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Integration and reinforcement of network infrastructure for transport, energy and water is a key component in the European policy framework for market competitiveness. However, in spite of considerable analysis and community co-funding since 1995, actual implementation progress for the 90 priority projects in the Transeuropean Energy Networks programme has been meager.The estimated network investment need of 40,000 M euro (2003-2013) is challenging the current heterogenous institutional mix of European network operators, regulators and the role of the commission. This paper presents an analytic framework for the network investment problem under decentralized control in both regulation, infrastructure ownership and management. Our results on the underinvestment problem from regulatory competition and non-coordination provide insights into the policy relevant topic of common infrastructure investment under varying budget balancing constraints and management objectives. From an economic policy viewpoint, the paper is tangential to the more general discussion on regulatory centralization vs. subsidiarity in the European Union. ; Ce papier présente un cadre analytique simple permettant de comprendre les problèmes de coordination entre gestionnaires d'infrastructure nationaux en présence de service internationaux (i.e., qui doivent utiliser les différentes infrastructures) et les rôles pontentiels pour l'intervention d'une autorité supra-nationale à la fois au niveau des décisions d'investissement mais aussi aux niveaux des politiques de tarification de l'accès et de financement des infrastructures

Integration and reinforcement of network infrastructure for transport, energy and water is a key component in the European policy framework for market competitiveness. However, in spite of considerable analysis and community co-funding since 1995, actual implementation progress for the 90 priority projects in the Transeuropean Energy Networks programme has been meager.The estimated network investment need of 40,000 M euro (2003-2013) is challenging the current heterogenous institutional mix of European network operators, regulators and the role of the commission. This paper presents an analytic framework for the network investment problem under decentralized control in both regulation, infrastructure ownership and management. Our results on the underinvestment problem from regulatory competition and non-coordination provide insights into the policy relevant topic of common infrastructure investment under varying budget balancing constraints and management objectives. From an economic policy viewpoint, the paper is tangential to the more general discussion on regulatory centralization vs. subsidiarity in the European Union. ; Ce papier présente un cadre analytique simple permettant de comprendre les problèmes de coordination entre gestionnaires d'infrastructure nationaux en présence de service internationaux (i.e., qui doivent utiliser les différentes infrastructures) et les rôles pontentiels pour l'intervention d'une autorité supra-nationale à la fois au niveau des décisions d'investissement mais aussi aux niveaux des politiques de tarification de l'accès et de financement des infrastructures

AbstractA concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. A "virtual Hotelling rule" describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costs along the optimal extraction path. Fields which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow different extraction paths. Resource might be left unexploited in the long run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a "virtual Herfindahl principle" and to another form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

We characterize the optimal extraction path when a concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. Under asymmetricinformation, a `virtual Hotelling rule' describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costsalong an optimal extraction path. In sharp contrast with the case of complete information, elds which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow dierent extraction paths. Some resource might be left unexploited in the long-run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a `virtual Herndahl principle' and to a new form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. Under asymmetric information, the market price converges faster to its long-run limit, exhibiting more stability.

Le régulateur et le juge : quelle articulation faceaux activités risquées ? Une firme dont les activités présentent certains risques pour la qualité de l'environnement possède une double information privée, sur les dispositifs de prévention qu'elledéploie et sur la valeur des actifs qu'elle détient et qui permettraient d'indemniser lesvictimes en cas d'accident. Nous déterminons la politique optimale de prévention desecond rang dans ce contexte d'asymétrie d'information. La politique optimale comprend deux volets : un contrôle a priori des efforts de prévention et une évaluation desactifs (ces inspections étant aléatoires, le problème est d'en déterminer la probabilité)et, lorsqu'il y a accident, la vérification de la richesse garante de l'indemnisation desvictimes.