The paper attempts to look at the problems of Soviet society in the period of 1964-1985 through the eyes of Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev, a professional historian and, at the same time, a responsible employee of the Central Committee of the CPSU, who served for many years in the Central Committee apparatus and took part in the preparation of many Brezhnev's speeches. Having written voluminous memories, Chernyaev is rightfully considered one of the most authoritative and thoughtful chroniclers of a huge era - from Stalin to the USSR collapse.
The article describes the specificity of the ethno-confessional policy of the Crimean regional government of M.A. Sulkevich (June - November 1918). The circumstances of the general's coming to power in the Crimea and the events preceding this, in which the national question played an important role, are noted. The significance of the ethno-confessional factor in the work of the cabinet of M.A. Sulkevich, the contradictory nature of his activities was proved. The relationship between M. A. Sulkevich with the Ukrainian State of Hetman P.P. Skoropadsky, who also had a national motive.
This article is devoted to the development of science and culture in the short period of the Wrangel Crimea - 1920. At this time, the brightest figures of Russian culture of that time worked on the territory of the small Peninsula: O. E. Mandelstam, M. A. Voloshin, B.D. Grekov, G.V. Vernadsky, V.I. Vernadsky and others. The article provides an overview of the life and activities of the Russian intelligentsia in 1920 in the Crimea, based on materials of periodicals as the most important source for studying the history of the Civil war in the South of Russia whose value is to be fully evaluated.
The article analyzes the features of the era of L. I. Brezhnev and its perceptions. The author presents his views on the political portrait of the Soviet leader. The article considers distinctive characteristics and stereotypical features of the image of the long-term leader of the Soviet state formed in the national and foreign historiography. The article indicates the key events and phenomena related to the foreign and domestic policy of the USSR under Brezhnev and describes the specific aspects of his managerial style. The author focuses on the details of the conspiracy to remove N. S. Khrushchev from power, and specifically point out that it was L. I. Brezhnev who headed this conspiracy, and not M. A. Suslov and A. N. Shelepin, as it is indicated in some research papers on the problem. The article also specifically examines the achievements of the foreign policy of the era of "détente", the role of L. I. Brezhnev in the successes of the policy of those years, the model of his behavior in relations with foreign leaders, such as R. Nixon, J. Ford, V. Brandt, and others. The research is based on the testimonies of people who worked closely with L. I. Brezhnev and those who were in his inner circle. According to the author, L. I. Brezhnev was ready to retire at the end of the 1970s, but members of the Politburo insisted that he should keep his post. Brezhnev did not manage to survive as a politician; his death remained practically unnoticed by the Soviet people.
An immense role in the collapse of the USSR was played by a whole array of factors: the public being tired of the Communist project; the massive shortages of consumer goods, which made people hate the government; the growing opposition within the Communist party to Gorbachev's reforms; the hesitation of the General Secretary who tried to rely in turn either on the right or on the left wing; the drastic fall in the living standards. The crucial role, however, was played by "the parade of sovereignties" and the Centre being too late in its attempts to address the national question. By the autumn of 1990, the President's close associates started to sense that power was slipping from Gorbachev's hands; with the fellow countrymen staying remarkably indifferent, the Soviet Union was heading towards dissolution as the ambitions of local party leaders in the constituent republics generated and cannily magnified nationalist and separatist trends. Gorbachev kept up his maneuver strategy, which put him on the verge of resignation in the spring of 1991 when his support was minimal. He seemed, though, to have managed to pull out of this dive thanks to the Soviet Union referendum held on March 17, in which the voters were asked if they considered the preservation of the USSR necessary. Eventually, however, the issue of preserving or not preserving a unified state depended directly on the position of Russia as the backbone of the Soviet Union. The study draws on the author's personal archive of original testimonies and interviews of the political figures directly involved in the events in question.
