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AbstractThe aim of this paper is to evaluate the welfare gains from financial integration for developing and emerging market economies. To do so, we build a stochastic endogenous growth model for a small open economy that can: (i) borrow from the rest of the world; (ii) invest in foreign assets; and (iii) receive foreign direct investment. The model is calibrated on 46 emerging market and developing economies for which we evaluate the upper bound for the welfare gain from financial integration. For plausible values of preference parameters and actual levels of financial integration, the mean welfare gain from financial integration is around 13.5% of initial wealth. Compared with financial autarky, actual levels of financial integration translate into higher annual growth rates.

In this paper, the public investment provision takes place in a stochastic environment. The role of the government is to remove a part of the uncertainty faced by the firm. If the government simply maximizes the value of the firm, then the optimal tax is smaller under imperfect competition then it is under perfect competition since more public capital reduces the selling price. But if the governement seeks to maximize the consumer surplus, tax and public capital provision are a mean to correct the market and the optimal tax is then higher.

In this paper, the public investment provision takes place in a stochastic environment. The role of the government is to remove a part of the uncertainty faced by the firm. If the government simply maximizes the value of the firm, then the optimal tax is smaller under imperfect competition then it is under perfect competition since more public capital reduces the selling price. But if the governement seeks to maximize the consumer surplus, tax and public capital provision are a mean to correct the market and the optimal tax is then higher.

Résumé Cet article est essentiellement empirique. Il a pour objectif de mesurer la prime de risque sur les actions françaises (1960-1992) et d'évaluer, à l'aide de calibrages et d'estimations économétriques, dans quelle mesure les modèles théoriques fondés sur différentes représentations des préférences des agents permettent de l'expliquer. On envisage successivement le cas où les préférences des agents sont récursives, le cas où l'utilité instantanée des agents dépend des habitudes de consommation et le cas où les préférences des agents sont interdépendantes.

Renewable energy generation and storage requires specialized capital goods, embedding critical raw materials (CRM). The scarcity of CRM therefore affects the transition from a fossil based energy system to one based on renewables, necessary to cope with climate change. We consider the issue in a theoretical model, where we allow for a very costly potential substitute, reflecting a backstop technology, and for partial and costly recycling of materials in capital goods. We characterize the main features of the efficient energy transition, and their dependence on the relative abundance of CRM and on the recycling technology. Recycling reduces the cost of the transition. It also calls for having a large stock of recyclable CRM embedded in specialized capital at the time of adoption of the backstop technology. Moreover, we consider constraints on policy tools and myopic regulation, and show how abstracting from the scarcity of CRM, or tightly linking subsidies for renewables to the carbon tax revenue, is misleading in designing climate policy.

Renewable energy generation and storage requires specialized capital goods, embedding critical raw materials (CRM). The scarcity of CRM therefore affects the transition from a fossil based energy system to one based on renewables, necessary to cope with climate change. We consider the issue in a theoretical model, where we allow for a very costly potential substitute, reflecting a backstop technology, and for partial and costly recycling of materials in capital goods. We characterize the main features of the efficient energy transition, and their dependence on the relative abundance of CRM and on the recycling technology. Recycling reduces the cost of the transition. It also calls for having a large stock of recyclable CRM embedded in specialized capital at the time of adoption of the backstop technology. Moreover, we consider constraints on policy tools and myopic regulation, and show how abstracting from the scarcity of CRM, or tightly linking subsidies for renewables to the carbon tax revenue, is misleading in designing climate policy.