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In recent years the problem of defining 'violence' has occupied a growing number of political philosophers, political scientists, and peace researchers. Unfortunately, thinking in this field has been vitiated by the methodological shortcoming that none or too little attention has been paid to the problem of clearly stating the conditions of adequacy that, relative to a given context, it is reasonable to demand that a definition of violence should satisfy in order to be acceptable (in that context). In this paper three conditions of adequacy are stated, i. e. a condi tion of normative adequacy, a condition of theoretical adequacy, and a condition of descriptive adequacy. The first one is introduced on the basis of a normative assumption which seems often to be made by peace researchers. The second one is introduced on the basis of some important empirical hypotheses on violence and nonviolence which peace researchers have discussed. The third one is introduced in order to keep in touch with common usage. It is then argued that recently proposed definitions of violence do not satisfy some or any of these requirements. Finally, definitions of violence and nonviolence are proposed which seem to satisfy the stated requirements and therefore to be particularly fruitful in the context of peace research.

In recent years, the problem of defining "violence" has occupied a growing number of political philosophers, political scientists, & peace researchers. Unfortunately, thinking in this field has been vitiated by the methodological shortcoming that none or too little attention has been paid to the problem of clearly stating the conditions of adequacy that, relative to a given context, it is reasonable to demand that a definition of violence should satisfy to be acceptable. Three conditions of adequacy are stated: (1) normative adequacy, (2) theoretical adequacy, & (3) descriptive adequacy. The first is introduced on the basis of a normative assumption that seems often to be made by peace researchers. The second one is introduced on the basis of some important empirical hypotheses on violence & nonviolence that peace researchers have discussed. The third one is introduced in order to keep in touch with common usage. It is then argued that recently proposed definitions of violence do not satisfy some or any of these requirements. Definitions of violence & nonviolence are proposed, which seem to satisfy the stated requirements, & therefore, to be particularly fruitful in the context of peace research. Modified HA.

This article is concerned with the problem of Gandhi's rejection of violence in situations of group conflict. Two questions have been asked: (1) On the basis of what arguments did Gandhi reject violence ? (2) Why did he on some occasions support violence ? The answer given to the first question is that Gandhi bases his rejection of violence on two different sorts of arguments. On one hand violence is condemned as morally bad in itself, independently of the consequences to which this rejection may lead. On the other hand violence is also rejected because of the consequences to which it leads. Violence, even used in self-defence, is in full contradiction with the democratic values and is not even able to defend them. Moreover it is never able to bring about accepted solutions of conflicts and it brutalizes man. According to Gandhi, Lenin is completely mistaken in his belief that violence can be used as a means to the achievement of the non-violent society of which he speaks in a famous passage of State and Revolution. For only means which are of the same ethical nature as the end sought can be conducive to its reali zation. Gandhi, however, on four occasions took direct part in war and repeatedly advised others to do the same. Our examination of Gandhi's writings and actions has shown that there are situations in which Gandhi believed it to be our duty to fight. These are the situations in which the alternatives open before us are not violence versus non violence but only direct violence versus indirect violence or violence versus cowardice and fear. The greatness of Gandhi, however, is not accounted for by his rejection of violence alone. His main contribution to the history of political ethics lies in his whole philosophy of conflict and in the non-violent techniques of conducting social conflicts which he devised as an effective and practical substitute for the traditional methods of violence.