This study deals with the impact of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis on the ethnic identity of resident migrants in Germany. To derive plausibly causal estimates, I exploit the quasiexperimental setting in Germany, by which refugees are allocated to different counties by state authorities without being able to choose their locations themselves. This study finds that higher shares of refugees in a county increased migrants' attachment to their home countries, while not affecting their perceived belonging to Germany. Further analyses uncover strong heterogeneities with respect to country of origin and immigrant characteristics and suggest that the observed effects may be primarily driven by experiences of discrimination and the consumption of foreign media. Lastly, I find that changes in ethnic identity coincide with the political polarization of migrants. These results have various policy implications in terms of the dispersal of asylum seekers, the modes of communication with different migrant groups and the importance of antidiscrimination measures.
This study deals with the impact of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis on the ethnic identity of resident migrants in Germany. To derive plausibly causal estimates, I exploit the quasiexperimental setting in Germany, by which refugees are allocated to different counties by state authorities without being able to choose their locations themselves. This study finds that higher shares of refugees in a county increased migrants' attachment to their home countries, while not affecting their perceived belonging to Germany. Further analyses uncover strong heterogeneities with respect to country of origin and immigrant characteristics and suggest that the observed effects may be primarily driven by experiences of discrimination and the consumption of foreign media. Lastly, I find that changes in ethnic identity coincide with the political polarization of migrants. These results have various policy implications in terms of the dispersal of asylum seekers, the modes of communication with different migrant groups and the importance of antidiscrimination measures.
This study deals with the impact of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis on the ethnic identity of resident migrants in Germany. To derive plausibly causal estimates, I exploit the quasi-experimental setting in Germany, by which refugees are allocated to different counties by state authorities without being able to choose their locations themselves. This study finds that higher shares of refugees in a county increased migrants' attachment to their home countries, while not affecting their perceived belonging to Germany. Further analyses uncover strong heterogeneities with respect to country of origin and immigrant characteristics and suggest that the observed effects may be primarily driven by experiences of discrimination and the consumption of foreign media. Lastly, I find that changes in ethnic identity coincide with the political polarization of migrants. These results have various policy implications in terms of the dispersal of asylum seekers, the modes of communication with different migrant groups and the importance of antidiscrimination measures.
This study deals with the impact of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis on the ethnic identity of resident migrants in Germany. To derive plausibly causal estimates, I exploit the quasiexperimental setting in Germany, by which refugees are allocated to different counties by state authorities without being able to choose their locations themselves. This study finds that higher shares of refugees in a county increased migrants' attachment to their home countries, while not affecting their perceived belonging to Germany. Further analyses uncover strong heterogeneities with respect to country of origin and immigrant characteristics and suggest that the observed effects may be primarily driven by experiences of discrimination and the consumption of foreign media. Lastly, I find that changes in ethnic identity coincide with the political polarization of migrants. These results have various policy implications in terms of the dispersal of asylum seekers, the modes of communication with different migrant groups and the importance of antidiscrimination measures.
[Einleitung] Vor zehn Jahren erreichte die globale Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise ihren Höhepunkt. Als am 15. September 2008 die bereits angeschlagene Investmentbank Lehman Brothers in die Insolvenz ging, wurde aus dem Schwelbrand an den Finanzmärkten ein Flächenbrand. Schon zuvor hatte es aufgrund der fallenden Immobilienpreise Probleme bei Banken und anderen Finanzinstituten gegeben, doch mit der Lehman-Pleite gab es einen regelrechten Brandbeschleuniger. Die Folgen waren verheerend. Banken in mehreren Industrieländern gerieten reihenweise in Schieflage, viele von ihnen mussten staatlich gestützt werden. Die Weltkonjunktur kippte, weil viele Unternehmen und Verbraucher aus Sorge vor den Folgen des Flächenbrandes auf den Finanzmärkten ihre Ausgaben drosselten. Das deutsche Wachstum brach um rund 5 % ein - ein einmaliges Ereignis im Nachkriegsdeutschland. Weltweit schnürten Regierungen umfangreiche Konjunkturpakete, um den einbrechenden Aus gaben im Privatsektor entgegenzuwirken. Die Notenbanken reagierten mit drastischen Zinssenkungen und legten damit den Grundstein für eine jahrelang anhaltende ultra-expansive Geldpolitik. Mit den Konjunkturprogrammen und den direkten