Suchergebnisse

Nowadays, liberty of conscience as an inalienable right is a standard of demoliberal constitutionalism. It is an obvious component of a well-organized society and state. However, at the very beginning of its presence in the political discourse, it was more a product of Christian theology (the free conscience perceived as a gift of God) than a legal category; more an endowment of divinity than an intrinsic human value. In the contemporary, secularized world, our understanding of freedom of religion includes not only free exercise of religion but also freedom from religion. An increasing number of non-believers changes our expectations of the state that is obliged to protect the freedom of conscience of all citizens regardless of their beliefs. The goal of the article is to consider the difficulties faced by people with a theistic worldview in the reality of a state founded on the principle of ideological neutrality.

New member states and "the political Copenhagen criteria"
Besides pointing out economical preconditions for states applying for membership in the European Union, the "Copenhagen criteria" are supposed to test and verify if candidates fulfill "the European standard of a well‑ordered state" that is democratic, respecting the rule‑of‑law, human rights and minority's rights. The article is an reflection on "European political cohesion" of the states entering the European Union in 2004 and in the following decade. In the face of deficit of, so called, "Copenhagen mechanism", a serious doubt arises: is it possible to evaluate impartially whether candidates and/or member states implement properly "the European standard of a well‑ordered state"? This doubt is shared by the author of the article.

The aim of the article is to reconstruct the relationships between the Baptist understanding of baptism (credobaptism; believer's baptism) and church and the religious policy promoted by the early Baptists. The following texts are explored: A Short Declaration of the Mystery of Iniquity (1612) by Thomas Helwys; Persecution for Religion Judged and Condemned (1615) by John Murton; and Religious Peace: Or, a Plea for Liberty of Conscience (1614) by Leonard Busher. Helwys and Murton were leaders of the congregation of Spitalfields, the first Baptist community in the Kingdom of England. Busher, lesser known, probably belonged to the congregation, and his said work is the first treaty to defend freedom of religion by a Baptist.

Abstract
This is a common knowledge that demographic trends in the EU Member States does not ensure the substitutability of generations. Trying to explain the situation we usually point at cultural changes. Presuming that everyone looks for a meaningful life that brings satisfaction and sense we shall ask if contemporary European perceive parenthood as an important condition of that kind of life. The aim of the article is to test the correlation between the life satisfaction and a low fertility rate in the European Union countries, in general, and in Poland, in particular. The relevant data were provided by the Eurobarometer and CBOS.

Two fundamental features of a liberal political community are usually identified in contemporary deliberations: (1) there is an inevitable pluralism of visions of good and worthy life, blended into a wide range of religious, philosophical and ethical positions; (2) those who are in power are under an obligation to set public matters in such a way as to avoid discrimination of any class of the ruled. In respect of (1) and (2), it is presumed that the process of enacting, implementing and executing public law shall be separated from any perfectionist moral position, because being impartial when making political decisions is a prerequisite for non-discriminatory politics. This kind of politics looks for proper, convincing and comprehensible reasons to establish a new legal standard of behaviour in the 'public reason' – a set of moral statements and political values commonly shared in an open, pluralistic and tolerant society, which does not provide decisive answers to any questions about the meaning of life and does not bring us closer to discover its ideal. This article tries to reproduce the main notions and ideas of leading, contemporary liberal philosophers – John Rawls and Charles Larmore – that deal with the very nature of impartiality of a liberal state and the ability of policymakers to be impartial. It also presents the critical views of Stephen Macedo and Nicholas Wolterstorff, who question the possibility of building a neutral state.

The political system of a democratic and liberal state lacks a space free of the necessity to confirm the rational character of authoritative decisions. The most important forum for such a validation is the hearings chamber of the constitutional tribunal. In the United States, the court empowered to make the final appraisal of the constitutionality of decisions made by the state authority, including their rational character, is the Federal Supreme Court, a nine-person collegiate body appointed by the president upon the advice and consent of the Senate, where decisions are made by a majority vote. This is the power referred to as judicial review. When appraising the reasonable character of authoritative decisions made by the legislative and the executive branch, the judicial branch is to be unencumbered by political pressure. In fact, being able to make law, it not only validates, vis-à-vis the constitution, the legality of actions on the part of the other two branches, but also participates in a effective way in the setting out of the conditions of their actions. The judicial branch is thus not only a political arbiter but also creates politics. Freed from political pressure, it is able, at the same time, to exert it. Validating the rational character of the actions of other parties, it faces the need to defend the rationality of its own decisions, bearing in mind that it also sets out the standards. Action on the part of the judicial branch is not limited to the settling of specific disputes based on the existing law. It also sets out the way of settling such disputes in the future. The court does make decisions on the cases of private individuals; however, in the final instance, it is as an arbiter deciding on problems of public policy, which makes it a participant in political disputes.