue that these findings might be appropriated by environmental managers to induce adoption of the N2000 Charter. Abstract A survey of private forest owners on adoption of the Natura 2000 charter has been designed to allow

A survey of private forest owners on adoption of the Natura 2000 charter has been designed to allow respondents to state motives for non-adoption. These motives fall into five main categories: Economic, Compatibility with own practices, Control over one's property, Information and " no motive ". Using a mixed logit model, we can show that owners of properties at least in part in N2000, significantly evoke the Control motive more often than the other owners; that is not the case of the other motives. Owners who are convinced their properties have a remarkable feature are significantly less likely to evoke the Control motive. We argue that these findings might be appropriated by environmental managers to induce adoption of the N2000 Charter. Abstract A survey of private forest owners on adoption of the Natura 2000 charter has been designed to allow

A survey of private forest owners on adoption of the Natura 2000 charter has been designed to allow respondents to state motives for non-adoption. These motives fall into five main categories: Economic, Compatibility with own practices, Control over one's property, Information and " no motive ". Using a mixed logit model, we can show that owners of properties at least in part in N2000, significantly evoke the Control motive more often than the other owners; that is not the case of the other motives. Owners who are convinced their properties have a remarkable feature are significantly less likely to evoke the Control motive. We argue that these findings might be appropriated by environmental managers to induce adoption of the N2000 Charter. Abstract A survey of private forest owners on adoption of the Natura 2000 charter has been designed to allow

A survey of private forest owners on adoption of the Natura 2000 charter has been designed to allow respondents to state motives for non-adoption. These motives fall into five main categories: Economic, Compatibility with own practices, Control over one's property, Information and " no motive ". Using a mixed logit model, we can show that owners of properties at least in part in N2000, significantly evoke the Control motive more often than the other owners; that is not the case of the other motives. Owners who are convinced their properties have a remarkable feature are significantly less likely to evoke the Control motive. We argue that these findings might be appropriated by environmental managers to induce adoption of the N2000 Charter. Abstract A survey of private forest owners on adoption of the Natura 2000 charter has been designed to allow

Brazilian Amazon deforestation rate is found to display a unit root and to be cointegrated with Brazilian GDP and its square – An Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Although, it is not the first time that such an EKC is detected, this may be the first such time-series evidence. Detecting an EKC is hampered by several econometric issues that have been shown to lead to possibly spurious results in cross-section and panel contexts, but are satisfactorily addressed in a cointegrated (time-series) framework. Alternative theories for explaining the deforestation path are rejected. There is evidence that the " Action Plan " of the Brazilian government against deforestation had an important effect. These results are in contrast to the economics literature on an EKC in emissions such asCO2, but appear to be consistent with a geographical sciences literature that considers that deforestation declines when alternative activities become available.

Brazilian Amazon deforestation rate is found to display a unit root and to be cointegrated with Brazilian GDP and its square – An Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Although, it is not the first time that such an EKC is detected, this may be the first such time-series evidence. Detecting an EKC is hampered by several econometric issues that have been shown to lead to possibly spurious results in cross-section and panel contexts, but are satisfactorily addressed in a cointegrated (time-series) framework. Alternative theories for explaining the deforestation path are rejected. There is evidence that the " Action Plan " of the Brazilian government against deforestation had an important effect. These results are in contrast to the economics literature on an EKC in emissions such asCO2, but appear to be consistent with a geographical sciences literature that considers that deforestation declines when alternative activities become available.

Brazilian Amazon deforestation rate is found to display a unit root and to be cointegrated with Brazilian GDP and its square – An Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Although, it is not the first time that such an EKC is detected, this may be the first such time-series evidence. Detecting an EKC is hampered by several econometric issues that have been shown to lead to possibly spurious results in cross-section and panel contexts, but are satisfactorily addressed in a cointegrated (time-series) framework. Alternative theories for explaining the deforestation path are rejected. There is evidence that the " Action Plan " of the Brazilian government against deforestation had an important effect. These results are in contrast to the economics literature on an EKC in emissions such asCO2, but appear to be consistent with a geographical sciences literature that considers that deforestation declines when alternative activities become available.

Brazilian Amazon deforestation rate is found to display a unit root and to be cointegrated with Brazilian GDP and its square – An Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). Although, it is not the first time that such an EKC is detected, this may be the first such time-series evidence. Detecting an EKC is hampered by several econometric issues that have been shown to lead to possibly spurious results in cross-section and panel contexts, but are satisfactorily addressed in a cointegrated (time-series) framework. Alternative theories for explaining the deforestation path are rejected. There is evidence that the " Action Plan " of the Brazilian government against deforestation had an important effect. These results are in contrast to the economics literature on an EKC in emissions such asCO2, but appear to be consistent with a geographical sciences literature that considers that deforestation declines when alternative activities become available.

In theory, health care providers may adapt their professional behavior to the financial incentives driven by their remuneration. Our research question is whether the users of health care services anticipate such a behavior from their general practitioner (GP) and, if they do, what are the consequences of such an anticipation on their preferences regarding financial incentives. We propose a theoretical model to identify potential determinants of such preferences. We empirically test our theoretical predictions using the data from a survey that elicits individual preferences for either patients' or providers' hypothetical incentives in France. The empirical results confirm the theoretical ones by establishing that users tend to prefer to pay a copayment themselves when the amount of GPs' incentives is high, the one of the patients' copayment is low, they anticipate that their GP's medical decisions are affected by financial incentives and their wealth is high. Otherwise, they prefer their GP to face financial incentives.

In theory, health care providers may adapt their professional behavior to the financial incentives driven by their remuneration. Our research question is whether the users of health care services anticipate such a behavior from their general practitioner (GP) and, if they do, what are the consequences of such an anticipation on their preferences regarding financial incentives. We propose a theoretical model to identify potential determinants of such preferences. We empirically test our theoretical predictions using the data from a survey that elicits individual preferences for either patients' or providers' hypothetical incentives in France. The empirical results confirm the theoretical ones by establishing that users tend to prefer to pay a copayment themselves when the amount of GPs' incentives is high, the one of the patients' copayment is low, they anticipate that their GP's medical decisions are affected by financial incentives and their wealth is high. Otherwise, they prefer their GP to face financial incentives.

In theory, health care providers may adapt their professional behavior to the financial incentives driven by their remuneration. Our research question is whether the users of health care services anticipate such a behavior from their general practitioner (GP) and, if they do, what are the consequences of such an anticipation on their preferences regarding financial incentives. We propose a theoretical model to identify potential determinants of such preferences. We empirically test our theoretical predictions using the data from a survey that elicits individual preferences for either patients' or providers' hypothetical incentives in France. The empirical results confirm the theoretical ones by establishing that users tend to prefer to pay a copayment themselves when the amount of GPs' incentives is high, the one of the patients' copayment is low, they anticipate that their GP's medical decisions are affected by financial incentives and their wealth is high. Otherwise, they prefer their GP to face financial incentives.