Suchergebnisse

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are arrangements between government and private sector entities for the purpose of providing public infrastructure, community facilities and related services. PPP infrastructure development can take place at a regional level on a large scale, such as a cross country tunnel construction or on a small scale at an urban level such as city waste water treatment and sewerage rehabilitation. The purpose of this article is to identify issues and challenges in the area of public-private partnerships for infrastructure provision and finance at the urban and national levels in Southeast Asia. More thought will be given to discuss essential features of regulatory and legal frameworks required to support public and private sectors to effectively deliver urban infrastructure services. These include building legal frameworks and institutions at the outset; introducing sound regulations to protect private sector investment; using contractual safeguards against potentially disputable matters; and implementing governance and accountability frameworks. It also offers some insights into the regulatory and surveillance machinery required at a national-urban PPP setting to ensure effectiveness, fairness and openness for executing urban infrastructure development projects. Reviews of impediments to successful PPPs have indicated several prevailing issues and challenges. Urban local authorities often encounter overlapping regulations and still need adequate clarity on their roles and authority levels. For central governments, there is a real need for a comprehensive and consistent regulatory framework and a more streamlined process for implementation of PPP projects.

In countries with large or potentially large oil and gas deposits, the resource and its extraction tend to become vital cornerstones of the economy. However, uncertainties involved in finding commercial quantities of oil and gas and the intensive capital required for undertaking exploration and production result in significant business risks. The petroleum fiscal systems in many developing countries are now opting for production‐sharing contracts (PSC) as a new model of agreement for the exploration and production of oil and gas resources. This paper extends the principal‐agent theory to foster understanding of partnership between the host government and its foreign contractor in the realm of PSC. The theory highlights the importance of moral hazard and adverse‐selection problems. To avoid these uncertainties and asymmetric information, the principal (national oil company) needs to design an incentive contract that induces the agent (international oil company (IOC)) to undertake actions that will maximise the principal's welfare. Under a PSC, the state has to offer contract terms that are attractive enough for the IOC to enter into an agreement. At the same time, the terms must allow the state to receive maximum economic returns from the venture.

Although public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been viewed as a framework for describing intersectoral co-operative ventures between government and the private sector, little attention has been paid in previous researches to the characteristics of co-operative behaviour in the partnering organisations, as well as the measurement of partnership performance. This study blends important features of the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) paradigm with the Interorganisational Relations (IORs) theory to better understand the maintenance of public-private partnerships in Thailand's electric utility industry. Empirical results obtained from the questionnaire survey of public and private management executives from seventy-one organisations indicated several interesting factors relevant to implementation of successful public-private partnerships. These factors include risk allocation, the use of constructive conflict resolution techniques, control of asymmetric relationships, and the existence of contractual safeguards for sovereign risks. This study also offers some insights into the dynamics of the differences between the private and public sectors pertaining to partnership performance. The findings reveal that respondents in government/state-owned enterprises were more likely to perceive partnership performance based on programme performance improvement, better service/product provisions, and more opportunities to expand their business interests. The private firms, on the other hand, were more likely to focus on better investment potential and more opportunities to expand their business interests. Private with part-state ownership organisations identified more opportunities to expand their business interests as the most apparent indicator.

A public‐private partnership can be seen as an appropriate institutional means of dealing with particular sources of market failure by creating a perception of equity and mutual accountability in transactions between public and private organisations through co‐operative behaviour. The relative merit of the idea of public‐private partnership is oriented mainly around a mutual benefit. As the roles of government in public‐private partnerships are not only to provide services, but also to monitor the marketplace, a well‐defined regulation framework is essential. A sound regulatory framework will increase benefits to the government by ensuring that essential partnerships operate efficiently and optimise the resources available to them in line with broader policy objectives, ranging from social policy to environmental protection. In turn, it provides assurance to the private sector that the regulatory system includes protection from expropriation, arbitration of commercial disputes, respect for contract agreements, and legitimate recovery of costs and profit proportional to the risks undertaken.