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AbstractIn any democratic system, the question of whether governments pay attention to citizens' needs and requests represents a crucial component of democratic quality. But what conditions favour this fundamental democratic process? This article compares policy priorities identified by public opinion with the actual legislative production in Italy, Spain and the UK from 2003 to 2012. The article's methodology is a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in which causal conditions are represented by politico-institutional and contextual factors, while the outcome consists of the degree of overlap between public opinion priorities and legislation. Empirical analysis shows that there are four paths leading to a correspondence in priorities: first, it is linked to the combination of high government decision-making capacity and declining citizens' trust in government; second, it is also linked to the combination of rising citizens' trust and low government decision-making capacity. Third and fourth, priorities also correspond where there is a simultaneous absence of both trust and elections, and in the absence of both decision-making capacity and elections, respectively.

This paper focuses on the reasons that Italian interest groups decide to lobby together with like-minded groups ('friends'), or engage in networking activity with groups that have conflicting interests ('foes'), in order to influence public policy. How often do Italian interest groups recur to these lobbying strategies? What favours the construction of a coalition of more or less different interest groups lobbying on a particular issue? What, on the contrary, influences the decision to lobby individually? In order to answer these questions, original data coming from a national survey conducted on 1277 Italian interest groups are provided. Empirical results are interesting: from a descriptive point of view, business groups are more likely to engage in joint lobbying than other group types, whereas the same holds true for unions with respect to networking with rival organizations. From an explanatory point of view, groups that perceive themselves to be threatened by rivals' influence in policymaking, or by environmental challenges, are more likely to work in coalitions and to engage in networking: resources do not matter in 'absolute' and 'objective' terms, but in 'relative' and 'subjective' ones.

The question of who wins or loses in the policy process lies at the heart of recent research into both interest groups and public policy. However, one of the most difficult challenges when empirically analysing interest groups consists in knowing exactly how to measure their influence: despite the fact that this question has been addressed by political scientists for decades, significant problems remain regarding both the conceptual definition and empirical measurement of influence. In order to develop a better understanding of interest group influence, I recommend as follows: (a) that such influence be conceptualized as a degree of preference attainment; (b) that the degree of generality of the concept be downgraded, by breaking it up on the basis of two fundamental dimensions: the lobbying direction (pro-status quoor anti-status quo) and the policy-making stage (agenda setting; decision making; implementation); (c) to proceed with a manual hand-coding in order to obtain a list of the policy issues around which interest groups lobby; (d) to resort to an expert survey in order to evaluate these issues. This methodological approach is used to empirically measure the influence that Italy's professional orders had on the liberalization process championed by the second Prodi government in 2006.