Suchergebnisse

Governments and non-governmental organizations promote school-based financial literacy programs as means to instill financial behaviors that can persist through adulthood. We conduct a randomized trial of two financial literacy education programs in government-run Ghanaian primary and junior high schools. The first integrated both financial and social education, while the second included only financial education. Our study finds that after nine months, both programs had positive impacts on self-reported savings at school relative to the control group, but there were no statistically significant increases in aggregate savings nor in hypothesized mechanisms such as attitudes, preferences, or knowledge. The financial education-only treatment led to a weakly statistically significant increase in child labor relative to the control group, although the difference in impact between the two treatment groups was not statistically significant. The lack of short-term effects of these programs on financial behaviors and attitudes indicate that alternative program designs should be evaluated to understand whether and how these outcomes can be influenced among students in this age group.

We evaluate, using a randomized trial, two school-based financial literacy education programs in government-run primary and junior high schools in Ghana. One program integrated financial and social education, whereas the second program only offered financial education. Both programs included a voluntary after-school savings club that provided students with a locked money box. After nine months, both programs had significant impacts on savings behavior relative to the control group, mostly because children moved savings from home to school. We observed few other impacts. We do find that financial education, when not accompanied by social education, led children to work more compared to the control group, whereas no such effect is found for the integrated curriculum; however, the difference between the two treatment effects on child labor is not statistically significant.

We examine the marginal effects of decentralized public health spending by incorporating estimates of behavioural responses to changes in health spending in benefit incidence analysis. The analysis is based on a panel dataset of 207 Indonesian districts over the period from 2001 to 2004. We show that district public health spending is largely driven by central government transfers, with an elasticity of around 0.9. We find a positive effect of public health spending on utilization of outpatient care in the public sector for the poorest two quartiles. We find no evidence that public expenditures crowd out utilization of private services or household health spending. Our analysis suggests that increased public health spending improves targeting to the poor, as behavioural changes in public health care utilization are pro-poor. Nonetheless, most of the benefits of the additional spending accrued to existing users of services, as initial utilization shares outweigh the behavioural responses.

We examine the marginal effects of decentralized public health spending by incorporating estimates of behavioural responses to changes in health spending in benefit incidence analysis. The analysis is based on a panel dataset of 207 Indonesian districts over the period from 2001 to 2004. We show that district public health spending is largely driven by central government transfers, with an elasticity of around 0.9. We find a positive effect of public health spending on utilization of outpatient care in the public sector for the poorest two quartiles. We find no evidence that public expenditures crowd out utilization of private services or household health spending. Our analysis suggests that increased public health spending improves targeting to the poor, as behavioural changes in public health care utilization are pro-poor. Nonetheless, most of the benefits of the additional spending accrued to existing users of services, as initial utilization shares outweigh the behavioural responses.

We evaluate, using a randomized trial, two school-based financial literacy education programs in government-run primary and junior high schools in Ghana. One program integrated financial and social education, whereas the second program only offered financial education. Both programs included a voluntary after-school savings club that provided students with a locked money box. After nine months, both programs had significant impacts on savings behavior relative to the control group, mostly because children moved savings from home to school. We observed few other impacts. We do find that financial education, when not accompanied by social education, led children to work more compared to the control group, whereas no such effect is found for the integrated curriculum; however, the difference between the two treatment effects on child labor is not statistically significant.

Using a panel dataset of 320 Indonesian districts we examine the impact of district budgets on public health spending, utilization patters in the public and private sector, and private health spending in the four years after decentralization. We exploit the panel structure of the data and the fact that district budgets are largely driven by central government transfers to determine causal patterns. We find that the elasticity of public health spending with respect to district budgets is around 0.9 with a higher elasticity for development spending than for routine spending. District splits reduce public health spending. We find a positive effect of public district health spending on public sector utilization, with the strongest effects in the poorest two quintiles. We find no significant effects on private sector utilization and out of pocket health expenditures.

The Indonesian Social Safety Net health card program was implemented in response to the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in 1997, to preserve access to health care services for the poor. Health cards were allocated to poor households, entitling them to subsidized care from public health care providers. The providers received budgetary support to compensate for the extra demand. This article focuses on the effect of the program on primary outpatient health care use, disentangling the direct effect of allocating health cards from the indirect effect of government transfers to health care facilities. For poor health card owners the program resulted in a net increase in use of outpatient care, while for nonpoor health card owners the program resulted mainly in a substitution from private to public health care. The largest effect of the program seems to have come from a general increase in the supply of public services resulting from the budgetary support to public providers. These benefits seem to have been captured mainly by the nonpoor. As a result, most of the benefits of the health card program went to the nonpoor, even though distribution of the health cards was propoor. The results suggest that had the program, in addition to targeting the poor, established a closer link between provision of services to the target groups and funding, the overall results would have been more propoor.

The Indonesian Healthcard program was implemented in response to the economiccrisis, which hit Indonesia in 1998, in order to preserve access to health care servicesfor the poor. The Healthcard provided the households with subsidised care at publichealth care providers, while the providers themselves received budgetary support tocompensate for the extra demand. This papers_new looks at the impact of this program onoutpatient care utilisation, and, in particular, endeavours to disentangle the directeffect of the allocation of Healthcards from the indirect effect of the transfer of fundsto health care facilities. It finds that the program resulted in a net increase inutilisation for the poor beneficiaries. Por non-poor beneficiaries the program resultedin a substitution from private to public providers only. However, the largest effect ofthe program seems to have come from a general increase in the quality of publicservices resulting from the budgetary support they received through this program.

On the basis of the baseline data collected for the evaluation of the Bolivian Social Investment Fund (SIF) this paper assesses (1) the benefit incidence of the SIF and (2) the quality of the evaluation design. We find that the benefits in education are most equally distributed over the population, the investments in health and sanitation favor those relatively well off. For the education component of the SIF, control groups of schools which will not receive benefits have been included in the survey. In one region theseschools where selected on the basis of matched comparison on the basis of observed characteristics, in the other region by means of randomization. We compare control and treatment groups and conclude there is a systematic bias in favor of treatment schools in the first region. We propose to use instrumental variables to control for the non-random selection. With the pre-intervention data we can test whether an instrument is valid. We find that among several candidates the number of NGOs (non governmental organizations)in the community is a valid instrument. Next, we investigate the possible loss of efficiency in the estimate of the impact due to the non experimental control group design.