Suchergebnisse

Purpose: In forest insurance market, there are three main participants including the insurance company, the forest farmer and the government. As different participant has different benefit object, there will be a complex and dynamic game relationship among all participants. The purpose of this paper is to make the game relationship among all participants in forest insurance market clear, and then to put forward some policy suggestions on the implementation of forest insurance from the view of game theory. Design/methodology/approach: Firstly, the static game model between the insurance company and the forest farmer is set up. According to the result of static game model, it's difficult to implement forest insurance without government. Secondly, the tripartite dynamic game model among the government, the insurance company and the forest farmer is proposed, and the equilibrium solution of tripartite dynamic game model is acquired. Finally, the behavioral characteristics of all participants are analyzed according to the equilibrium solution of tripartite dynamic game model. Findings: the government's allowance will be an important positive factor to implement forest insurance. The loss of the insurance company, which the lower insurance premium brings, can be compensated by the allowance from the government. The more the government provides allowance, the more actively the insurance company will implement forest insurance at a low insurance premium. In this situation, the forest farmer will be more likely to purchase the forest insurance, then the scope of forest insurance implementation will expend. Originality/value: There is a complex and dynamic game relationship among all participants in forest insurance market. Based on the tripartite dynamic game model, to make the game relationship between each participant clear is conducive to the implementation of forest insurance market in China.

Purpose: In forest insurance market, there are three main participants including the insurance company, the forest farmer and the government. As different participant has different benefit object, there will be a complex and dynamic game relationship among all participants. The purpose of this paper is to make the game relationship among all participants in forest insurance market clear, and then to put forward some policy suggestions on the implementation of forest insurance from the view of game theory. Design/methodology/approach: Firstly, the static game model between the insurance company and the forest farmer is set up. According to the result of static game model, it's difficult to implement forest insurance without government. Secondly, the tripartite dynamic game model among the government, the insurance company and the forest farmer is proposed, and the equilibrium solution of tripartite dynamic game model is acquired. Finally, the behavioral characteristics of all participants are analyzed according to the equilibrium solution of tripartite dynamic game model. Findings: The government's allowance will be an important positive factor to implement forest insurance. The loss of the insurance company, which the lower insurance premium brings, can be compensated by the allowance from the government. The more the government provides allowance, the more actively the insurance company will implement forest insurance at a low insurance premium. In this situation, the forest farmer will be more likely to purchase the forest insurance, then the scope of forest insurance implementation will expend. Originality/value: There is a complex and dynamic game relationship among all participants in forest insurance market. Based on the tripartite dynamic game model, to make the game relationship between each participant clear is conducive to the implementation of forest insurance market in China. ; Peer Reviewed

Purpose: In forest insurance market, there are three main participants including the insurance company, the forest farmer and the government. As different participant has different benefit object, there will be a complex and dynamic game relationship among all participants. The purpose of this paper is to make the game relationship among all participants in forest insurance market clear, and then to put forward some policy suggestions on the implementation of forest insurance from the view of game theory. Design/methodology/approach: Firstly, the static game model between the insurance company and the forest farmer is set up. According to the result of static game model, it's difficult to implement forest insurance without government. Secondly, the tripartite dynamic game model among the government, the insurance company and the forest farmer is proposed, and the equilibrium solution of tripartite dynamic game model is acquired. Finally, the behavioral characteristics of all participants are analyzed according to the equilibrium solution of tripartite dynamic game model. Findings: The government's allowance will be an important positive factor to implement forest insurance. The loss of the insurance company, which the lower insurance premium brings, can be compensated by the allowance from the government. The more the government provides allowance, the more actively the insurance company will implement forest insurance at a low insurance premium. In this situation, the forest farmer will be more likely to purchase the forest insurance, then the scope of forest insurance implementation will expend. Originality/value: There is a complex and dynamic game relationship among all participants in forest insurance market. Based on the tripartite dynamic game model, to make the game relationship between each participant clear is conducive to the implementation of forest insurance market in China. ; Peer Reviewed

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we study corporate social responsibility (CSR) in China through the prism of investments. We work with large stocks and assess their CSR performance from agency CSR data. We formulate Chinese CSR by a multiple objective extension of a traditional portfolio selection model and analytically solve the extension. We also solve the extension by a genetic algorithm and directly evaluate the algorithm's performance against the analytical solution. The multiple objective formulation is tested by randomly choosing nondominated portfolios with out‐of‐sample data to identify nondominated portfolios that outperform the 1/n portfolio (equally weighted portfolio). Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Scene reconstruction uses images or videos as input to reconstruct a 3D model of a real scene and has important applications in smart cities, surveying and mapping, military, and other fields. Structure from motion (SFM) is a key step in scene reconstruction, which recovers sparse point clouds from image sequences. However, large-scale scenes cannot be reconstructed using a single compute node. Image matching and geometric filtering take up a lot of time in the traditional SFM problem. In this paper, we propose a novel divide-and-conquer framework to solve the distributed SFM problem. First, we use the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) information from images to calculate the GNSS neighborhood. The number of images matched is greatly reduced by matching each image to only valid GNSS neighbors. This way, a robust matching relationship can be obtained. Second, the calculated matching relationship is used as the initial camera graph, which is divided into multiple subgraphs by the clustering algorithm. The local SFM is executed on several computing nodes to register the local cameras. Finally, all of the local camera poses are integrated and optimized to complete the global camera registration. Experiments show that our system can accurately and efficiently solve the structure from motion problem in large-scale scenes.