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It is safe to say that much of international law—the bedrock of the international order—has been shaped by the Western legal doctrine. How does the Islamic legal tradition relate to international law? What are Islamic law states' (ILS) stance toward the global order and international relations? This article offers a fresh perspective of similarities and differences between international law and Islamic law. ILS' patterns of commitments to a number of international treaties and institutions reveal a nuanced picture of these states' position in the contemporary global order. I bring together the English-language-dominated field of international relations and the Arabic-language literature on global order and Islamic law. I trace Islam's contributions to international law and argue that international law and Islamic law share more similarities than they are given credit for. However, the inherent diversity of Islamic law and the lack of an authoritative body of Islamic international law muddle effects of historical cross-fertilization between Islamic law and international law. In reality, ILS' position in the global order is not about a fundamental clash of values. A much more intricate picture emerges. In an important way, this paper sketches an emerging research agenda for understanding ILS' position in the modern global order.

AbstractThis article argues that specific characteristics of the domestic legal institutions of Islamic law states shape these states' choices of peaceful resolution methods in territorial disputes. After providing original data on the characteristics of Islamic legal structures, I systematically compare pertinent rules of international dispute resolution methods and Islamic law. I demonstrate empirically that not all Islamic law states view international settlement venues in the same way. Secular legal features, such as constitutional mentions of education, supreme court, or peaceful settlement of disputes have the power to attract these states to the most formal international venues—arbitration and adjudication. On the other hand, Islamic law states whose legal system is infused with Islamic religious precepts are attracted to less-formalized venues.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), as the principal judicial organ of the UN, plays an important role in peaceful resolution of international disputes. Traditionally, relations between Islamic law states, international law, and courts have been relatively tense due to the inherent link between Islamic law and the Islamic faith. Yet, several Islamic law states recognize the ICJ's compulsory and compromissory jurisdiction. This article asks: Why do some Islamic law states extend support to the International Court of Justice, while others turn away from the Court? I argue and empirically demonstrate that specific characteristic of Islamic law can explain variation of Islamic law states' preferences towards the ICJ. After providing original data on the characteristics of Islamic legal structures, I systematically compare pertinent rules of international law and Islamic law, focusing on similarities and differences between the two. Islamic law features such as respect for legal scholarship and peaceful resolution of disputes are compatible with principles embraced by the ICJ. Islamic law states that incorporate these norms are supportive of the Court. In contrast, Islamic law states that directly adopt sharia as the law of the land and incorporate sharia in their education systems are less open to the ICJ's adjudication.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) constitute two prominent international courts. However, there exists considerable variation in states' support for these two institutions. The Rome Statute, which recognizes the jurisdiction of the ICC has been ratified by over half the states in the world; only a third of states accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. How are we to understand this variation in state support for these two courts? I argue that there is an inherent link between the quality of a state's domestic legal system (rule of law) and perceived legitimacy of an international court. Empirical analyses of states' support for the ICJ and the ICC show that rule-of-law states lend support to the ICC, a court perceived by the international community as legitimate. Alleged bias of the ICJ has, on the other hand, substantially weakened support for this court among rule-of-law states. Adapted from the source document.

Do domestic legal systems affect states' propensity to form military alliances? This article, building upon the existing research ininternational relations, adopts a socio-legal approach to understanding international treaty making. By focusing on the essence of international negotiations-communication between states' representatives- I argue that negotiating parties who share a common legal language have a common a priori understanding concerning concepts under discussion. Domestic laws operating within states impact the process of creation of international law embodied in treaties. Empirical analyses show that states with similar legal systems are more likely to form military alliances withone another. Additionally, domestic legal systems influence the way that states design their alliance commitments. In general, my findings suggest that the influence of domestic laws does not stop at "the water's edge." It permeates the interstate borders and impacts the relations between states, especially the treaty negotiating and drafting process. International negotiators bring their legal backgrounds to the negotiating table, which influences both their willingness to sign treaties and the design of the resulting agreements. (International Interactions/ FUB)

This article considers how international criminal justice administered by the International Criminal Court (ICC) affects the possibility of negotiated, peaceful transitions of power in autocracies. We argue that a strong international criminal tribunal can deter dictators' decisions to peacefully relinquish their power. It does so when the dictator in question has faced a relatively violent opposition, one that was ready to strike a deal with the dictator promising him amnesty in exchange for stepping down. Facing an opposition that "has skeletons in its closet," the dictator will peacefully exit his office only under a weak ICC regime. We use a cross-national time-series data set spanning 1998 to 2007 to test our theory and find that under a weak ICC regime, the more skeletons the opposition has in its own closet, the more likely is the dictator to peacefully step down from office. Interestingly, this relationship holds, to a large extent, across various levels of dictator's culpability. If the ICC is strong, the number of skeletons the opposition has in its closet has, for the most part, no effect on the dictator's likelihood of stepping down.