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This article aims to analyze the principles of Sartre's ontology. Starting from the discussion about the foundation and the separation between being and nothingness, and being and phenomenon, we try to emphasize the synthetic unity of such principles from the finitude and the individual. This movement allows us to understand the practical character of this philosophy and the proper form of Sartre's ontology, namely as an existential anthropology.

This article aims to analyze the notion of finitude in Sartre's work as a basis for the existential anthropology developed in it. Going from Being and Nothingness to the last interviews, we discuss this thesis based on the analyses, above all, by Bornheim, Moutinho and Mészáros. For this, at first it discusses the relationship between being, finitude and negation. In a second moment, we associate the notion of finitude with that of singularity and how the relationship between ontology, history and existential psychoanalysis is established through it. Finally, we assess the game of irreducibles as the dynamic that underlies existential anthropology.

This article aims to analyze in Sartre's philosophy the notion of personalization. Inserted in the framework of existential psychoanalysis, this notion elucidates about the original choice and the existential project. Since his first works, Sartre has presented an impersonal transcendental conscience, so that freedom as nadification is independent of psychic life. We want to demonstrate that from the development of existential psychoanalysis freedom is not separated from the notion of personalization, but presupposes it due to the finitude condition of freedom. In this case, although it presupposes an impersonal transcendental field, freedom can only be apprehended concretely through personalization. This presupposes a necessary relationship between ontology and existential psychoanalysis in the elucidation of freedom, history, and the man.

This article aims to analyze in Sartre's philosophy the relation between the subjectivities from the notion of understanding. Differentiating knowledge of understanding, Sartre proposes that by understanding it is possible to apprehend subjectivity without making it an objective knowledge. Although he points this in several of his studies is the conference on Kierkegaard that this thesis becomes more manifest. In this article we try to demonstrate that this thesis modifies a whole perception about the freedom, so that it as a singularity has a transhistorical dimension, at the same time that it can only be taken, in its own finitude, by understanding. This thesis does not contradict those of the ontology, but, rightly, legitimates the Being as finitude. Finally, freedom is not denoted as an objective knowledge, but as an invitation to understanding ourselves.

This article aims to analyze the notion of creation in Sartre's thought. This notion is not predominant in the first texts. We try to demonstrate their place in the philosopher's thinking. First, we turn to the text Cahiers pour une morale where such a notion occupies a fundamental place. Then, we show how this analysis is resumed in the Critique of Raison Dialectique. This analysis will explain the content of creation as a process of singularization so that the being of the individual or his freedom is taken as a singular quality, this is, as meaning of being while it is finitude. Finally, this configuration alludes to relations according to his gift and generosity as existence in the world.

This article aims to analyze one of Mészáros' criticisms of Sartre, that is, the negative determination of totality. Starting from the distinction between real and unreal, we return to the discussion between the real and the imaginary and indicate a third element, the possible, as the texture of the real. The possible characterizes the real as a movement and denotes this as a totalization. Thus, always as process and possibility, the real and the total are understood according to the freedom of the subject.