А.М. OREKHOV. Travel after the Owl of Minerva: Ancient Philosophy
In: Voprosy filosofii: naučno-teoretičeskij žurnal, Issue 8, p. 218-218
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In: Voprosy filosofii: naučno-teoretičeskij žurnal, Issue 8, p. 218-218
In: Obščestvo: filosofija, istorija, kulʹtura = Society : philosophy, history, culture, Issue 4, p. 41-48
ISSN: 2223-6449
In: Voprosy filosofii: naučno-teoretičeskij žurnal, Issue 7, p. 153-163
The article concerns the place and the role of the text, which is attributed to Rāmānuja, in the philosophical tradition of Viśiṣtādvaita. A historiographical review of the studies of the main parts of the Gādya-traya is given (in particular, the main arguments for and against the assertion of Ramanuja's authorship of this text, put forward in the articles of R. Lester (Rāmānuja and Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism: The Concept of Prapatti or Śaraṇāgatigādya) and N. Nayar (The Concept of prapatti inRāmānuja's Gītārthasaṃgraha), as well as questions raised by a number of other authors). The role of this text in the late Viśiṣtādvaita tradition (in particular, in the Teṇgalai and Vaḍagalai traditions) is also briefly highlighted. Based on textual comparisons of the Sanskrit texts of the Vaikuṇṭhagādya (one of the parts of "Gādya-traya") and the "Vedārthasaṃgraha" of Rāmānuja the arguments for and against considering Rāmānuja as the author of this text are considered. The content of the text is interpreted in the aspect of G. Oberhammer's Transcendental hermeneutics, in particular, one of his categories – "Encounter" (Begegnung). The philosophical content of the category "Encounter" is revealed in one of Oberhammer's works (Begegnung als Kategorie der Hermeneutik Religioser Traditionen), the translation of its fragment is adjuncted to this article.
In: Obščestvo: filosofija, istorija, kulʹtura = Society : philosophy, history, culture, Issue 5, p. 38-45
ISSN: 2223-6449
In: Obščestvo: filosofija, istorija, kulʹtura = Society : philosophy, history, culture, Issue 2, p. 13-21
ISSN: 2223-6449
In: Idei i idealy: naučnyj žurnal = Ideas & ideals : a journal of the humanities and economics, Volume 12, Issue 4-1, p. 59-76
ISSN: 2658-350X
This article aims to clarify two traditions of understanding time, namely the rationalistic, which includes the scientific (in the West, going back to the 'Physics' of Aristotle) and philosophical (going back in the West to Augustine), and mystical (the most methodically sustained is the Yogic tradition of Classical India and Sufism). The article contains several sections: Introduction raises the problem of time and sets the subject boundaries. The main part is comprised of the following sections: 1. Time as found in objects: a brief summary of the rational scientific and quasi scientific trend of time interpretation from Aristotle's Physics to Reichenbach's "Philosophy of Time and Space". The physical one-sidedness of the consideration of time is completely immersed in the object domain. 2. Time as associated with the ontological subject: essential points of purely philosophical understanding of time beginning with St. Augustine via Kant up to Heidegger. This philosophical approach is no less one-sided, and comprehends time almost exclusively as a subjective phenomenon (memory, contemplation, desire, one's own nature etc.) Both trends lack any discrimination between the initial indication of the phenomenon of time (the answer to the question 'what is time as a phenomenon?') and the interpretation of the meaning of this phenomenon (the answer to the question 'how to understand the phenomenon of time?'). 3. Interpretations of the time phenomenon are implicitly based on the everyday mode of awareness. The problem of time is one of the most difficult problems to comprehend. The main thesis of the article is that the pra-phenomenon of time is revealed to consciousness from the necessarily occurring switching and comparison between two processes: orientation in the external world and attention to cogitation, i.e., between the external and internal. This duality coincides with the duality that is realized in the elementary unit of rational thought - judgment, the subject of which is recognized as belonging to the external world, and the predicate – to the internal. Separately, it is planned to consider the understanding of time in the mystical tradition. We will focus on two ways of understanding time - the rationalistic (philosophical), represented by the teachings of Kant, and the mystical, represented by the Sufis and Yogis (with an indication of the fundamental difference between them). Note that these two methods are not opposed by us, although in a sense they exclude each other. 4. Lapse of time and the notion of a mode of awareness. The ordinary mode of awareness called vikṣipta 'dispersed' in Yoga philosophy is characterized by a fundamental dualism of inner and outer worlds' events. Both are processes and the non predicative comparison of their pace constitutes the ordinary experience of the lapse of time. This mode is the most habitual one and the very mode within which it is possible to speak and compose texts, however it is not unique. There exist other possibilities. 5. One-pointed awareness mode and the atemporal process. Voluntarily achieved one-pointedness has no distinction between the outer and inner world and is therefore 'out of' or 'above' time. It is well known in mystical literature (exemplified by the text by eminent Sufi author, Niffari). In European rational philosophy this position was explained by Hegel, but not in his 'Philosophy of Nature", usually associated with the concept of time, it was in the 'Science of Logic' (in the timeless unfolding of absolute knowledge). The Conclusion presents a summary. The crucial point which enables a thinker to overcome the traditional scientific and philosophical one-sidedness of the conceptualization of time is the notion of a mode of awareness and comprehension of the fundamental duality of outer world processes and cogitations' succession. A non-ordinary awareness mode is methodologically elaborated in Yoga philosophy, witnessed in mystical Sufi texts, and finally, grasped in Hegel's concept of a speculative proposition.
In: Voprosy Filosofii, Issue 9, p. 181-190
The article raises an important but unpopular question of the possibility of translating Sanskrit philosophical terms and concepts into the Arabic language. In modern (and not only) Indological studies, the specifics of translating Sanskrit philosophical vocabulary into the language of the author of the study are somehow affected. A meaningful translation of philosophical texts from Sanskrit into Arabic is rather a rare phenomenon. In the medieval Arabic literature, two such translations made by al-Bīrūnī are known: a paraphrase of the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali and the translation of the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, which is possibly not extant. We will consider a number of the most important philosophical terms in Sanskrit (generally significant for all areas of Indian philosophy) and their Arabic equivalents proposed by al-Bīrūnī. Among such terms, the most significant is the term karma (karman), known to the general public in its vulgar meaning as a kind of return of negativity to the one who was its source. Less well-known are such important pair-functioning ontological concepts as a subtle one (sūkṣma) and gross one (sthūla). The analysis of the Arabic equivalents of the corresponding Sanskrit words proposed by al-Bīrūnī demonstrates the limits of the possibilities of the Arabic philosophical language (we mean the translation precisely, not calcification, transliteration or transcription).
In: Voprosy filosofii: naučno-teoretičeskij žurnal, Issue 6, p. 5-44
In February 2022, a "round table" was held to discuss the concept of the "logic of sense", elaborated by A.V. Smirnov in a number of monographs and articles. The participants focused their attention on the following questions: • What are the implications of the thesis about the possibility of initially variable ways of sense-positing?• What philosophical conclusions are implied by non-universality of European reason and non-universality of philosophy in its European version? • What are the epistemological perspectives of logic of substance and logic of process? • Do we recognize the variability of the ability of judgment, i.e. variability of methods of subject-predicate linking, modifying Kant's thesis postulating its invariance? • Is P-logic possible as an organon of probative thinking? • If all the big cultures are based on specific logics of sense-positing, will then the philosophical culturology and typology of big cultures be a study of consciousness in its variability and typological completeness? • Is a philosophical study of non-Western cultures indispensable to philosophy of consciousness? The discussion opened up prospects for further research on this issue. The round table proceedings are published below.