About the editor -- Acknowledgments - Introduction -- Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn? -- The trade effects of us antidumping actions -- On the spread and impact of anti-dumping - USA : evolving trends in temporary trade barriers -- Pricing behavior in the presence of antidumping law -- Dumping and double crossing : the (in)effectiveness of cost-based trade policy under incomplete information -- Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings : evidence from four countries -- Cumulation and ITC decision-making : the sum of the parts is greater than the whole -- US anti-dumping : much ado about zeroing -- The economic and strategic motives for antidumping filings -- WTO exceptions as insurance -- Using safeguard protection to raise domestic rivals' costs.
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
In 2007 the US reversed its long-standing policy prohibiting the simultaneous imposition of anti-dumping duties (ADDs) and countervailing duties (CVDs) against non-market economies. The EU followed the US' lead and also began imposing simultaneous ADDs and CVDs. The practice, however, leads to double remedies, which are when a domestic subsidy is offset by both an ADD and CVD. The WTO Appellate Body recently ruled that double remedies were inconsistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and that the burden was on the investigating authorities to ensure that double remedies were not being imposed.
In this paper two key costs of AD protection are documented. First, once AD has been adopted, countries often have a difficult time restraining its use. In recent years \′new' users have accounted for half of the overall world total. Many of the heaviest AD users are countries who did not even have an AD statute a decade ago. Second, I will show that that, on average, AD duties cause the value of imports to fall by 30–50 per cent. I find that trade falls by almost as much for settled cases as for those that result in duties. I also find that, even for those cases that are rejected, imports fall. JEL Classification: F13 A propos de la généralisation et de l'impact des mesures anti‐dumping. Ce mémoire souligne deux coûts importants des mesures de protection anti‐dumping (AD). D'abord, une fois la mesure en place, les pays ont souvent de grandes difficultés à en restreindre l'usage. Au cours des années récentes, les "nouveaux" utilisateurs de ces mesures comptent pour la moitié de l'activité AD dans le monde. Et plusieurs des pays qui en font un usage intensif n'avaient pas de loi AD il y a une décennie. Ensuite, en moyenne, les droits de douane AD entraînent une chute des importations de l'ordre de 30%à 50%. Et le commerce chute de presque autant pour les cas où il y a résolution du problème que pour ceux où un tarif de rétorsion est imposé. Fait intéressant, il appert que les importations chutent même dans les cas où la plainte est rejetée.
Recommended readings (Machine generated): 1. James Brander and Paul Krugman (1983), 'A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of International Trade', Journal of International Economics, 15 (3-4), November, 313-21 -- 2. Wilfred J. Ethier (1982), 'Dumping', Journal of Political Economy, 90 (3), June, 487-506 -- 3. Robert W. Staiger and Frank A. Wolak (1992), 'The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly', Journal of International Economics, 32 (3-4), May, 265-87 -- 4. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (1990), 'A Theory of Managed Trade', American Economic Review, 80 (4), September, 779-95 -- 5. Richard H. Clarida (1993), 'Entry, Dumping, and Shakeout', American Economic Review, 83 (1), March, 180-202 -- 6. James E. Anderson (1992), 'Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters', American Economic Review, 82 (1), March, 65-83 -- 7. Thomas J. Prusa (1997), 'The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions', in Robert C. Feenstra (ed.), The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies, Chapter 7, Chicago, IL, USA and London, UK: University of Chicago Press and Cambridge, MA, USA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 191-213 -- 8. Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley (2007), 'Trade Deflection and Trade Depression', Journal of International Economics, 72 (1), May, 176-201 -- 9. Kathy Baylis and Jeffrey M. Perloff (2010), 'Trade Diversion from Tomato Suspension Agreements', Canadian Journal of Economics, 43 (1), February, 127-51 -- 10. Tibor Besedeš and Thomas J. Prusa (2017), 'The Hazardous Effects of Antidumping', Economic Inquiry, 55 (1), January, 9-30 -- 11. Robert W. Staiger and Frank A. Wolak (1994), 'Measuring Industry-Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 51-103, references -- 12. Corinne M. Krupp and Patricia S. Pollard (1996), 'Market Responses to Antidumping Laws: Some Evidence from the U.S. Chemical Industry', Canadian Journal of Economics, XXIX (1), February, 199-227 -- 13. J. M. Finger, H. Keith Hall and Douglas R. Nelson (1982), 'The Political Economy of Administered Protection', American Economic Review, 72 (3), June, 452-66 -- 14. Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley (2013), 'Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy', American Economic Review, 103 (2), April, 1071-90 -- 15. Bruce A. Blonigen and Chad P. Bown (2003), 'Antidumping and Retaliation Threats', Journal of International Economics, 60 (2), August, 249-73 -- 16. Alberto Martin and Wouter Vergote (2008), 'On the Role of Retaliation in Trade Agreements', Journal of International Economics, 76 (1), September, 61-77 -- 17. Michael O. Moore and Maurizio Zanardi (2009), 'Does Antidumping Use Contribute to Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries?', Canadian Journal of Economics, 42 (2), May, 469-95 -- 18. Michael M. Knetter and Thomas J. Prusa (2003), 'Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries', Journal of International Economics, 61 (1), October, 1-17 -- 19. Bruce A. Blonigen and Stephen E. Haynes (2002), 'Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates', American Economic Review, 92 (4), September, 1044-61
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
AbstractThis paper examines the impact of preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping protection. We employ a two‐step selection model where the first step accounts for the impact of membership in a preferential trade agreement on the original antidumping determination and the second step estimates the impact of membership in a preferential trade agreement on the duration of the measures. We find the duration of antidumping protection is about 17% shorter for preferential trade agreement members compared with targeted countries that are not preferential trade agreement members. The impact on duration depends largely on whether preferential trade agreements have rules related specifically to antidumping. Preferential trade agreements with rules are associated with a 28% reduction in the duration of protection, whereas the duration for preferential trade agreements without rules is not statistically different from the duration for non‐preferential trade agreement countries. While the duration of antidumping measures against China is longer than for other countries, the impact of preferential trade agreement rules is robust to controlling for China.
