Suchergebnisse

These notes aim to provide a brief overview of the behaviour of the Argentinian public sector in the last century and a half. It is not a work of history but rather a partial illustration of developments. I have tried to minimise the amount of data by limiting the attention to those that seem most relevant to me. Work is likely to be unbalanced in terms of the space allocated to each topic and this is due to the fact that I have selected those that I have studied most over time. One is fiscal federalism which for many years has been at the heart of tax issues and which, due to the poor design of policies, has had at least three negative effects: first, it made it possible to expand the social welfare sector by concealing at some times its structural deficit and the postponement of a long-term solution (from the system of capitalisation of contributions at the beginning of the 1990s); secondly, because the misdesign of policies simultaneously led to a deterioration in the quantity and quality of public goods due to the lack of funding due to the diversion of funds to other purposes; thirdly, by redeployments of resources between the provinces resulting from this disruption of the system of co-participation of taxes. Another issue is public pricing and tariff policies, which were used at various times as instruments for stabilisation, income distribution, promotion of sectors and activities, which led to negative financial results that added to the public deficit and thus diverted funds from the production of public goods. The third issue that is present throughout development is the subsidiary state, the promoter of sectors and regions, a financing insurer for various activities, which diverted resources that should have been earmarked for the provision of public goods. Faculty of Economics ; Estas notas tienen como objetivo brindar un breve panorama del comportamiento del sector público argentino en el último siglo y medio. No es un trabajo de historia sino más bien una ilustración parcial de la evolución. He ...

Se estudian los efectos de igualación de las transferencias intergubernamentales Nación- Provincias en la Argentina. La pregunta es en qué medida compensan las diferencias de capacidad fiscal propia de modo de lograr que cada provincia provea un nivel similar de servicios con un nivel similar de presión tributaria. Las transferencias no trabajan bien para ese objetivo ya que originan reordenamientos de la capacidad fiscal total que violan la equidad horizontal y disminuyen el potencial igualador de las transferencias -entre el 40% y más del 100% en ocho observaciones entre 1959 y 2010. Corregir esta anomalía debería ser parte de la próxima reforma. ; This paper studies the effects of fiscal equalization of transfers from the national government to the provinces in Argentina. The question is to what extent these transfers compensate for differences in provinces' own revenues so that they can provide similar levels of services at similar levels of taxation. Transfers do not work well here because they give rise to new order (re-ranking) in provinces' fiscal capacities - a situation that results in the violation of the principle of horizontal equity and a drop in the equalization potential of such transfers -between 40% and over 100% in observations from 1959 to 2010. Correcting this anomaly should be one aim of the upcoming reform. ; Facultad de Ciencias Económicas

En este trabajo se demuestra que al diseñar un sistema de transferencias intergubernamentales que contemple las diferencias de capacidad y necesidad fiscal es importante que no se creen incentivos perversos para los gobiernos locales. Las propuestas que se han formulado para la Argentina suponen, en muchos casos, que las elasticidades-alícuotas de las bases imponibles son cero de modo que el gobierno sub-nacional no puede modificar su capacidad tributaria estándar. El caso general, cuando esas elasticidades no son cero, las jurisdicciones tendrán incentivos para modificar las alícuotas para obtener mayores transferencias. También tendrán incentivos para ocultar base imponible. La forma de evitar esa manipulación por los gobiernos locales es realizando los cálculos de capacidad fiscal en base a datos exógenos. Algo similar ocurre con el cálculo de la necesidad fiscal. ; In this paper it is shown that in the design of a system of intergovernmental transfers based on fiscal capacities and fiscal needs it is important not to create perverse incentives for the sub-national governments. Several proposals for Argentina assume that the tax-rate elasticities of the tax bases are zero and, in this way, the sub-national governments cannot modify their standard fiscal capacity. In general terms, when these elasticities are different from zero, the jurisdictions will have incentives to manipulate tax rates to obtain higher transfers. They will also have incentives to hide tax bases. To avoid these manipulations fiscal capacities and fiscal needs must be estimated using exogenous data for these governments. ; Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas

These Clase Notes are, for the most part, revised and updated versions of those which were published in Series No 26 (1980) and No 34 (1980, 1989). Some of these Notes are not included in this volume, while others are added on more recent developments of some topics. The use of these notes as teaching material for a long time — albeit with updates — and the suggestions of students and graduates to redraft them led us to take over the task given to us as Doctorate No 9 of the Department of Economics of the Faculty of Economics. When publishing these Notes, it is necessary to reiterate that they are a complement and not a substitute for theoretical and practical classes and textbooks. Department of Economics ; Estas Notas de Clase son, en su mayor parte, versiones revisadas y actualizadas de las que fueran oportunamente publicadas en la Serie Cuadernos Nº 26 (1980) y Nº 34 (1980, 1989). Algunas de aquellas Notas no son incluidas en este volumen, en tanto que se agregan otras sobre desarrollos más recientes de algunos temas. La utilización de estas Notas como material docente durante mucho tiempo –por cierto con actualizaciones- y las sugerencias de alumnos y graduados de reeditarlas, nos llevó a encarar la tarea que se concreta como Trabajo Docente Nº 9 del Departamento de Economía de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Al publicar estas Notas es necesario reiterar que son un complemento y no un sustituto de las clases teóricas y prácticas y de los libros de texto. Departamento de Economía

