The adaption problem, evolution and normative economics
In: Papers on economics & evolution 0708
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In: Papers on economics & evolution 0708
In: Journal of human development and capabilities: a multi-disciplinary journal for people-centered development, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 161-181
ISSN: 1945-2837
In: Journal of human development and capabilities: a multi-disciplinary journal for people-centered development, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 145-161
ISSN: 1945-2837
In: Human Development in Times of Crisis, S. 195-209
In: Journal of human development and capabilities: a multi-disciplinary journal for people-centered development, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 22-34
ISSN: 1945-2837
In: Economica, Band 77, Heft 306, S. 410-411
ISSN: 1468-0335
Informed or rational desire, capability and prudential value list views of well-being - must accommodate human limitations, as well as address issues about adaptation and paternalism. They sometimes address adaptation by toughening the requirement(s) on those desires, satisfaction of which constitutes well-being. That exacerbates a concern that these accounts if adopted will encourage policies which override actual desires and enforce paternalistic restrictions. Sunstein, like Sen, invokes democratic deliberation to address the adaptation problem, and advocates autonomy promoting paternalistic restrictions. Sunstein and Thaler's 'libertarian paternalism' extends this flavour of argument to cover examples of irrationality from behavioural economics. Their variation of the informed desire account involves highly idealized preferences which cannot, in practical terms, guide a paternalistic social planner, but lead to a potentially large range of cases where paternalistic intervention might, in principle, be justified. I argue that the liberal paternalist policy agenda should as currently conceived be resisted.
BASE
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 251-266
ISSN: 1741-3060
Amartya Sen's recent works on identity have emerged at the same time as a much wider and growing literature on the topic across the disciplines of politics, philosophy, and economics. This article outlines some of Sen's claims and attempts a partial elucidation of their relationship to some strands in the relevant literatures on identity, community, and justice. It thereby frames Sen's works in such a way as to facilitate comparisons with other views on identity and multiculturalism, community, justice, and recognition which feature in this volume and the relevant literatures. Framing Sen's work in this way also helps to clarify Sen's position in relation to those of Bhikhu Parekh and certain communitarian thinkers.
Informed or rational desire, capability and prudential value list views of well-being - must accommodate human limitations, as well as address issues about adaptation and paternalism. They sometimes address adaptation by toughening the requirement(s) on those desires, satisfaction of which constitutes well-being. That exacerbates a concern that these accounts if adopted will encourage policies which override actual desires and enforce paternalistic restrictions. Sunstein, like Sen, invokes democratic deliberation to address the adaptation problem, and advocates autonomy promoting paternalistic restrictions. Sunstein and Thaler's 'libertarian paternalism' extends this flavour of argument to cover examples of irrationality from behavioural economics. Their variation of the informed desire account involves highly idealized preferences which cannot, in practical terms, guide a paternalistic social planner, but lead to a potentially large range of cases where paternalistic intervention might, in principle, be justified. I argue that the liberal paternalist policy agenda should as currently conceived be resisted.
BASE
In: The journal of philosophical economics: reflections on economic and social issues, Band I Issue 1, Heft Articles
ISSN: 1844-8208
This paper examines the implications of some of the growing literature at the borderline of ethics and economics for development debates. It argues that this literature has already had considerable impact on development economics, particularly as a result of work on well-being and capabilities. Other areas where there has been considerable growth include population ethics and the area which explores the link between the contractarian tradition in moral philosophy and game theory. Work here has had less impact on development economics, and there is considerable scope for more work. Finally, both ethics and economics have been criticised for taking too abstract a view of human beings. Each has begun to take on this line of criticism and work which responds to it in various ways - such as by taking account of issues relating to identity, allowing for hard choices and fuzziness - is relevant to development.
In: Journal of human development, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 327-335
ISSN: 1469-9516
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 169-192
ISSN: 1741-3060
Amartya Sen has recently suggested that certain issues which arise in the application of the capability approach can be seen in terms of social choice. This article explores certain connections and tensions between Kenneth Arrow's celebrated discussion of social choice and the capability approach while focusing on one central link: pluralism. Given the variety of values people hold, substantive issues which arise in the application of the capability approach can be seen as social choice problems. Seeing them in this way helps to explain some of Sen's suggestions about applying the approach in the light of an analogue of Arrow's theorem. However, it also poses a potential problem because of the focus on preferences in social choice theory, given that the capability approach is motivated in part by problems which `adaptive preferences' raise for `utility'-based views. In this article, it is argued that Sen's writings about public reasoning allow him to address this problem to some degree. The reading underlying this argument clarifies issues about the relationship between the individual and society in his approach. It also illuminates the extent of Sen's debt to John Rawls's writings on `public reason', while clarifying some points on which Sen and Rawls diverge.
In: Journal of human development, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 291-298
ISSN: 1469-9516
In: Journal of human development, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 145-150
ISSN: 1469-9516
In: Journal of human development, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 355-375
ISSN: 1469-9516