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Abstract
What effect does judicializing international commitments have on incentives to comply with international law? We study this question using experiments embedded in a survey of the American public. We find that non-compliance signals from an international court work precisely as theories of non-compliance anticipate, raising perceptions of legal obligation and support for returning to compliance relative to non-compliance signals from foreign state parties (i.e., the "victims" in a given dispute). At the same time, we find that signals from courts are no more (and no less) effective in generating public support for returning to compliance than identical non-compliance signals sent by international organizations or domestic political elites. These results suggest that courts are not uniquely positioned to shape the politics of compliance and that the often-rancorous debates over institutional design may be just as much about conflicts over institutional control as they are about conflicts over institutional forms or labels.

AbstractWe study how international status concerns among the public affect support for political leaders, arguing that because status competition is pervasive in social life and because international status competition entails high‐profile displays of scientific or martial savvy, the public is likely to be attuned to the status implications of foreign policy crises. We test this argument in seven survey experiments across four issue areas. The results show that adverse outcomes in world affairs increase expectations of international status loss and, through that mechanism, reduce presidential approval. Analysis of open‐ended survey responses reveals that the public views international status in much the same way that international relations scholars do: it is multidimensional, positional, and instrumentally useful. Taken together, our results suggest that the public's international status concerns have significant implications for leaders and offer new insight into how the public parses the implications of events abroad.

AbstractAs international trade flourishes, Americans can choose from an increasing number of foreign products even at their local grocery stores, allowing consumers to directly experience the consequences of globalized trade in a simple and intuitive way that does not require much political expertise. Yet, most prior scholarship on political consumerism assumes that consumers are aware of the political and economic implications of their choices at the checkout lane. We move away from this assumption, focusing instead on more fundamental psychological predispositions such as ethnocentrism that may guide daily consumer choices. Using a discrete choice conjoint experiment, we show that Americans, on average, exhibit ethnocentric consumer preferences, with demand for products falling as they are produced in more culturally and ethnically distant places. Additionally, we show that this effect is more pronounced among those with higher levels of ethnocentrism. Our results provide evidence for a "naïve" form of political consumerism.

We study how informing the public about the views of international policy experts shapes public support for international cooperation. Using survey experiments, we test whether variation in levels of support among experts with differing types of domain-specific knowledge can shape public support for a recent and politically salient international treaty: the UNFCCC COP21 Paris Climate Agreement. Our results show that the public is, under certain conditions, deferential to the views of experts, with respondents reporting increasingly higher levels of support for the COP21 agreement as support among experts increased. In addition, we provide suggestive evidence that domain-specific expertise matters: When it comes to support for the COP21 agreement, the public is most sensitive to the views of climate scientists, while exposure to the views of international relations and international economics experts have less dramatic and less consistent effects. Despite these results, we find that it is exposing the public to information about opposition to a proposed treaty among members of relevant epistemic communities that has greatest and most consistent effects. Our findings thus provide new insight into the conditions under which epistemic communities can shape public support for particular policy alternatives.

ABSTRACTZigerell (this issue) cites the findings of his recent reanalysis (Zigerell 2015) of the data in our 2013 study of the gender citation gap in the international relations literature to support his claim that our study showed a "preference for statistically-significant results." We thank Zigerell for so closely engaging with our work. However, we note that he is focused on how his changes to our sample affect a single model in our original paper, highlight the fact that we reported statistically insignificant results when they arose in our original analyses, and review the findings of other recent re-analyses of our data. Ultimately, while we disagree with Zigerell's conclusions about our work, we join Zigerell in calling for greater diversity in the discipline.

What does the decline in paradigmatic self-identification mean for how international relations (IR) scholars think about the world? We answer this question with a 2020 survey among nearly two thousand IR scholars. We uncover a two-dimensional latent theoretical belief space based on scholarly agreement with conjectures about the state, ideas, international institutions, domestic politics, globalization, and racism. The first dimension separates status quo–oriented scholars from more critical scholars. The second dimension captures the realist–institutionalist divide. We have three key findings. First, non-paradigmatic scholars vary greatly in their theoretical beliefs. Second, measurement invariance tests show that there is a similar structure underlying the beliefs of paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic scholars. Third, we find no evidence that non-paradigmatic scholars rely less on their theoretical beliefs in making predictions about conflict, institutions, political economy, democracy, and human rights. Instead, the positions of scholars in the two-dimensional theoretical belief space rather than self-assigned paradigmatic labels correlate with predictions about the world. Our findings suggest that non-paradigmatic scholars are not so different from self-identified Liberals, Constructivists, and Realists, although the decline of paradigmatic self-identification may still matter for how scholars organize debates and disciplinary divides.

