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Considering computer contracting?If you are, then read this book. It explores the many aspects of the computer contracting world and gives sound practical advice to both the newcomer and the experienced contractor. It will also be invaluable if you are an employer wrestling with the perennial problem of finding staff in this highly competitive marketplace.Let this book show you how to break loose from being an employee to working freelance. The author, a freelancer himself, considers what it takes to become a contract worker and gives you invaluable information throughout to help you get start

AbstractI analyze a model of production in a competitive environment with heterogeneous firms. Efficient production requires individuals within the organization to take noncontractible actions for which rewards must be informally promised rather than contractually assured. The credibility of such promises originates from a firm's future competitive rents. In equilibrium, heterogeneous firms are heterogeneously constrained, and competitive rents are inefficiently concentrated at the top. I explore several policy and empirical implications of this result.

The New Legal Press and the Redefinition of the Legal Professions
This article describes the emergence in the late 1970s of three new American law journals and studies their influence on legal journalism, the law and the legal profession. By giving space to a much wider range of subjects than had previously been the case in the tradi-tional specialized press, and by adopting a more aggressive and irreverent tone, they revolutionized the whole notion of legal journalism and opened up a new era in law. In challenging the habits of secrecy and the traditional reserve of the old WASP legal elite, the new law press beeame the voice of a new, more commercial form of professionalism, which was needed at a time when the market was becoming more competitive. These new publications beeame prominent during a period of change in the legal professions in the United States, marked by the rationalization of production and the development of a sense of common interests among lawyers at national level.

This paper aims to improve the practical applicability of the classic theory of incentive contracts under moral hazard. We establish conditions under which the information provided by an A/B test of incentive contracts is sufficient for answering the question of how best to improve a status quo incentive contract, given a priori knowledge of the agent's monetary preferences. We assess the empirical relevance of this result using data from DellaVigna and Pope's (2018) study of a variety of incentive contracts. Finally, we discuss how our framework can be extended to incorporate additional considerations beyond those in the classic theory. (JEL D82, D86, D91)