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The Second World War is often regarded as a virtually total conflict, with few mutual restraints to bind the belligerents to less than maximum use of their destructive capabilities. While it is generally remembered that poison gas and bacteriological weapons were not used, these limits are usually cited as great exceptions to the rule. Relatively little notice has been taken of the restraints in Europe on the use of conventional high-explosive and incendiary bombs in aerial bombardment, restraints which remained in effect for an unexpectedly long time after the start of the war.

George H. Quester argues that the possiblity of nuclear war continues to loom despite the reduction in stockpiles by the major powers. Supporters of total nuclear disarmament often dismiss pessimistic objections to the possiblity of reaching nuclear zero as being hypothetical, but this book looks at real illustrations for this possibility, taken from the years that gave the world the Manhattan Project. Any advocate of total nuclear disarmament must deal with the challenge of "realist" analysts of international relations, those who worry that being at zero nuclear weapons, or even close to zero, would be unstable and dangerous. Mutual fears could be self-confirming, leading to cheating on disarmament, and even nuclear war. While such fears are often dismissed as theoretical or hypothetical, this book attempts to test them against the real-life experience of the last time we were at nuclear zero. The years from 1933 to 1945 saw many such self-confirming fears, leading to the Manhattan Project and the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Optimism about the future cannot be ruled out totally, but the history of our experience with nuclear disarmament must be examined carefully to identify the crucial prerequisites for elimination of such weapons of mass destruction. This book is required reading for courses on arms control, defense policy, and international relations, or for readers looking for historical background on a critical global issue. -- Front jacket flap

This provocative and timely work examines various scenarios in which the deployment of nuclear weapons could occur, the probable consequences of such an escalation, the likely world reactions, and the plausible policy ramifications. Rather than projecting the physical damage that would result from nuclear attacks, George H. Quester offers an exploration of the political, psychological, and social aftermath of nuclear conflict. The prospect of nuclear attack - sixty years after atomic bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki - is difficult to confront on many levels. We may avoid the discussion for emotional reasons, for fear of generating a self-confirming hypothesis, or simply because of the general "nuclear taboo." But there are also self-denying propositions to be harnessed here: if the world gives some advance thought to how nuclear weapons might be used again, such attacks may be headed off. If the world avoids nuclear weapons use until the year 2045, it will be able to celebrate one hundred years of nuclear concord. Quester suggests that this may be achieved through the careful consideration of possible nuclear deployment scenarios and their consequences. In this insightful analysis, he provides a starting point for informed and focused reflection and preparation

The end of the Cold War came as good news for most of the world. No one had predicted the collapse of Communist rule for several decades. This book looks at how political scientists failed to predict such a quick resolution and ways in which the world might develop post Cold War.