Trading coups for civil war: The strategic logic of tolerating rebellion
In: African security review, Volume 23, Issue 4, p. 329-338
ISSN: 2154-0128
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In: African security review, Volume 23, Issue 4, p. 329-338
ISSN: 2154-0128
In: African security review, Volume 23, Issue 3, p. 213-224
ISSN: 2154-0128
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Volume 58, Issue 1, p. 169-196
ISSN: 1552-8766
In this article, I move beyond prior efforts to explore the relationship between the risk of a coup and international conflict by considering alternatives that leaders can utilize to strengthen their regimes. I offer two theoretical expectations. First, I theorize that leaders lose the incentive and ability to use diversion when the structural coup-proofing apparatus is strengthened. Second, I expect military finances to lead to disparate behavior when considering regime type. Autocrats are expected to use military funds to provide private incentives to the armed forces, largely in the form of allowances. Democracies, in contrast, will be required to use expenditures to promote the public good of national security due to the transparency of their regimes. Autocrats are expected to lose the incentive to use diversion as the financial endowment of their militaries increase, while democracies will continue to show a diversionary trend due to their increased military capabilities. The theory is tested using global data from 1962 to 2000, with the findings strongly supporting the theory. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Volume 58, Issue 1, p. 169-196
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Volume 58, Issue 1, p. 169-196
ISSN: 1552-8766
In this article, I move beyond prior efforts to explore the relationship between the risk of a coup and international conflict by considering alternatives that leaders can utilize to strengthen their regimes. I offer two theoretical expectations. First, I theorize that leaders lose the incentive and ability to use diversion when the structural coup-proofing apparatus is strengthened. Second, I expect military finances to lead to disparate behavior when considering regime type. Autocrats are expected to use military funds to provide private incentives to the armed forces, largely in the form of allowances. Democracies, in contrast, will be required to use expenditures to promote the public good of national security due to the transparency of their regimes. Autocrats are expected to lose the incentive to use diversion as the financial endowment of their militaries increase, while democracies will continue to show a diversionary trend due to their increased military capabilities. The theory is tested using global data from 1962 to 2000, with the findings strongly supporting the theory.
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Studies in comparative international development: SCID, Volume 51, Issue 2, p. 169-188
ISSN: 1936-6167
In: Foreign Policy Analysis, p. n/a-n/a
In: Journal of peace research, Volume 48, Issue 2, p. 249-259
ISSN: 1460-3578
Once considered a 'hot topic' among scholars, research on coups d'état has waned in recent years. This decline is surprising given that 7 coups have happened between January 2008 and December 2010, bringing the last decade's total to almost three dozen. One explanation for the lack of coup research is the absence of a temporally and spatially comprehensive dataset to test theories. Also absent is a discussion of what makes coups distinct from other forms of anti-regime activity. This article seeks to remedy these problems. The authors present a new dataset on coups from 1950 to 2010. They begin by explaining their theoretical definition and coding procedures. Next, they examine general trends in the data across time and space. The authors conclude by explaining why scholars studying a variety of topics, including civil wars, regime stability, and democratization, would benefit by paying closer attention to coups.
In: Journal of peace research, Volume 48, Issue 2, p. 249-260
ISSN: 0022-3433
In: Africa Spectrum, Volume 57, Issue 3, p. 327-339
ISSN: 1868-6869
World Affairs Online
In: Small wars & insurgencies, Volume 30, Issue 3, p. 641-659
ISSN: 1743-9558
In: International studies review, Volume 24, Issue 1
ISSN: 1468-2486
AbstractThe term "coup" has been used to describe a diverse range of events. Although recent decades have seen the academic study of coups focus on an increasingly narrow type of military intervention in politics, the general public, governments, and international organizations frequently apply the coup label to a broader set of antidemocratic actions. This was dramatically illustrated after the overrunning of the US Capitol Building on January 6, 2021, when discussions of the event led to debates about whether or not it constituted a coup. More than a mere matter of semantics, describing an event as a coup can have analytical, normative, and practical implications. The scholars in this forum explore the challenges inherent in distinguishing coups from other types of antidemocratic actions, highlight gaps between academic and popular conceptions of the term, and identify ways in which scholars can productively contribute to public debates around contentious events.