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The legacy of the Pinochet regime ; El legado del régimen de Pinochet
Chile ha vivido más de treinta años de democracia a la sombra de la dictadura de diecisiete años liderada por Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). Este capítulo ofrece una descripción general de los legados dictatoriales con énfasis en la distribución del poder económico y político, como se ve en la literatura económica más reciente. También describimos las oleadas de descontento que han intentado suprimir los legados más importantes durante los últimos veinte años. Terminamos con una discusión sobre el camino actual del cambio institucional que podría poner fin al legado de Pinochet. ; Chile has experienced more than thirty years of democracy at the shadow of the seventeen-year dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). This chapter provides an overview of the dictatorial legacies with an emphasis on the distribution of economic and political power, as viewed from the most recent literature in economics. We also describe the waves of discontent which have attempted to suppress the most important legacies during the past twenty years. We end with a discussion of the current path of institutional change that could put Pinochet's legacy to an end.
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Corruption and Firms
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Working paper
Corruption and Firms
In: https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/20334
We estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anti-corruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil over the period 2003-2014. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities experience an increase in economic activity concentrated in sectors most dependent on government relationships. These effects spill over to nearby municipalities and are larger when the audits are covered by the media. Back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest that $1 away from corruption generates more than $3 in local value added. Using administrative matched employer-employee and firm-level datasets and novel face-to-face firm surveys we argue that corruption mostly acts as a barrier to entry, and by introducing costs and distortions on local government-dependent firms. The political misallocation of resources across firms plays a seemingly secondary role, indicating that at the local level most rents are captured by politicians and public officials rather than firms.
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The Value of Political Capital : Dictatorship Collaborators as Business Elites
In: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/14297
What is the value of political capital for individuals? Towards the end of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, military and civilian collaborators entered the business elite, controlling the largest and most important firms in the country. Using a novel panel dataset of board members in these firms, we document a work premium for those who had previously collaborated with Pinochet. After democratization, however, collaborators were removed from boards and their compensation premium disappeared, suggesting that the value of their networks depreciated. To shed light on these findings, we study military personnel before, during, and after Pinochet and find evidence of a wage premium only during the dictatorship. We interpret these results as Pinochet favoring his collaborators while he was in power.
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Working paper
Can Television Bring Down a Dictator? Evidence from Chile's "No" Campaign
Can televised political advertising change voting behavior in elections held in authoritarian regimes? We study the case of Chile, where the opposition used television campaigns weeks before the election that ended the Pinochet regime. We show that after campaigns were launched, firms linked to Pinochet lost stock market value, confirming the contemporaneous importance of television. Using national surveys conducted before the election and administrative electoral data, we provide evidence of a positive effect of television exposure on opposition votes. These results suggest that televised political campaigns can help to defeat dictators at the polls.
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Working paper
Losing Your Dictator : Firms During Political Transition
In: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/14296
Can firms transfer distortions across political regimes? To answer this question, we use a novel dataset and a network analysis to study firms during Chile's transition to democracy. We find that firms with links to the dictatorship were relatively unproductive before the transition, increased their productive capacity, enjoyed higher profits, and obtained more loans from state-owned banks during political transition. We test for different explanations and provide suggestive evidence consistent with strategic behavior aiming to improve their market position in democracy. These results suggests that distortions can be transferred across political regimes.
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The limits of hegemony: U.S. banks and Chilean firms in the Cold War
In: Journal of development economics, Band 166, S. 103212
ISSN: 0304-3878
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Lost in transition? The persistence of dictatorship mayors
In: Journal of development economics, Band 151, S. 102669
ISSN: 0304-3878
Lost in Transition? The Persistence of Dictatorship Mayors
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Working paper
Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations
In: American economic review, Band 110, Heft 10, S. 3071-3099
ISSN: 1944-7981
In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals. (JEL D72, D73, J45, O17)