Suchergebnisse

To improve low-carbon technology, the government has shifted its strategy from subsidizing low-carbon products (LCP) to low-carbon technology. To analyze the impact of government subsidies based on carbon emission reduction levels on different entities in the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), game theory is used to model the provision of government subsidies to low-carbon enterprises and retailers. The main findings of the paper are that a government subsidy strategy based on carbon emission reduction levels can effectively drive low-carbon enterprises to further reduce the carbon emissions. The government's choice of subsidy has the same effect on the LCP retail price per unit, the sales volume, and the revenue of low-carbon products per unit. When the government subsidizes the retailer, the low-carbon product wholesale price per unit is the highest. That is, low-carbon enterprises use up part of the government subsidies by increasing the wholesale price of low-carbon products. The retail price of low-carbon products per unit is lower than the retail price of low-carbon products in the context of decentralized decision making, but the sales volume and revenue of low-carbon products are greater in the centralized decision-making. The cost–benefit-sharing contract could enable the decentralized decision model to achieve the same level of profit as the centralized decision model.

Authorized remanufacturing is an important means to achieve green manufacturing and carbon neutrality. In this study, a game theory model between a manufacturer and a remanufacturer was constructed to analyze the impact of government subsidies and carbon tax policies on authorized remanufacturing. Based on the game theory model, the effects of two government policies on the optimal solution, namely, the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization and the waste product recovery rate, were compared and analyzed. This analysis could provide a reference for the government to improve and formulate relevant remanufacturing policies. The main results are as follows: government subsidy policies may increase the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization and the rates of waste product recovery; government carbon tax policies may not affect the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization, and increase the rates of waste product recovery; the government subsidy policy may not affect the unit retail price of new products, and reduces the unit retail price of remanufactured products; the government subsidy and carbon tax policies may reduce sales of new products and increase sales of remanufactured products; the government subsidies may increase the revenue of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the remanufacturer; and the government carbon tax policies may increase the revenue of the remanufacturer. However, government carbon tax policies increase the revenue of the OEM only when the new product carbon tax amount is higher than a certain threshold. The impact of the two policies on the environment is related to the ratio of the two products' impact on the environment, i.e., the quota ratio between the unit government carbon tax of the new product and the unit government subsidy of the remanufactured product. Finally, the consumer surplus is maximized when the government adopts the subsidy policy and lowest when the government adopts the carbon tax policy.

AbstractThis article examines whether relationships between social capital characteristics and the willingness of farmers to cooperate in collective action is moderated by the farmers' income level. We employed a structural equation model to analyze the influence of social capital components (social networks, interpersonal trust, social reciprocity, and social participation) on the willingness of farmers to cooperate in collective small‐scale irrigation in Guangling County, Shanxi Province of China. This analysis was complemented by a multigroup analysis to measure the potential variance effects across income groups. Our results show that low‐ and middle‐income farmers give more importance to the aspects of social networks, social reciprocity, and social participation, while high‐income farmers place emphasis on interpersonal trust and social participation. Accordingly, the willingness of farmers to cooperate for the different income groups was influenced in different ways in relation to the various social capital components. Therefore, social capital and income differences have complex effects on the willingness of farmers to cooperate. In this regard, our research provides an alternative way to understand the complex process involved in the formation of collective action under the presence of increasing economic heterogeneity in local communities.