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AbstractScholars have examined the role that negative stereotypes play in electoral discrimination against minority candidates. Incorporating literature on in-group favoritism, the author argues here that some degree of this discrimination can be explained instead by voters holding positive stereotypes of majority candidates and discriminating in their favor. Based on the results of an original moderation-of-process survey experiment carried out in Italy, the study provides evidence of electoral discrimination pertaining to immigrant-origin candidates, concentrated among right-wing citizens. It finds that stereotypes have little mediating effect on discriminationagainstcandidates with a migration background; rather, the primary role played by stereotypes is in discriminationin favor ofmajority candidates, that is, positive bias that reserves electoral benefits to them. The relevance of in-group favoritism is corroborated by the finding that large segments of the Italian voting population hold distinctively positive stereotypes of majority candidates without also negatively stereotyping immigrant-origin candidates.

An influential explanation for the persistent political underrepresentation of minorities in elected office is that minority candidates are discriminated against by voters of the dominant ethnic group. We argue, however, for the need to distinguish between two forms of discrimination: ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility. We measure the impact of each by using an extensive data set drawn from Swiss elections, where voters can cast both positive and negative preference votes for candidates. Our results show that immigrant-origin candidates with non-Swiss names incur an electoral disadvantage because they receive more negative preference votes than candidates with typically Swiss names. But we also find that minority candidates face a second disadvantage: voters discriminate in favor of majority candidates by allocating them more positive preference votes. These two forms of electoral discrimination are critically related to a candidate's party, whereas the impact of the specific outgroup to which a minority candidate belongs is less pronounced than expected.

An influential explanation for the persistent political underrepresentation of minorities in elected office is that minority candidates are discriminated against by voters of the dominant ethnic group. We argue, however, for the need to distinguish between two forms of discrimination: ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility. We measure the impact of each by using an extensive data set drawn from Swiss elections, where voters can cast both positive and negative preference votes for candidates. Our results show that immigrant-origin candidates with non-Swiss names incur an electoral disadvantage because they receive more negative preference votes than candidates with typically Swiss names. But we also find that minority candidates face a second disadvantage: voters discriminate in favor of majority candidates by allocating them more positive preference votes. These two forms of electoral discrimination are critically related to a candidate's party, whereas the impact of the specific outgroup to which a minority candidate belongs is less pronounced than expected.

Many refugee-receiving countries have restricted their asylum policies and stepped up their border control policies to prevent asylum seekers from reaching their territories. At the same time, the resettlement of refugees has gained popularity. Many states have introduced resettlement schemes or have increased the number of refugees they resettle. Why do states voluntarily admit refugees by expanding resettlement? This article develops a comprehensive theoretical account of countries' resettlement choices and identifies the determinants of their openness to refugee resettlement through an empirical analysis of 33 OECD countries between 1980 and 2019. We find that the supply-side factor of wealth best predicts whether a country engages in refugee resettlement. The number of effective resettlement admissions tends to fluctuate with the demand-side factor of humanitarian need. Nevertheless, the expansion of resettlement policies has not resulted in a subsequent expansion of humanitarian protection. Instead, states combine resettlement policies with restrictive border control policies which allows them to preserve their humanitarian credentials while curtailing refugees' overall access to asylum. These findings provide important insights into the policy-making of refugee resettlement and the strategic considerations in the asylum governance of liberal democracies.

AbstractDoes anxiety affect how public officials process policy information? It is often argued that the increasing number of policy failures can be explained by a lack of policy learning by decision makers. While previous studies show that socioeconomic and partisan variables are related to the perception of policy information, little attention has been paid to the role of emotions, such as anxiety, in the policymaking process. In this paper, we investigate the impact of anxiety on the policy learning of local office holders at the individual level in Switzerland. We introduce the Marcus' Affective Intelligence Model—which examines how emotions affect individuals' information processing—to the policy learning literature. To test the expectations of the model, we draw on novel experimental data collected among local elected officials from the 26 Swiss cantons. In the experiment, we randomly display anxiety‐inducing images along with policy information. We provide evidence that anxiety has a positive causal effect on learning. Considering potential moderators of this effect, we show that the relationship is not conditioned by the strength of priors or the perceived complexity of public policies. However, these variables are substantially correlated with policy learning. Our findings have important implications for better understanding how information influences policymaking.

AbstractImmigrants and other minorities are underrepresented in politics in most Western democracies. We argue that strategically acting party gatekeepers who update their nomination strategies based on voter behavior contribute to this representation gap. Drawing on unique panel data from Swiss local elections, we find that candidates with a "foreign‐sounding" name systematically receive not only fewer votes but are also fielded on less promising list positions compared to native candidates. We track candidates across elections and show that this inequality is driven by voter discrimination in previous elections. Our study carries relevance for research on minority candidates by linking different stages in the electoral process and showing how parties indirectly discriminate due to their use of candidate‐performance information. It also bears practical implications, pointing to avenues how parties can break the cycle of discrimination in the electoral process.

In recent decades, we have witnessed the diffusion of policy diffusion studies across many sub-disciplines of political science. Four mechanisms of policy diffusion—learning, competition, emulation and coercion—have become widely accepted as explanations for how policymaking processes and policy outcomes in one polity influence those in other polities. After pointing to major shortcomings of this inductively gained set of mechanisms, we present a theoretically more coherent typology that draws on key concepts from International Relations and Policy Studies. The four mechanisms we lay down consider rationalist and social constructivist approaches equally and they incorporate symmetric and asymmetric constellations. By further distinguishing between processes confined to one policy field and those arising from links across policy fields, we present a typology of eight theoretically consistent pathways of policy diffusion. Our framework enables the aggregation of knowledge and contributes to conceptual coherence in multi-methods research.

In recent decades, we have witnessed the diffusion of policy diffusion studies across many sub-disciplines of political science. Four mechanisms of policy diffusion—learning, competition, emulation and coercion—have become widely accepted as explanations for how policymaking processes and policy outcomes in one polity influence those in other polities. After pointing to major shortcomings of this inductively gained set of mechanisms, we present a theoretically more coherent typology that draws on key concepts from International Relations and Policy Studies. The four mechanisms we lay down consider rationalist and social constructivist approaches equally and they incorporate symmetric and asymmetric constellations. By further distinguishing between processes confined to one policy field and those arising from links across policy fields, we present a typology of eight theoretically consistent pathways of policy diffusion. Our framework enables the aggregation of knowledge and contributes to conceptual coherence in multi-methods research. ; + ID der Publikation: unilu_56552 + Sprache: Englisch + Letzte Aktualisierung: 2022-01-10 12:45:27