Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The Israeli Supreme Court has become increasingly polarized between liberal and conservative judges. This phenomenon is relatively new to the Israeli Supreme Court and follows the much older and more well-known example of the U.S. Supreme Court. This article surveys both U.S. and Israeli court polarization and shows the history, reasons, and special features of polarization of both courts, including the important differences between them. It also adds a distinction to existing literature on court polarization—the distinction between court polarization and politicization, and especially the distinction between "regular" polarization and "one-side" polarization. Regular court polarization happens when the court is divided roughly equally between the two main political contenders (usually between right and left). One-side polarization happens when there is a clear advantage to one side of the political map in the make-up of the court. The current U.S. Supreme Court, with six conservative justices and only three liberal justices, is an example of one-side court polarization that is tilted to the right. The current Israeli Supreme Court (as of the writing of these lines) is an example for one-side court polarization tilted to the left; there are 10 liberal judges and only five conservative judges on the court. The article's main argument is that one-side court polarization presents a particularly vexing problem for the legitimacy of the court, even more so than "regular" polarization. The article concludes with a survey of possible solutions to help Israel retract itself from one-side court polarization.

The Jehovah's Witnesses cases of the late 1930s and early 1940s presented some of the first instances of American Supreme Court's attempts to grapple with the challenges of a multicultural society. Taken as a whole, these cases represented a favorable position towards minorities' claims, even to some extent a path breaking one. The Jehovah's Witnesses cases were a precursor of the Court's growing involvement in the protection of minorities' rights, which colored the entire second half of the 20th century. They further introduced a new language, and new judicial forms into constitutional jurisprudence—the language of balancing and balancing tests. In all these aspects the Jehovah's Witnesses cases seem to have shown the early sings of multicultural ideology in Supreme Court jurisprudence. However, not all Jehovah's Witnesses cases showed the same kind of judicial willingness to protect minorities' interests from the will of the majority, and not all involved the new judicial rhetoric of balancing. What explains these different judicial responses in cases which are similar in their facts and close to each other in time? In this Article I will attempt to distinguish between three types of Jehovah's Witnesses cases and argue that the different judicial responses in each of them indicates a different structure of the multicultural conflict, and a different structure of the multicultural claims in each of them.