Abstract
What does the decline in paradigmatic self-identification mean for how international relations (IR) scholars think about the world? We answer this question with a 2020 survey among nearly two thousand IR scholars. We uncover a two-dimensional latent theoretical belief space based on scholarly agreement with conjectures about the state, ideas, international institutions, domestic politics, globalization, and racism. The first dimension separates status quo–oriented scholars from more critical scholars. The second dimension captures the realist–institutionalist divide. We have three key findings. First, non-paradigmatic scholars vary greatly in their theoretical beliefs. Second, measurement invariance tests show that there is a similar structure underlying the beliefs of paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic scholars. Third, we find no evidence that non-paradigmatic scholars rely less on their theoretical beliefs in making predictions about conflict, institutions, political economy, democracy, and human rights. Instead, the positions of scholars in the two-dimensional theoretical belief space rather than self-assigned paradigmatic labels correlate with predictions about the world. Our findings suggest that non-paradigmatic scholars are not so different from self-identified Liberals, Constructivists, and Realists, although the decline of paradigmatic self-identification may still matter for how scholars organize debates and disciplinary divides.

AbstractThis article investigates the extent to which citation and publication patterns differ between men and women in the international relations (IR) literature. Using data from the Teaching, Research, and International Policy project on peer-reviewed publications between 1980 and 2006, we show that women are systematically cited less than men after controlling for a large number of variables including year of publication, venue of publication, substantive focus, theoretical perspective, methodology, tenure status, and institutional affiliation. These results are robust to a variety of modeling choices. We then turn to network analysis to investigate the extent to which the gender of an article's author affects that article's relative centrality in the network of citations between papers in our sample. Articles authored by women are systematically less central than articles authored by men, all else equal. This is likely because (1) women tend to cite themselves less than men, and (2) men (who make up a disproportionate share of IR scholars) tend to cite men more than women. This is the first study in political science to reveal significant gender differences in citation patterns and is especially meaningful because citation counts are increasingly used as a key measure of research's quality and impact.

There is a widening divide between the data, tools, and knowledge that international relations scholars produce and what policy practitioners find relevant for their work. In this first-of-its-kind conversation, leading academics and practitioners reflect on the nature and size of the theory-practice divide. They find the gap varies by issue area and over time. The essays in this volume use data gathered by the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project over a fifteen-year period. As a whole, the volume analyzes the structural factors that affect the academy's ability to influence policy across issue areas and the professional incentives that affect scholars' willingness to attempt to do so. Individual chapters explore these questions in the areas of trade, finance, human rights, development, environment, nuclear weapons and strategy, interstate war, and intrastate conflict. Each substantive chapter is followed by a response from a policy practitioner, providing their perspective on the gap and the possibility for academic work to have an impact.Bridging the Theory-Practice Divide in International Relations provides concrete answers and guidance about how and when scholarship can be policy relevant.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Explaining the Theory-Practice Divide in International Relations: Uncertainty and Access -- 2 Rights and Wrongs: Human Rights at the Intersection of the International Relations Academy and Practice -- 3 Closing the Influence Gap: How to Get Better Alignment of Scholars and Practitioners on Human Rights -- 4 The Study and Practice of Global Environmental Politics: Policy Influence through Participation -- 5 The Limits of Scholarly Influence on Global Environmental Policy -- 6 Mind the Gap? Links between Policy and Academic Research of Foreign Aid -- 7 Making Academic Research on Foreign Aid More Policy Relevant -- 8 Trade Policy and Trade Policy Research -- 9 Making International Relations Research on Trade More Relevant to Policy Officials -- 10 Is International Relations Relevant for International Money and Finance? -- 11 Is International Relations Relevant for International Monetary and Financial Policy? Reflections of an Economist -- 12 Lost in Translation: Academics, Policymakers, and Research about Interstate Conflict -- 13 Reflections from an Erstwhile Policymaker -- 14 The Weakest Link? Scholarship and Policy on Intrastate Conflict -- 15 On the Challenge of Assessing Scholarly Influence on Intrastate Conflict Policy -- 16 The Bumpy Road to a "Science" of Nuclear Strategy -- 17 Academia's Influence on National Security Policy: What Works and What Doesn't? -- 18 Supply- and Demand-Side Explanations for the Theory-Practice Divide -- References -- Contributors -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.