How the Constitution Aggravates Polarized Politics: The Trap the Framers Left Us
In: Journal of political institutions and political economy, Band 3, Heft 3–4, S. 413-431
ISSN: 2689-4815
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In: Journal of political institutions and political economy, Band 3, Heft 3–4, S. 413-431
ISSN: 2689-4815
In: The Forum: a journal of applied research in contemporary politics, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 143-162
ISSN: 1540-8884
What did Trump's four years do to our mass politics? Partisanism—a blind, often unyielding loyalty to one's own party—has come to define much of our political discourse, very much to the detriment of the American polity. Both the literature and the data on party evaluations confirm that people are behaving in ways that display not just consistent polarization but a deeper level of partisan bias, despite their lack of ideological consistency. Political science should respond to these developments with increased focus on the negative aspects of partisanship that can lead to this form of partisanism so dangerously exhibited in the Capitol riot, among other events, as well as a thoughtful classroom critique of these habits.
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 275-276
ISSN: 1541-0986
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 130, Heft 1, S. 148-149
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 130, Heft 1, S. 148
ISSN: 0032-3195
In: The Forum: a journal of applied research in contemporary politics, Band 10, Heft 3
ISSN: 1540-8884
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 73, Heft 1, S. 287-288
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 73, Heft 1, S. 287-288
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 123, Heft 1, S. 188-190
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 123, Heft 1, S. 188-189
ISSN: 0032-3195
In: The public opinion quarterly: POQ, Band 88, Heft 1, S. 149-160
ISSN: 1537-5331
Abstract
Traditional realignment theory has fallen out of fashion among political scientists, yet the popular press talk about political realignments with great regularity. However, in this research note we show that political science should reconsider realignment theory because over the last decade American politics has dramatically realigned—but only for white Americans. Specifically, we demonstrate that income has gone from a highly polarizing factor to one in which there is little to no polarization at all, while at the same time education polarization has increased dramatically to become the prominent demographic cleavage in the white segment of the electorate. However, no such realignment has occurred among Black or Latino voters. These differences across racial groups show how it is essential to consider race in theories of realignment, particularly because of the different experiences across racial groups. Realignment theory is quite viable in the twenty-first century, but the lens of race is the key to seeing the white realignment.
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 435-443
ISSN: 2049-8489
AbstractAre cues from party leaders so important that they can cause individuals to change their own issue positions to align with the party's position? Recent work on the importance of party cues suggests they do, especially given the literature on partisanship as a strong and persistent group identity. However, in this paper we test the limits of those partisan cues. Using a unique two-wave panel survey design we find that the effect of party cues is moderated by the prior level of importance individuals place on an issue. We find that when a person believes an issue area to be more important, party cues are less likely to move that citizen's position, particularly when the cue goes against partisan ideological norms. Our results show evidence that an individual's own issue positions—at least the important ones—can be resilient in the face of party cues.
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 719-736
ISSN: 1541-0986
What does the rise and election of Donald J. Trump as president mean for the future of conservatism? Republican elites continue to argue about whether Trump is changing the definition of conservatism for better or worse, although many Republicans seem content to let him shape the issues, direction, and brand of the traditional party of conservatism. We examine the ideological characteristics of different groups of Republican voters across three types of ideology: symbolic, operational, and conceptual. We find distinct differences between Republicans who consistently supported Trump and other groups that either supported him in the general election only and those who never supported him. The Never Trump camp stands out as a group that is less symbolically and operationally conservative but also better able to articulate what it means to be a conservative than do Trump's core supporters, who look very much the opposite. These results suggest a contemporary Republican Party that is far from unified in what it means to be a conservative.
In: American political science review, Band 113, Heft 1, S. 38-54
ISSN: 1537-5943
Are people conservative (liberal) because they are Republicans
(Democrats)? Or is it the reverse: people are Republicans
(Democrats) because they are conservatives (liberals)? Though much
has been said about this long-standing question, it is difficult to
test because the concepts are nearly impossible to disentangle in
modern America. Ideology and partisanship are highly correlated,
only growing more so over time. However, the election of President
Trump presents a unique opportunity to disentangle party attachment
from ideological commitment. Using a research design that employs
actual "conservative" and "liberal" policy statements from President
Trump, we find that low-knowledge respondents, strong Republicans,
Trump-approving respondents, and self-described conservatives are
the most likely to behave like party loyalists by accepting the
Trump cue—in either a liberal or conservative direction. These
results suggest that there are a large number of party loyalists in
the United States, that their claims to being a self-defined
conservative are suspect, and that group loyalty is the stronger
motivator of opinion than are any ideological principles.