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International Conflict: Logic and Evidence is based on the premise that proper understanding of international conflict - a necessary prerequisite for achieving peace - can come only from logic and evidence, not from opinion and anecdote. This groundbreaking book introduces students to international conflict's key theories and empirical research. Throughout the text, author Stephen L. Quackenbush gives examples that enable readers to see the theory in real-world events, and provides the data from the most recent research. Covering the entire process of interstate war, from causes of conflict to escalation, conduct, resolution, and recurrence, the book provides readers with a fascinating, thorough study that will help them understand how international conflict works.

This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises.

This book bridges the divide between formal and quantitative studies of deterrence by empirically testing and extending perfect deterrence theory. The author focuses on general deterrence, which relates to managing relations between states at all times, not only during crises. This distinction is important because understanding general deterrence is more important than understanding immediate deterrence, and because empirical analyses of immediate deterrence can be misleading due to selection effects. In a series of formal and quantitative analyses, the author tests perfect deterrence theory, applies the theory to explain recurrent conflict, and develops a new three-party game of extended deterrence.

Many theories of international conflict are based on the premise that war can occur by accident. The basic idea of accidental war is that crisis situations can spiral out of control, leading to the outbreak of a war despite no one having decided to go to war. Although World War I is often claimed to be the prime example of such an accidental war, modern research suggests that it began as a result of deliberate choices, not by accident. Nonetheless, accidental war continues to be used as an important building block in many theories, including theories of deterrence, bargaining, and the spiral model. In this article, I examine the validity of the assumption that wars can begin by accident, as well as the implications that the lack of accidental wars has for international relations theory.

"Empirical Analyses of Deterrence" published on by Oxford University Press.

Bargaining models argue that wars usually terminate when the information gap closes enough to create a bargaining range. Although this convergence is assumed to be straightforward, factors that identify the information regarding the likely military outcome to the belligerents have not been identified. One of Clausewitz's main ideas was that states can win wars by attacking the enemy's centers of gravity, which I argue provide an important way through which information convergence is achieved. I examine the importance of three centers of gravity—capturing the enemy's capital, destroying the enemy's military forces, and eliminating enemy allies from the war—on war outcomes through a quantitative analysis of wars from 1816 to 2007.

Although deterrence theory was a central focus in the study of International Relations during the Cold War, attention has shifted away from deterrence since the end of that conflict. Nonetheless, deterrence is a general phenomenon that is not limited to any particular time or space. Moving beyond a simple focus on the US-Soviet relationship, scholars have recently begun further explorations of deterrence, through development of theory, analysis of policy alternatives, and empirical analysis. This article seeks to evaluate where deterrence theory stands today through: (1) a consideration of distinctions between different strands of theory; (2) a discussion of the assumption of rationality in deterrence theory; (3) an examination of three important distinctions in deterrence; (4) an evaluation of the difficult task of testing deterrence theory, and (5) an overview of recent theoretical developments. The primary conclusion is that perfect deterrence theory provides a logically consistent alternative to classical deterrence theory and therefore provides the most appropriate basis for further theoretical development, empirical testing, and application to policy. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractAlthough deterrence theory was a central focus in the study of International Relations during the Cold War, attention has shifted away from deterrence since the end of that conflict. Nonetheless, deterrence is a general phenomenon that is not limited to any particular time or space. Moving beyond a simple focus on the US-Soviet relationship, scholars have recently begun further explorations of deterrence, through development of theory, analysis of policy alternatives, and empirical analysis. This article seeks to evaluate where deterrence theory stands today through: (1) a consideration of distinctions between different strands of theory; (2) a discussion of the assumption of rationality in deterrence theory; (3) an examination of three important distinctions in deterrence; (4) an evaluation of the difficult task of testing deterrence theory, and (5) an overview of recent theoretical developments. The primary conclusion is that perfect deterrence theory provides a logically consistent alternative to classical deterrence theory and therefore provides the most appropriate basis for further theoretical development, empirical testing, and application to policy.

It is well established that territorial issues are highly conflict prone. Furthermore, dyads encountering conflicts over territory should be expected to fight more frequently, with shorter durations of peace than other dyads. However, the growing literature examining factors leading to the recurrence of conflict has largely ignored the impact of territorial issues, focusing instead on factors such as the type of dispute settlement. In this article, I seek to examine the relationship between territorial issues, settlements, and conflict recurrence through survival analyses of the periods of peace following 2,974 dyadic militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 2001.

The current stance of the Bush administration has renewed debate on the implications of national missile defense. While a large part of that debate concerns its technical and economic feasibility, there is also considerable debate concerning the ramifications of national missile defense for international peace and stability. Unfortunately, few studies have analyzed the implications of missile defense through the lens of deterrence theory. Those that have were based on classical deterrence theory, which is plagued by a variety of logical inconsistencies and empirical anomalies. Accordingly, I examine the implications of national missile defense for deterrence from the vantage point of an alternative theory of deterrence, perfect deterrence theory. The results indicate that national missile defense generally enhances the stability of deterrence; the greatest threat missile defense poses is causing dissatisfaction in potential challengers.

Although in reality, states simultaneously pursue direct and extended deterrence, extant theories of deterrence have considered direct and extended deterrence situations separately. Furthermore, extended deterrence theories have not modeled all three actors in extended deterrence situations. To overcome these limitations in the literature, the author develops the three-party extended deterrence game and analyzes it with both complete and incomplete information, allowing conclusions to be drawn regarding deterrence and the related areas of alliance reliability and war expansion. For example, the findings indicate that deterrence is most likely to succeed when the alliance between Defender and Protégé is reliable. However, neither Defender nor Protégé wishes to be a more reliable ally than the other; if there is an asymmetry in reliability, Challenger will chose the more reliable state to attack in order to avoid a multilateral war. This counterintuitive conclusion was only reached by considering all three actors in extended deterrence.

Since states cannot fight without the opportunity to do so, empirical identification of opportunity is important. Unfortunately, previous measures of opportunity—politically relevant dyads, the politically relevant international environment, and regional dyads—are inadequate. I attempt to measure opportunity by developing the concept of a politically active dyad, using contiguity, power status, and alliances as defining characteristics. I then use Braumoeller and Goertz's (2000) methodology for necessary conditions to compare active dyads with previous measures. This test demonstrates that although previous measures are unable to capture opportunity as a necessary condition for international conflict, the concept of politically active dyads does.