Although Latin American migrants to the United States, particularly Mexicans, are typically portrayed as poor and uneducated, some, such as Peruvians, are disproportionately well educated compared to those who never left their countries. This article examines who emigrates and why by comparing migrants' selectivity from Mexico and Peru. Using the Peruvian data of the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP), collected in five communities in Lima between 2001 and 2005, and comparable data for twelve urban communities from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), the authors compare the determinants of out-migration from these two countries. The results show that the difference in migrant selectivity is not so much attributable to migrants' legal status, urban versus rural origins, demographic background, or geographic distance. Rather, a crucial difference lies in the nature of migrant networks, or how networks develop over time and how migrants utilize networks in migrating.
Analysis of the impact of international migration on the socioeconomic conditions of migrants and their families in Peru, using data from the Latin American Migration Project, suggests that international migration contributes to individuals' socioeconomic well-being. While those who migrate tend to come from relatively privileged backgrounds in the first place, they gain further relative economic advantage by moving out of the country. A possible implication of this is that the growing international migration observed today is likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the already uneven distribution of income and rigid socioeconomic hierarchy in Peru.
Although Latin American migrants to the United States, particularly Mexicans, are typically portrayed as poor & uneducated, some, such as Peruvians, are disproportionately well educated compared to those who never left their countries. This article examines who emigrates & why by comparing migrants' selectivity from Mexico & Peru. Using the Peruvian data of the Latin American Migration Project (LAMP), collected in five communities in Lima between 2001 & 2005, & comparable data for twelve urban communities from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), the authors compare the determinants of out-migration from these two countries. The results show that the difference in migrant selectivity is not so much attributable to migrants' legal status, urban versus rural origins, demographic background, or geographic distance. Rather, a crucial difference lies in the nature of migrant networks, or how networks develop over time & how migrants utilize networks in migrating. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]
Immigration reforms in the United States initiated in the 1960s are widely thought to have opened the door to mass immigration from Asia and Latin America by eliminating past discriminatory policies. While this may be true for Asians, it is not the case for Latin Americans, who faced more restrictions to legal migration after 1965 than before. The boom in Latin American migration occurred in spite of rather than because of changes in US immigration law. In this article we describe how restrictions placed on the legal entry of Latin Americans, and especially Mexicans, set off a chain of events that in the ensuing decades had the paradoxical effect of producing more rather than fewer Latino immigrants. We offer an explanation for how and why Latinos in the United States, in just 40 years, increased from 9.6 million people and 5 percent of the population to 51 million people and 16 percent of the population, and why so many are now present without authorization.
Over the past four decades, the Latino population of the United States was transformed from a small, ethnically segmented population of Mexicans in the southwest, Puerto Ricans in New York, and Cubans in Miami into a large national population dominated by Mexicans, Central Americans, and South Americans. This transformation occurred through mass immigration, much of it undocumented, to the point where large fractions of non-Caribbean Hispanics lack legal protections and rights in the United States. Rising illegality is critical to understanding the disadvantaged status of Latinos today. The unauthorized population began to grow after avenues for legal entry were curtailed in 1965. The consequent rise in undocumented migration enabled political and bureaucratic entrepreneurs to frame Latino migration as a grave threat to the nation, leading to a rising frequency of negative framings in the media, a growing conservative reaction, and increasingly restrictive immigration and border policies that generated more apprehensions. Rising apprehensions, in turn, further enflamed the conservative reaction to produce even harsher enforcement and more still more apprehensions, yielding a self-feeding cycle in which apprehensions kept rising even though undocumented inflows had stabilized. The consequent militarization of the border had the perverse effect of reducing rates of out-migration rather than inhibiting in-migration, leading to a sharp rise in net undocumented population and rapid growth of the undocumented population. As a result, a majority of Mexican, Central American, and South American immigrants are presently undocumented at a time when unauthorized migrants are subject to increasing sanctions from authorities and the public, yielding down-ward pressure on the status and well-being of Latinos in the United States.
This article analyzes migratory flows and labor outcomes for temporary migrants from Mexico who participate in the H-2A visa program in the United States and the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program in Canada. Using data from the Mexican Migration Project, we analyze the determinants of taking a first trip to each country with temporary work documents, the financial and labor circumstances that migrants experience while working abroad, and the factors that determine the likelihood and amount of money sent home to Mexico as remittances or held onto and brought home to Mexico as savings. We find that temporary agricultural workers migrating to both countries come from rural backgrounds, but those working in the United States earn higher wages and experience shorter workdays than those in Canada. Nevertheless, total annual work hours and earnings are quite similar for both groups of migrants. We observe few differences between the two groups in remittance amounts sent home, but find that temporary workers in the United States return home with more savings than do those working in Canada.