Hilfen für angeschlagene Finanzinstitute (einschließlich Verstaatlichungen) haben die Regierungen schwere finanzielle Lasten auf sich genommen. Teile der zuvor privaten Schulden wurden in öffentliche Schulden umgewandelt. Der daraus resultierende drastische Anstieg der in manchen Fällen vorher schon hohen Staatsschulden hat bei vielen Marktteilnehmern und in der Bevölkerung die Sorge vor massiver Inflation, Staatsbankrotten und sogar Währungsreformen ausgelöst. Vielen Beobachtern erschien die Situation ausweglos. Wir haben die weit verbreiteten Sorgen schon im Jahr 2009 zum Anlass genommen, uns in unserer Studienreihe Strategie 2030 intensiv mit dem Thema Staatsverschuldung auseinanderzusetzen. Der Tenor unserer Analyse war damals, dass die Situation des Finanzsystems und der öffentlichen Finanzen zwar sehr ernst ist, dass es aber Wege aus der Krise gibt, ohne dass es zu den befürchteten Staatsbankrotten, Währungsreformen oder Hyperinflationen kommen muss. Zehn Jahre später wissen wir, dass die Untergangsszenarien ausgeblieben sind. Staatsbankrotte gab es - mit Ausnahme Griechenlands - nicht. Währungsreformen sind ebenfalls ausgeblieben. Auch der zwischenzeitlich unter einer schweren Vertrauenskrise leidende Euro ist nicht zerbrochen. Und eine nennenswerte Verbraucherpreisinflation hat es bis heute in den großen Industrienationen nicht gegeben. In den vergangenen Jahren ging es für die Notenbanken eher darum, eine Deflation - also das Gegenteil von Inflation - zu verhindern. Ist diese positive Bilanz lediglich eine Momentaufnahme oder gibt es gute Gründe für eine Entwarnung? Drohen die mühsam erarbeiteten Erfolge bei der Stabilisierung der Staatsfinanzen im nächsten Konjunkturabschwung wieder wegzubrechen? Was geschieht, wenn das Zinsniveau eines Tages deutlich anzieht? Und droht eine neue Schuldenkrise, wenn hoch verschuldete Länder wie Italien die mühsam erarbeiteten Reformerfolge durch einen erneuten wirtschaftspolitischen Schwenk zunichtemachen? Wir möchten diesen Fragen in der vorliegenden Studie nachgehen. Dabei werden wir den Status quo beleuchten und skizzieren, wo neue Gefahren lauern und woher ein neuerliches Aufflackern der Schuldenkrise kommen könnte.
[Introduction] Ten years ago, the global economic and financial crisis was at its peak. When ailing investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for insolvency on 15 September 2008, the smouldering crisis on the financial markets became a full-scale firestorm. While falling real estate prices had already been causing problems for banks and other financial institutions, it was the Lehman collapse that fanned the flames of the disaster. The consequences were devastating. In several industrial countries, bank after bank was plunged into financial turmoil, and several had to be propped up by the state. The global economy was upended, with many companies and consumers cutting back on spending because of concerns about the consequences of the crisis on the financial markets. Growth in Germany collapsed by roughly 5%, something that had never before been seen in the post-war era. Governments around the world drew up extensive economic stimulus packages in a bid to counter the collapse of private sector spending. Central banks responded with drastic interest cuts, thus laying the foundations for an ultra-expansive monetary policy that would persist for several years. With the economic stimulus measures and the direct aid for troubled financial institutions (including nationalisation), national governments took on a heavy financial burden. Parts of what had been private debt were converted into public debt. The resulting dramatic rise in sovereign debt, which in some cases had already been running at a high level, caused many market participants and the general public to fear huge inflation, state bankruptcy and even currency reforms. A large number of observers described the situation as hopeless. It was this widespread concern that prompted us, back in 2009, to take an in-depth look at the topic of sovereign debt as part of our Strategy 2030 series. The tenor of our analysis at the time was that while the situation in the financial system and with public finances was very serious, there were ways out of the crisis without having to resort to the state bankruptcies, currency reforms or hyperinflation that people feared. Ten years on, we now know that these doomsday prophecies did not come true. With the exception of Greece, there were no state bankruptcies. Similarly, there was no need for currency reforms. Even the euro, which suffered a severe loss of trust in the interim, did not implode. And there has still not been any significant consumer price inflation in the major industrial countries. In fact, in recent years central banks have been more concerned with preventing deflation. So is this positive outcome merely a »snapshot« of the current moment in time, or is there good reason to suggest that we have weathered the crisis? Is there a risk that these painstakingly achieved successes in stabilising state finances could be lost again the next time the economy takes a nose-dive? What happens if interest rates one day start to spike? And is there a threat of a new debt crisis if highly indebted countries such as Italy destroy the tediously crafted reform successes with another departure in economic policy? These are the questions we want to examine in this study. We will shed some light on the status quo and outline the areas that could pose new risks with the ability to reignite the debt crisis.
