Suchergebnisse

In the early 1980s Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico had commercial banking sectors that were dominated by local banks. The largest countries in Latin America were subjected to common international economic pressures during both the neoliberal 1980s and 1990s – including the expansion of capital markets in the periphery and integration into the regional trade agreements NAFTA and Mercosur – and the post1998 financial turmoil. By 2015, however, the three countries had consolidated alternative commercial banking systems: domestic private group dominated (Brazil), mixed (i.e., ownership more evenly divided among public, private domestic, and foreign banks (Argentina), and foreign bank dominated (Mexico). The article traces these alternative outcomes to the power of prereform private financial groups, the virulence of "twin crises" in the transition from fixed to floating exchange rates, and the (contingent) role played by government ideology. ; Fil: Etchemendy, Sebastian. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina ; Fil: Puente. Ignacio. Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Estados Unidos

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Private Equity, Financial Development and Corporate Governance Reform -- Chapter 3. Private Equity and Latin America -- Chapter 4. Institutions: From Rules to Investors -- Chapter 5. Business Association and the Politics of Regulatory Reform -- Chapter 6. Beyond Latin America -- Chapter 7. Conclusions: Private Equity and Development.

Fil: Puente, Ignacio. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. ; "Within a comparative political economy framework, this thesis applies social network analysis to the study of business in Latin America using data from firm's board of directors membership. The main contributions are threefold. First, it introduces a novel methodological tool that can provide useful metrics about how firms are interconnected, in particular measuring the cohesiveness of national business communities. Interestingly, these country-level metrics are benchmarked with hypotheses from the literature on business politics in Latin America and two preliminary correlations indicating a negative relationship between elite cohesion and tax revenues as well as a lack of association between business cohesion and formal property rights are presented. Second, it provides new evidence indicating that even after more than two decades of financial liberalization and contrary to arguments about globalization and convergence, corporate control is still distinctively defined at the national level. Third, it explores the most salient actors that characterize governance regimes in Chile and Brazil: respectively, business groups and investment managers. Asset managers, as those prevalent in the Brazilian network are an under-theorized actor; this paper therefore advances in a description of the distinctive characteristics of this novel corporate governance player. It also explores and contrast each country's most connected director's links with both business associations and political parties." ; Tommasi, Mariano

A inicios de los años ochenta, la banca comercial en Argentina, Brasil y México estaba dominada por bancos locales. Los países más grandes de Latinoamérica estuvieron sujetos a presiones económicas internacionales comunes tanto durante la etapa "neoliberal" de los ochenta y noventa -incluida la expansión de los mercados de capitales en la periferia y la integración en bloques comerciales- como en el periodo que le siguió al incremento en la volatilidad financiera de 1998. Hacia 2015, en cambio, estos tres países habían consolidado modelos de sistemas bancarios comerciales claramente diferenciados: dominado por grupos privados domésticos en Brasil, mixto (i.e. mercado dividido entre bancos públicos, privados nacionales y extranjeros) en Argentina, y dominado por bancos extranjeros en México. Este artículo busca el origen de estos distintos desenlaces en el poder de los grupos financieros privados en el periodo ISI, la virulencia de las "crisis gemelas" (cambiarias y bancarias) durante la transición de un régimen de tipo de cambio fijo hacia uno más flexible, y el rol (contingente) de la ideología de los gobernantes.