Although Salvadoran emigration to the United States is one of the most important migratory flows emanating from Latin America, there is insufficient information about the predictors of first unauthorized migration from El Salvador to the United States. In this study, we use data from the Latin American Migration Project–El Salvador (LAMP-ELS4) to perform an event history analysis to discern the factors that influenced the likelihood that a Salvadoran household head would take a first unauthorized trip to the United States between 1965 and 2007. We take into account a series of demographic, social capital, human capital, and physical capital characteristics of the Salvadoran household head; demographic and social context variables in the place of origin; as well as economic and border security factors at the place of destination.Our findings suggest that an increase in the Salvadoran civil violence index and a personal economic crisis increased the likelihood of first-time unauthorized migration. Salvadorans who were less likely to take a first unauthorized trip were business owners, those employed in skilled occupations, and persons with more years of experience in the labor force. Contextual variables in the United States, such as a high unemployment rate and an increase in the Border Patrol budget, deterred the decision to take a first unauthorized trip. Finally, social capital had no effect on the decision to migrate; this means that for unauthorized Salvadoran migrants, having contacts in the United States is not the main driver to start a migration journey to the United States.We suggest as policy recommendations that the United States should award Salvadorans more work-related visas or asylum protection. For those Salvadorans whose Temporary Protected Status (TPS) has ended, the United States should allow them to apply for permanent residency. The decision not to continue to extend TPS to Salvadorans will only increase the number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States. The United States needs to revise its current immigration policies, which make it a very difficult and/or extremely lengthy process for Salvadorans and other immigrants to regularize their current immigration status in the United States. Furthermore, because of our research findings, we recommend that the Salvadoran government — to discourage out-migration — invest in high-skilled job training and also offer training and credit opportunities to its population to encourage business ventures.
Linking municipal-level homicide rates from 1990 through 2018 with data from the Mexican Migration Project, we estimate a series of multinomial discrete-time event history models to assess the effect that exposure to lethal violence has on the likelihood of migration within Mexico and to the U.S. without documents. Statistical estimates indicate that the homicide rate negatively predicts the probability of taking a first undocumented trip to the U.S. but positively predicts the likelihood of taking a first trip within Mexico. Among those undocumented migrants, who have already taken a first U.S. trip, lethal violence also negatively predicts the likelihood of taking a second undocumented trip. Among returned internal migrants whose first trip was to a Mexican destination, the odds of taking a first undocumented trip were also negatively predicted by the municipal homicide rate. Violence in Mexico is not a driver of undocumented migration to the U.S.
A majority of Mexican and Central Americans living in the United States today are undocumented or living in a marginal, temporary legal status. This article is a comparative analysis of how Mexican and non-Mexican Latino immigrants fare in the U.S. labor market. We show that despite higher levels of human capital and a higher class background among non-Mexican migrants, neither they nor Mexican migrants have fared very well in the United States. Over the past four decades, the real value of their wages has fallen across the board, and both Mexican and non-Mexican migrant workers experience wage penalties because they are in liminal legal categories. With Latinos now composing 17 percent of the U.S. population and 25 percent of births, the precariousness of their labor market position should be a great concern among those attending to the nation's future.
From 1988 to 2008, the United States' undocumented population grew from 2 million to 12 million persons. It has since stabilized at around 11 million, a majority of whom are Mexican. As of this writing, some 60 percent of all Mexican immigrants in the United States are in the country illegally. This article analyzes the effect of being undocumented on sector of employment and wages earned in the United States. We show that illegal migrants are disproportionately channeled into the secondary labor market, where they experience a double disadvantage, earning systematically lower wages by virtue of working in the secondary sector and receiving an additional economic penalty because they are undocumented. Mexican immigrants, in particular, experienced a substantial decline in real wages between 1970 and 2010 attributable to their rising share of undocumented migrants in U.S. labor markets during a time when undocumented hiring was criminalized.
In this article we undertake a systematic analysis of why border enforcement backfired as a strategy of immigration control in the United States. We argue theoretically that border enforcement emerged as a policy response to a moral panic about the perceived threat of Latino immigration to the United States propounded by self-interested bureaucrats, politicians, and pundits who sought to mobilize political and material resources for their own benefit. The end result was a self-perpetuating cycle of rising enforcement and increased apprehensions that resulted in the militarization of the border in a way that was disconnected from the actual size of the undocumented flow. Using an instrumental variable approach, we show how border militarization affected the behavior of unauthorized migrants and border outcomes to transform undocumented Mexican migration from a circular flow of male workers going to three states into an eleven-million person population of settled families living in 50 states.
Using data from the Mexican Migration Project and the Latin American Migration Project, we find that undocumented migration from Mexico reflects U.S. labor demand and access to migrant networks and is little affected by border enforcement, which instead sharply reduces the odds of return movement. Undocumented migration from Central America follows primarily from political violence associated with the U.S. intervention of the 1980s, and return migration has always been unlikely. Mass undocumented migration from Mexico appears to have ended because of demographic changes there, but undocumented migration from Central America can be expected to grow slowly through processes of family reunification.
