Suchergebnisse

Motivated by the international business literature that examines the interactions between organizations, corruption, and political forces, we examine whether and how government connections affect small and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) credit access around the world. Using a sample of SMEs across 30 developing countries, we show that SMEs with government connections are significantly less likely to be discouraged from approaching banks for a loan as compared to SMEs without such connections. However, connected SMEs do not receive preferential lending from banks. Moreover, the nature of this effect depends on the institutional setting. Specifically, the effect becomes stronger in countries with high levels of corruption, suggesting that government connections are substitutes for poorly functioning formal institutions. Our findings have important implications for policies targeted at reducing corruption, improving access to financing, facilitating entrepreneurship, and attracting foreign investment.

We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design features on bilateral cross-border deposits (CBD) in a gravity model setting. We find that both the absolute quality of a country''s DI and its relative quality vis-a-vis other countries'' DI generally affect depositor behavior. However, during systemic banking crises, cross-border depositors primarily seek countries with the best DI schemes. Similarly, during the 2008-2009 great financial crisis, the emergency actions taken by the governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, have led to substantial relocations of CBD. (JEL F34, G18)

We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design features on bilateral cross‐border deposits (CBD) in a gravity model setting. We find that both the absolute quality of a country's DI and its relative quality vis‐à‐vis other countries' DI generally affect depositor behavior. However, during systemic banking crises, cross‐border depositors primarily seek countries with the best DI schemes. Similarly, during the 2008–2009 great financial crisis, the emergency actions taken by the governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, have led to substantial relocations of CBD. (JEL F34, G18)

We examine the impact of the existence on an explicit deposit insurance (DI) scheme and its design features on bilateral cross-border deposits (CBD) in a gravity model setting. We find that both the absolute quality of a country's DI and its relative quality vis-à-vis other countries' DI generally affect depositor behavior. However, during systemic banking crises, cross-border depositors primarily seek countries with the best DI schemes. Similarly, during the 2008–2009 great financial crisis, the emergency actions taken by the governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, have led to substantial relocations of CBD. (JEL F34, G18)