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Theorists of widely different persuasions are making serious efforts to understand difference and to bring the concerns and ideals of others within the reach of intellectual and political visions. Yet this attention to difference continues to be examined almost entirely through precise, rigorous, and sophisticated theoretical language. This is only appropriate if we presume that this language, the language-of-theory, is able to represent—and serve as the master interpreter of—all ideas and ideals, all senses of self and politics. I believe that this presumption is deeply flawed. Theoretical language passes over and distorts the differences it would understand. Theory more attentive to difference needs to gain access to the meanings that circulate within different lives, especially as reflected in literary writing of those who, themselves, speak and write from sites of difference.

A capitalist market system of social exchange is justified primarily because it protects individual freedom. This system, its advocates claim, achieves the complex task of production and distribution through a process of voluntary exchanges; coordination is effectively achieved without coercion. I argue that this claim is largely unwarranted. The negative concept of freedom that underlies voluntary choice (the absence of interference by others) is unable to differentiate between instances of freedom and unfreedom. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether exchanges are voluntary or coerced. A more adequate conception of free choice (as the relevant capacities and conditions for deliberate decisions and actions) suggests that a capitalist market broadly and systematically denies the possibility of voluntary agreements. This general failure to protect individuals' freedom is examined in relation to the acquisition of property, the transfer of property, and the process of production.

Both liberal theorists and their critics have been unable to reconcile successfully respect for individual freedom and autonomy with a system of legitimate political authority. Liberal theory fails because its system of rights and representative institutions is particularistic, favoring the interests of restricted individuals and groups. Nonliberal theory threatens individuals' freedom by having political authority exercised in the name of a dubious, real will. Present liberal and nonliberal theory continues to reflect these problems.This article is an effort to present a view of political authority that respects individual freedom and is legitimate, supporting the interests of all citizens. The failure of liberal and nonliberal theory to achieve this reconciliation is believed to result from their excessively ambiguous, incomplete views of central issues—freedom, authority, and normative reasoning—and a related tendency to examine these problems in isolation. The analysis presented here proposes a more complete view of their meaning and integrates this understanding into a conception of legitimate political authority. The conclusion seriously challenges the view of political legitimacy presented by liberal theory and suggests that a different set of problems must be addressed if political authority is to be legitimate and support individuals' freedom.