Suchergebnisse

The main aim of our paper is to discuss the influence of the different forms of the workers' participation on the power of management and experts in carrying out the restructuring of the Slovenian firms. The firms with the strongest influence of the management and the experts resulted to be more successful in developing the strategic way of thinking, to have clearer and more defined strategies and goals and to adapt better to the international competition. Our empirical analysis further confirms the hypothesis that the management and experts have a stronger influence in the firms with higher internal ownership, younger management and in those that have successfully implemented the intra‐firm bargaining. On the other hand, the management and experts' power is negatively correlated with the percentage of the workers' representatives on the Supervisory Board.

In this paper we present and test a theory of how political corruption, found in many transition and emerging market economies, affects corporate governance and productive efficiency of firms. Our model predicts that underdeveloped democratic institutions that do not punish political corruption result in political connectedness of firms that in turn has a negative effect on performance. We test this prediction on an almost complete population of Slovenian joint stock companies with 100 or more employees. Using the supervisory board structure, together with balance sheet and income statement data for 2000-2010, we show that a higher share of politically connected supervisory board members leads to lower productivity.