Suchergebnisse

What is the role of law in a society in which order is maintained mostly through social norms, trust, and nonlegal sanctions? Eric Posner argues that social norms are sometimes desirable yet sometimes odious, and that the law is critical to enhancing good social norms and undermining bad ones. But he also argues that the proper regulation of social norms is a delicate and complex task, and that current understanding of social norms is inadequate for guiding judges and lawmakers. What is needed, and what this book offers, is a model of the relationship between law and social norms. The model shows that people's concern with establishing cooperative relationships leads them to engage in certain kinds of imitative behavior. The resulting behavioral patterns are called social norms. Posner applies the model to several areas of law that involve the regulation of social norms, including laws governing gift-giving and nonprofit organizations; family law; criminal law; laws governing speech, voting, and discrimination; and contract law. Among the engaging questions posed are: Would the legalization of gay marriage harm traditional married couples? Is it beneficial to shame criminals? Why should the law reward those who make charitable contributions? Would people vote more if non-voters were penalized? The author approaches these questions using the tools of game theory, but his arguments are simply stated and make no technical demands on the reader

Labor monopsony in the United States -- The failure of antitrust -- Collusion -- Monopsony -- Mergers -- Noncompetes -- The limits of antitrust -- Employment and labor law : old and new directions -- The gig economy and independent contractors -- Conclusion : whither work?

"Cuts through the hyperbole and hysteria that often distorts assessments of our republic, particularly at this time." - Alan Taylor, winner of the 2014 Pulitzer Prize for History What-and who-is a demagogue? How did America's Founders envision the presidency? What should a constitutional democracy look like-and how can it be fixed when it appears to be broken? Something is definitely wrong with Donald Trump's presidency, but what exactly? The extraordinary negative reaction to Trump's election-by conservative intellectuals, liberals, Democrats, and global leaders alike-goes beyond ordinary partisan and policy disagreements. It reflects genuine fear about the vitality of our constitutional system. The Founders, reaching back to classical precedents, feared that their experiment in mass self-government could produce a demagogue: a charismatic ruler who would gain and hold on to power by manipulating the public rather than by advancing the public good. President Trump, who has played to the mob and attacked institutions from the judiciary to the press, appears to embody these ideas. How can we move past his rhetoric and maintain faith in our great nation? In The Demagogue's Playbook, acclaimed legal scholar Eric Posner offers a blueprint for how America can prevent the rise of a demagogue and protect the features of a democracy that help it thrive-and restore national greatness, for one and all"--

"Countries solemnly intone their commitment to human rights, and they ratify endless international treaties and conventions designed to signal that commitment. At the same time, there has been no marked decrease in human rights violations, even as the language of human rights has become the dominant mode of international moral criticism. Well-known violators like Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan have sat on the U.N. Council on Human Rights. But it''s not just the usual suspects that flagrantly disregard the treaties. Brazil pursues extrajudicial killings. South Africa employs violence against protestors. India tolerate child labor and slavery. The United States tortures. In The Twilight of Human Rights Law the eminent legal scholar Eric A. Posner argues that purposefully unenforceable human rights treaties are at the heart of the world's failure to address human rights violations. Because countries fundamentally disagree about what the public good requires and how governments should allocate limited resources in order to advance it, they have established a regime that gives them maximum flexibility--paradoxically characterized by a huge number of vague human rights that encompass nearly all human activity, along with weak enforcement machinery that churns out new rights but cannot enforce any of them. Posner looks to the foreign aid model instead, contending that we should judge compliance by comprehensive, concrete metrics like poverty reduction, instead of relying on ambiguous, weak, and easily manipulated checklists of specific rights."--

A theory of customary international law Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner -- A compliance-based theory of international law Andrew T. Guzman -- Do human rights treaties make a difference? Oona A. Hathaway -- Treaty reservations and the economics of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention Francesco Parisi and Catherine Ševčenko -- Competing for capital : the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960-2000 Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons -- The concept of legalization Kenneth W. Abbott ... [et al.]. -- The cost of credibility : explaining resistance to interstate dispute resolution mechanisms Andrew T. Guzman -- Judicial independence in international tribunals Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo -- Self-enforcing voting in international organizations Giovanni Maggi and Massimo Morelli -- Public versus private enforcement of international economic law : standing and remedy Alan O. Sykes -- An economic analysis of state and individual responsibility under international law Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes -- Sanctions Jonathan Eaton and Maxim Engers -- Economics of alliances : the lessons for collective action Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley -- Optimal war and Jus ad Bellum Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes

The first months of the Obama administration have led to expectations, both in the United States and abroad, that in the coming years America will increasingly promote the international rule of law-a position that many believe is both ethically necessary and in the nation's best interests. With The Perils of Global Legalism, Eric A. Posner explains that such views demonstrate a dangerously naive tendency toward legalism-an idealistic belief that law can be effective even in the absence of legitimate institutions of governance. After tracing the historical roots of the concept, Posner carefully

"The first months of the Obama administration have led to expectations, both in the United States and abroad, that in the coming years America will increasingly promote the international rule of law--a position that many believe is both ethically necessary and in the nation's best interests. With The Perils of Global Legalism, Eric A. Posner explains that such views demonstrate a dangerously naive tendency toward legalism--an idealistic belief that law can be effective even in the absence of legitimate institutions of governance. After tracing the historical roots of the concept, Posner carefully lays out the many illusions--such as universalism, sovereign equality, and the possibility of disinterested judgment by politically unaccountable officials--on which the legalistic view is founded. Drawing on such examples as NATO's invasion of Serbia, attempts to ban the use of land mines, and the free-trade provisions of the WTO, Posner demonstrates throughout that the weaknesses of international law confound legalist ambitions--and that whatever their professed commitments, all nations stand ready to dispense with international agreements when it suits their short- or long-term interests. Provocative and sure to be controversial, The Perils of Global Legalism will serve as a wake-up call for those who view global legalism as a panacea--and a reminder that international relations in a brutal world allow no room for illusions."--Provided by publisher

Abstract
Some products, notably but not only platforms, increase in value for users as the number of other users increases. These interaction or network effects can result in 'product market traps' (Bursztyn et al., 2023) where people who use the product would be better off if they all stopped using it and switched to another product, but cannot because of coordination problems. A parallel but overlooked phenomenon is the labor market trap, where employees would be better off if they collectively left an employer, job, or profession, but cannot because of the difficulty of coordination. Product market and labor market traps pose a challenge to public policy because of the complexity of people's behavior in networks, but can be mitigated in some cases with relatively simple taxes and regulatory interventions.