Suchergebnisse

One possible explanation for the migration from the central city to fiscally independent suburbs is a lack of equivalence between taxation and perceived benefits from local public goods. Spill-outs to suburbs add to this process and may lead to fiscal erosion of the central city. Piecemeal evidence is presented that this problem applies to the city of Zurich. Various possible remedies are discussed, one of which has been applied in Zurich, though not successfully. It is shown theoretically and empirically why this failure occurred. Alternative countermeasures are suggested and an account of how Zurich government officials reacted is supplied.

"Eindeutige Befunde, wonach öffentliche Unternehmen mit vergleichsweise höheren Kosten produzieren, sind für wirtschaftspolitische Schlußfolgerungen nicht unmittelbar bedeutend. Kostenvergleiche weisen jedoch auf unternehmensexterne Ursachen hin. Die 'Mehrkosten' öffentlicher Unternehmen sind in Wirklichkeit Leistungen zugunsten politisch einflußreicher Gruppen. Ein öffentliches Unternehmen schützt sich um so besser vor Privatisierung, je höher die 'Mehrkosten' sind, die es in den Dienst solcher Interessengruppen stellt. Nur auf den Markt ausgerichtete Staatsunternehmen sind schutzlos gegenüber den kurzfristigen Zwängen haushaltspolitischer Mittelbeschaffung. Es ist zu bezweifeln, daß Privatisierungen dieser Art beitragen, die volkswirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit zu steigern. Zur Durchsetzung eines nachfragegerechten Mitteleinsatzes liegen andere Möglichkeiten nahe: Öffentliche Unternehmen können durch eine klare Abgrenzung von Geschäftsbereichen und insbesondere durch eine Intensivierung des Wettbewerbs zu einem sparsamen und nachfragegesteuerten Mitteleinsatz angehalten werden. Solche Maßnahmen erscheinen volkswirtschaftlich gesehen lohnender als - wie im Rahmen der Privatisierungsdebatte - die Jagd nach vordergründigen Effizienzgewinnen." (Autorenreferat)

SUMMARYThis paper deals with the occurrence of fiscal illusion and its effect on public expenditures. Fiscal illusion is here taken to be a systematic misperception by individuals of both the public revenue burden borne by them and the amount of benefit they derive from public expenditures. Taking the revenue structure and public outlays of the 110 largest Swiss cities as an example, it is shown that there is in fact empirical evidence for the existence of fiscal illusion (presently defined for the most part in the literature as a systematic underestimation of fiscal burden) and, as a result, for higher public expenditures when it occurs than when it is absent. By dividing the Swiss cities according to the degree of citizen participation in the making of public decisions, we were able to formulate hypotheses predicting to what degree fiscal burden illusion (understood as systematic underestimation) will occur under each system. These hypotheses have been empirically confirmed. Further analysis of the results has indicated that in cities in which the citizens can only indirectly participate in public decision‐making, the government and public bureaucracy have more freedom to act independent of the wishes of the voters with respect to expenditures, though these are taken more and more into consideration as elections approach. This expenditure behavior and particularly the concrete manner in which expenditures are adjusted to approaching general elections leads us to the conclusion that illusion with respect to the benefit derived from public expenditures also exists.