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AbstractThis paper explores hypotheses that could explain both the creation of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in Brazil, and the differences in the design of the Brazilian IRAs in the telecommunications and electricity sectors. To formulate specific hypotheses that make sense of the Brazilian case, the paper critically interrogates the "weak state" hypothesis and the "political bias" hypothesis. The first argues that countries with flawed governance structures, such as Latin American countries, are less likely to establish independent regulators than European countries. The second argues that "political bias" is a determinant factor in predicting the implementation of IRAs in Latin America. The first part of the paper uses these two general hypotheses as a basis to formulate specific hypotheses to explain the creation of IRAs in Brazil. The second part of the paper formulates specific hypotheses that could explain why institutional guarantees of IRA independence are stronger in the telecommunications sector, than in the electricity sector. In particular, the paper argues in support of a revised version of the "political bias" hypothesis to explain sectoral divergence, suggesting that bureaucratic resistance to reform may be the cause for the variations observed in Brazil between regulatory reform in electricity and in telecommunications.

Abstract Since democratization, Brazil has established a robust network of accountability institutions that perform a myriad of functions in combating corruption. While there is empirical research on the inner workings of the Brazilian accountability network, many questions remain unanswered and many dimensions of the interactions between institutions in this system have yet to be analyzed and uncovered. This paper argues that the accountability literature can benefit from further descriptive empirical studies, especially detailed analyses that account for empirical differences in norms, procedures and sanctions. To promote this type of granular empirical analysis, we formulate a research agenda for the Brazilian accountability system, arguing that the concept of institutional multiplicity has much to offer in this endeavour. Considering the difficulty in capturing the complexity of Brazil's vast network of accountability institutions in a single paper, we focus on the accountability systems for civil servants working for the federal executive branch. Despite being focused on a particular dimension of the accountability system, we hope that the topics proposed here can inform research questions about other areas of the system as well.

"PREFACE: Over the past three decades, a substantial consensus has emerged among development scholars and development agencies that the quality of a country's institutions

Institutional bypass is a reform strategy that creates alternative institutional regimes to give citizens a choice of service provider and create a form of competition between the dominant institution and the institutional bypass. While novel in the academic literature, the concept captures practices already being used in developing countries. In this illuminating book, Mariana Mota Prado and Michael J. Trebilcock explore the strengths and limits of this strategy with detailed case studies, showing how citizen preferences provide a benchmark against which future reform initiatives can be evaluated, and in this way change the dynamics of the reform process. While not a 'silver bullet' to the challenge of institutional reform, institutional bypasses add to the portfolio of strategies to promote development. This work should be read by development researchers, scholars, policymakers, and anyone else seeking options on how to promote change and implement reforms in developing countries around the world.

This important book focuses on the idea that institutions matter for development, asking what lessons we have learned from past reform efforts, and what role lawyers can play in this field. What Makes Poor Countries Poor? provides a critical overview of different conceptions and theories of development, situating institutional theories within the larger academic debate on development. The book also discusses why, whether and how institutions matter in different fields of development. In the domestic sphere, the authors answer these questions by analyzing institutional reforms in the public (ru