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World Affairs Online
Talking to terrorists: how to end armed conflicts
Introduction -- Why we must talk to terrorists -- Making contact with the enemy -- Building a channel -- How governments engage with terrorists -- The third party -- Starting a negotiation -- The art of negotiation -- Why do some negotiations succeed and others fail? -- Only implementation creates trust -- The lessons of history -- The future
Leader survival strategies and the onset of civil conflict: a coup-proofing paradox
In: Armed forces & society, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 27-44
ISSN: 1556-0848
It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being plagued with rebellion. Scholarship has argued the practice of coup-proofing is potentially responsible for this trend. However, though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, states often retain substantial capabilities in the form of well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing units. This article argues that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are hesitant to deploy their coup-proofing units: when coup risk is high. Using a global sample of authoritarian regimes for the years 1971–2011, tests indicate that heavily coup-proofed regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high but see no change in conflict propensity when coup risk is low.
World Affairs Online
Leader Survival Strategies and the Onset of Civil Conflict: A Coup-Proofing Paradox
In: Armed forces & society, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 27-44
ISSN: 1556-0848
It is paradoxical that authoritarian leaders often hold power for long periods of time, despite their states being plagued with rebellion. Scholarship has argued the practice of coup-proofing is potentially responsible for this trend. However, though regular armed forces are often allowed to whither when coup-proofing, states often retain substantial capabilities in the form of well-armed and well-trained coup-proofing units. This article argues that coup-proofing is more likely to contribute to rebellion when leaders are hesitant to deploy their coup-proofing units: when coup risk is high. Using a global sample of authoritarian regimes for the years 1971–2011, tests indicate that heavily coup-proofed regimes do in fact see a considerable increase in civil war likelihood when the risk of a coup is high but see no change in conflict propensity when coup risk is low.
An assessment of the "democratic" coup theory: democratic trajectories in Africa, 1952-2012
In: African security review: a working paper series, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 213-224
ISSN: 1024-6029
World Affairs Online
Regime vulnerability and the diversionary threat of force
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 58, Heft 1, S. 169-196
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
Trading coups for civil war: the strategic logic of tolerating rebellion
In: African security review: a working paper series, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 329-338
ISSN: 1024-6029
World Affairs Online
Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups D'Etat
In: Forthcoming at the Journal of Conflict Resolution
SSRN
An Assessment of the 'Democratic' Coup Theory: Democratic Trajectories in Africa, 1952-2012
In: Forthcoming at African Security Review
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
Trading Coups for Civil War: The Strategic Logic of Tolerating Rebellion
SSRN
Working paper
Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 56, Heft 6, S. 1017-1040
ISSN: 1552-8766
Previous studies have attested to leaders "coup-proofing" their regimes by reducing the ability or disposition of their armies to seek their removal. The following article tests the utility of these efforts. "Structural" coup-proofing such as counterbalancing is expected to reduce the ability to organize a coup plot by creating substantial coordination obstacles to soldiers. Coup-proofing by spoiling militaries with organizational resources is expected to reduce the willingness to intervene. However, increased organizational resources are expected to increase the army's capabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of a coup's success. The theory is empirically tested using a selection model with a global sample from 1961 to 2000. Findings suggest that both coup-proofing strategies are effective deterrents of coup activity and, more generally, that characteristics of the military appear to be far more important than economic influences on coups.
Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups dtat
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 56, Heft 6, S. 1017-1041
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
Regime Vulnerability and the Diversionary Threat of Force
SSRN
Working paper
A lasting glow: Seizing the optimism of the Arab Spring
In: Public policy research: PPR, Band 18, Heft 4, S. 207-212
ISSN: 1744-540X
Jonathan Powell predicts that we will see the seeds of the Arab Spring spreading across the Middle East, with regime change on the way in Syria and possibly even Iran. The west should not rule out intervention if there is local and regional support for military action.