Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Implicit public debt is a calculation based on assumptions that are qualitatively and fundamentally different from explicit public debt, i.e. it cannot be added to the latter. Moreover, they distort the real costs of ageing considerably. This creates a mirage of public debt that drives fiscal policy in the wrong direction like a will-o'-the-wisp. The costs of demographic change are systematically overestimated.

Upholding the EU fiscal rules at the elevated public debt level due to the Corona crisis would trigger a phase of long-standing austerity in the euro area. In this study, major proposals for reforms are reviewed, with a critical focus on the expenditure rule, which is central in many think-tanks' and academic researchers' advice. A different reform based on a fiscal analogue to the well-known Taylor-rule for monetary policy is designed here. It is argued that under a low-interest environment growth rates exceed interest rates, a fact not compatible with the present ruleset and with far-reaching consequences. This requires redefining debt sustainability. The proposal chooses as the operational variable for fiscal policy primary balances rather than structural balances. The anchor for fiscal stability, until know the 60% cap on public debt, should be replaced by a cap on the interest payments on public debt at roughly 3% of GDP. This allows higher fiscal space for investment and innovations. The fact that the interest rate burden of all Member States in the euro area stands at the lowest level ever experienced, although the debt level is at an all-time high, clarifies that the focus on the debt ratio is misleading. Change could be possible in the secondary law of the EU without change of the Treaties.

The 60 percent debt cap and the 3 percent deficit cap, enshrined in the EU Treaties since 1992, are cornerstones of the complex fiscal policy framework of the Euro area. Both numbers came into the Maastricht Treaty more or less by coincidence. There is no sound economic justification for the caps, in particular for the 60 percent debt cap if combined with the 3 percent deficit limit. The taboo of not questioning them in debates about reforming the EU fiscal framework prevents innovative thinking. We analyse attempts to explain or justify both caps by the EU Commission and compare them with other propositions from the IMF and in academia. The rules entail a bias for contractionary policy, thus dampening growth and employment, especially since the Fiscal Compact (2011). This becomes best visible if the debt and deficit dynamics in the EMU are compared with the U.S. The paper pleads for a thorough reconsideration of the EU fiscal policy rulebook in face of a fundamental change in the relationship of interest and growth rates, a key determinant of public debt. The deficit rule should allow for a more effective counter-cyclicality and for more fiscal space for public investment. Furthermore, high-debt countries in EMU should have the option to carry their legacy debt over a longer period to avoid growth-dampening austerity. ; Mehr oder minder durch Zufall kamen die 3-Prozent und 60- Prozent-Grenzen für Haushaltsdefizite und Staatsschulden in den Vertrag von Maastricht 1992. Eine robuste Erklärung dieser Werte gibt es nicht. Der EU-Fiskalpakt von 2011 hat zwei weitere problematische Grenzwerte für strukturelle Defizite hinzugefügt. Mehr öffentliche Investitionen, notwendig für einen Green New Deal in Europa, werden durch die jetzigen Fiskalregeln erschwert.

Warum eigentlich 3 % und 60 %? Die Auseinandersetzung mit den Grenzwerten für Defizite und Schuldenstände in der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion zeigt, dass diese politisch willkürlich gesetzt und wenig ökonomisch fundiert sind. Auch ist der Schuldenstand als Grenzwert im Gegensatz zum Haushaltsdefizit ein europäischer Sonderweg. Eine Reform der Kriterien des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts sowie des Fiskalpakts ist dringend geboten.

Despite performing very positively on some key macroeconomic indicators in recent years, the German economy is in grave disequilibrium if the high current account surplus is included in the analysis. The paper scrutinises the evolution of Germany's external surplus since the inception of the Euro in 1999. This is done by identifying the main determinants of exports and imports and by analysing the accounting identity in which the current account is national saving less total fixed investment. While price competitiveness measured by real exchange rates is strongly improved by German imports for exports within international value chains, also by real undervaluation against other member countries, the focus is on the combination of price- and non-price competitiveness. The latter is mainly determined by the global income elasticity for imports from Germany, relative to the income elasticity for imports to Germany. Despite heavy fluctuations, the past trend shows a clear wedge between the growth of exports and imports of almost one percentage point. If this trend continues the German trade balance would reach 15% of GDP in 2026 which would be a time bomb for the cohesion of the European Monetary Union. Market-based rebalancing is not in sight. It is the built-in dynamics of the external surplus that is hazardous. The problem is aggravated as Germany sits in the same boat with three other hard-core surplus seeking countries (Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg). In recent years the imbalances within EMU have changed, pulling former deficit countries in mild surplus but leaving the diversity of current account balances among EMU members at a spread of 8-10 percentage points, with an external trade surplus of EMU as a whole of 4.5% and 3.5% current account surplus. Germany carries nearly 77% and 55% of the current account and the trade surplus, respectively, and has - far ahead others - become the largest surplus country on the globe, in absolute terms. This constellation is unsustainable and requires policy action in Germany, in the European Union, the Euro Area and also by global authorities.