Suchergebnisse

This article examines why the decades-old Moro insurgency in Mindanao, southern Philippines, has remained difficult to resolve, and how recent international developments, such as the jihadization of once secular ethno-nationalist movements and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have influenced it. The author argues that jihadism made significant inroads in the Moro nationalist struggle already in the 1990s, way before 9/11, and that since 2007, a more moderate Islamism has gained ascendancy. He argues further that the Moro insurgency has remained intractable because of grave errors committed by the Arroyo and Aquino administrations; recurrent outbursts of anti-Moro hysteria incited by demagogic politicians; and a continuing weak third-party role in the Mindanao peace process. He warns that the apparent collapse of the most recent peace pact between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) poses the danger of the possible rise of new ISIS-linked jihadist groups.

"Sie sind Flecken auf der Landkarte - und doch sind die kleinen Inseln, Riffe, Sandbänke und Felsen im Südchinesischen Meer heute Gegenstand eines brisanten Disputs, der sich zu einem Brennpunkt der internationalen Politik entwickelt. Seit 2011 hat es eine Reihe von Zwischenfällen gegeben, die fast zu bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen geführt hätten. Der Bau von künstlichen Inseln auf den Riffen des Spratly-Archipels durch China hat seine Nachbarn alarmiert, aber auch die USA, die nach wie vor die dominierende Macht im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum sind. Das Südchinesische Meer und das angrenzende Ostchinesische Meer sind 'ein Pulverfass aus Wasser'." (Autorenreferat)

In recent years, Maoist insurgents in the Philippines have intensified their extortion activities through 'revolutionary taxation' and through the collection of 'permit to campaign'/'permit to win' (PTC/PTW) fees during elections. This article examines why the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), through its guerrilla force, the New People's Army (NPA), has resorted to, and put greater emphasis on, 'revolutionary' extortion. It analyzes whether greed rather than grievance has now become the main driving factor behind the Maoist insurgency, and what the turn to larger scale extortion indicates about the CPP-NPA's logistical situation and its revolutionary strategy. The author argues that the intensification of revolutionary extortion has been brought about by the decline, uncertainty or political indefensibility of other revenue sources, and by favourable factors such as high levels of electoral violence and the mining boom. Despite the turn to extortion, the CPP-NPA has not degenerated into banditry and it continues to be an ideologically motivated revolutionary force. Rather than demonstrating the renewed strength of the Maoist insurgency, however, the stepped-up extortion activities are showing up the insurgents' serious logistical problems, and continuing strategic dilemmas.

Despite declaring their intentions to recognize human-rights standards and international humanitarian law through the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), neither the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) nor the Communist Party of the Philippines -New People's Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) have been truly determined to improve the human rights situation in the Philippines caused by almost four decades of conflict. Both sides wish to destroy each other militarily as well as use the peace talks as a diversionary tactic. To say that one or both sides are not really serious about the whole process may seem too facile an explanation for the lack of progress in the talks. But indeed, neither side has demonstrated genuine sincerity to the process. The Philippine government is dominated by a politico-economic elite composed of powerful families that manipulate elections through patronage, corruption, and violence. Meanwhile, the CPP-NPA-NDF seeks to overthrow the government and establish a "people's democracy" based on a Stalinist-Maoist one-party dictatorship. The solution lies in third party forces: civil-society organizations and international political entities.

Elections in the Philippines have long been the turf of trapos - traditional politicians identified with the country's oligarchic elite. At the same time, elections have been one of the weakest spots on the left. This is so not only because the trapos have always seen to it that there is no level playing field, but also because for some time, a large section of the left rejected elections as "bourgeois" exercises and chose to boycott them and fight in other arenas. This article examines the electoral challenge of the left - communists and the Communist Party-aligned "national democrats," as well as social democrats and independent socialists - to the trapos and traditional parties in the Philippines. The author argues that the left has not made much progress in breaking trapo domination over the post-Marcos political party and electoral systems not so much because of its long-held aversion to electoral politics, as some scholars contend, but more because of the persistence of an instrumental view of democratic processes and institutions - at least within a sizeable part of the left. But this is changing. The author observes that some emergent left parties have adopted or are moving toward an integral view of democracy. These emergent forces have made vital breakthroughs in the congressional partylist vote and are now more methodically entering other electoral contests, particularly at the barangay (village) and municipal levels. (Crit Asian Stud/DÜI)