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In: Very short introductions
Throughout history scepticism and the urge to question accepted truths has been a powerful force for change and growth. Today, as we are bombarded by adverts, scientific studies praising the latest superfoods, and political rhetoric, a healthy amount of scepticism is widely encouraged. But when is such scepticism legitimate - for example, as a driver of new ideas - and when is it problematic? And what role might adopting a sceptical outlook play in leading an intellectually virtuous life? Duncan Pritchard explores both the advantages of scepticism, in challenging outdated notions, and also how it can have unhelpful social consequences, in generating distrust. He considers the role of scepticism at the source of contemporary social and political movements such as climate change denial, post-truth politics, and fake news.
In: Studies in philosophy
In: Palgrave Philosophy Today
Duncan Pritchard offers students not only a new exploration of topics central to current epistemological debate, but also a new way of doing epistemology. This advanced textbook covers such key topics as virtue epistemology, anti-luck epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism and attributer contextualism.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 202, Heft 5
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractAccording to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are everyday, apparently mundane, commitments that we are optimally certain of, but which in virtue of the 'hinge' role that they play in our rational practices cannot themselves enjoy rational support. Granted that there are such hinge commitments, what is the nature of the propositional attitude in play? Many commentators have described this propositional attitude as a kind of trusting, on account of how our hinge commitments are effectively a groundless kind of presupposition. In contrast, I want to push back against this way of thinking about hinge commitments and argue instead that it is crucial to our understanding of Wittgenstein's proposal especially in terms of its implications for radical scepticism to realize that hinge commitments are not presuppositions and that the hinge propositional attitude is not one of trusting.
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, S. 1-12
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, S. 1-23
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 200, Heft 4
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractThis paper offers an articulation and defence of the modal account of legal risk in light of a range of objections that have been proposed against this view in the recent literature. It is argued that these objections all trade on a failure to distinguish between the modal nature of risk more generally, and the application of this modal account to particular decision-making contexts, such as legal contexts, where one must rely on a restricted body of information. It is argued that once the modal account of legal risk is properly understood as involving information-relative judgements about the modal closeness of the target risk event, the objections to the view are neutralized.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 200, Heft 3
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 199, Heft 1-2, S. 715-729
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft S15, S. 3635-3664
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft 6, S. 5515-5528
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft S7, S. 1711-1723
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractIt is widely accepted that one strong motivation for adopting a conciliatory stance with regard to the epistemology of peer disagreement is that the non-conciliatory alternatives are incompatible with the demands of intellectual character, and incompatible with the virtue of intellectual humility in particular. It is argued that this is a mistake, at least once we properly understand what intellectual humility involves. Given some of the inherent problems facing conciliatory proposals, it is maintained that non-conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagreement are thus on much stronger dialectical ground than many suppose, including some defenders of this line. In particular, non-conciliatory proposals can resist the idea that epistemic peer disagreement directly weakens one's epistemic justification, as conciliatory views maintain. This means that the epistemic justification that our beliefs in this regard enjoy, and thus our knowledge, is more secure than conciliatory approaches to epistemic peer disagreement would suggest.
In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 51-66
It is argued that standard accounts of the epistemology of religious commitmentfail to be properly sensitive to certain important features of the nature of religious conviction. Once one takes these features of religious conviction seriously, then it becomes clear that we are not to conceive of the epistemology of religious conviction along completely rational lines.But the moral to extract from this is not fideism, or even a more moderate proposal (such as reformed epistemology) that casts the epistemic standing of basic religious beliefs along nonrational lines. Rather, one needs to recognise that in an important sense religious convictions are not beliefs at all, but that this is compatible with the idea that many other religious commitments are beliefs. This picture of the nature of religious commitment is shown to fit snugly with the Wittgensteinian account of hinge commitments, such that all rational belief essentially presupposes certain basic arational hinge commitments, along lines originally suggested by John Henry Newman. We are thus able to marshal a parity-style argument in defence of religious commitment. Although religious belief presupposes basic arational religious convictions, it is not on this score epistemically amiss since all belief presupposes basic arational convictions, or hinge commitments. The resulting view of the epistemology of religious commitment is a position I call quasi-fideism.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 197, Heft 7, S. 2879-2894
ISSN: 1573-0964