En este trabajo se presenta y evalúa la experiencia argentina con los gobiernos locales. En primer lugar se estudia la evolución y situación actual de la estructura vertical del sector público, las interrelaciones y tensiones entre los niveles de gobierno y la descripción del sistema de gobiernos locales. Se estudian luego varias cuestiones de economía de los gobiernos locales, con referencia al caso argentino: la relación entre el gasto público municipal y la población; el efecto de imitación entre las Municipalidades; el impacto del gasto público provincial sobre el gasto municipal; los determinantes del empleo, los salarios y el gasto público municipales; las relaciones entre el tamaño, la correspondencia y la descentralización fiscal en el nivel sub-nacional de gobierno; la distribución del residuo fiscal provincial entre las Municipalidades; y el voto en las urnas como mecanismo de control de los gobiernos locales. ; In this paper the Argentine experience in the field of local governments is presented. In the first place, the paper studies the evolution and current situation of the vertical structure of the public sector, the relationships and tensions among the levels of government, and the description of the system of local governments. Some topics of local government economic applied to the argentinian case are then investigated: the relationship between the size of the group and the local expenditures; the imitation effect among municipalities; the effect on the municipal expenditures of the provincial expenditures in the municipality; the determinants of employment, wages and public expenditures in the municipalities; the relationships among size, fiscal correspondence and fiscal decentralization; the distribution of the provincial fiscal residue among municipalities and, finally, the ballot box as a mechanism of control of local governments. ; Trabajo presentado en el "Meeting on Local Public Finance in Federal Countries: A Comparative Experience", Urban Public Economic Association (Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, España, octubre 2004). ; Departamento de Economía

The aim of this work is to give historical insight into the federal tax co-participation regime. There are two main periods: the pre-Federal co-participation of taxes (1853-1934), characterised as competitive federalism, and the co-participation of taxes from 1935 to the present day. In this second large period, nine stages or periods are distinguished on the basis of legislative developments and quantitative results. The first five stages include birth, maturation and processing, extending from 1935 to the end of the 1970s. The sixth period (1980-1984) starts the path towards the disruption and fall of the regime, leading to the next three periods (1985-87; 1988-89 and 1990 to the present day) of the birth and consolidation of coercive federalism. Each of these periods leaves lessons and lessons that can be useful for the design of a new scheme. Project "Regional Disparities and Fiscal Federalism: A proposal for the reform of the Federal co-participation regime for taxes in Argentina "in the Department of Economics of the UNLP is supported by the Tinker Foundation. Director of the Project: Dr Alberto Porto. Department of Economics ; The aim of this paper is to make an historical review of the Argentine Revenue Sharing System. Two main periods are distinguished: one previous to the Revenue Sharing System (1853-1934), characterized as Competitive Federalism; and the Revenue Sharing period itself, from 1935 onwards. Within this second period nine sub-periods are distinguished according to the evolution Revenue Sharing both legally and quantitatively. The first five sub-periods (from 1935 to the 70s) include the birth, maturing and improvement of the regimen; the system evolved from a Competitive to a Cooperative federalism. The sixth period (1980-1984) starts the way towards the disarticulation and the end of the regimen, giving place to the following three periods of birth and consolidation of the Coercitive Federalism. Each period generates illuminating lessons offering interesting insights for the design of a ...

Abstract
We study the interaction between intergovernmental transfers on the level and the structure of local own revenues. Based on a sample for Argentina's local governments, specifically the 135 municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires, we find that transfers facilitate local revenues collection. This effect is more pronounced in urban local governments, with higher population density, poverty levels, and demand for public services. In addition, transfers bias own revenues composition. That is, higher transfers lead to higher local tax collection, which is obtained through less distortionary taxation (i.e., property tax). Interestingly, this bias is stronger for local governments with a higher share of divisible public goods (that are likely to be financed according to the "benefit principle"). The results are robust to a battery of different estimation methods and can be rationalized with existing theory from public finance and political economy as well. The findings might have important policy implications for local governments' public finance.

This paper studies the effect of consolidate –national and provincial– fiscal policy in Argentina on income distribution, building a novel panel data for 1995-2010 considering the 24 jurisdictions and quintile groups within provinces. We allocate expenditures, taxes and transfers among provinces and among people within provinces, according to benefit and incidence principles, avoiding double accounting, and build three measures of income: ex ante, interim, and ex post (or extended) income. We find that i) personal income inequality increased between 1995 and 2002, and then reverted the trend; ii) the trends in income inequality have a parallel with the different macroeconomic regimes nested in the sample (convertibility between 1995 and 2001 and post convertibility since 2002); iii) the effect of fiscal policy is a reduction in the Gini coefficient of 6 points in 1995, 5 points in 2002 and 10 points in 2010; iv) the mix of instruments to redistribute income changed with time towards cash transfers and against in-kind expenditures; iv) provincial budgets contribute strongly to progressivity; v) social expenditure is the most important redistribution tool, but economic services have grown in size between sub-periods, pushed by government subsidies in energy and transport, and vi) the paper measures the distribution of budget but leave aside the distribution of results (e.g., expenditure performance). ; Facultad de Ciencias Económicas

This paper studies the connection between economic policy and electoral outcomes. In particular, it analyzes the impact of the conflict between the agro-manufacturing sector and the national government on the congressional elections for national deputies in the 134 municipalities of the province of Buenos Aires – a conflict which stemmed from the increase in taxation and the imposition of quantitative restrictions on the sector's production and exports. The municipalities differ greatly in their productive structures; therefore, a policy that is detrimental (beneficial) to a certain sector of activity may be expected to have a greater negative (positive) impact on the election results for the governing party in those municipalities where that sector is quantitatively important. The estimations show that the relative importance of the agro-manufacturing sector, controlling for economic, social and political variables, had a positive impact on the party in office in 2007 and a negative one in 2009. ; Facultad de Ciencias Económicas