Suchergebnisse

The doctrine of double effect -- ie, that the pursuit of a good tends to be less acceptable where a resulting harm is intended as a means than where it is merely foreseen -- is examined. As generally stated, the doctrine may lead to uninviting moral distinctions because it rests on an underlying theory of the intentional, which may vary with description of choices & the closeness of choice & outcome. However, distinguishing between direct & indirect agency shows a genuine difference in the intentional structures of contrasting cases even under a strict interpretation of what is intended & even if intention stems from a choice to act or not to act. The doctrine of double effect rests on the principle of respect for persons over & above duty not to harm or to prevent harm, & on the strong moral presumption that those involved in promotion of a goal that may lead to loss of an independent moral right, such as loss of life or bodily integrity, should do so voluntarily. It grants each person the veto power over attempts to make the world a better place at his or her expense. D. Generoli

It is argued that the traditional justification of criminal punishment -- that the moral right to punish derives from a prior self-protective right to place people under real threat of punishment -- is incorrect. An imaginary situation is described in which sophisticated mechanical devices are capable of enforcing the law by dispensing mechanical "punishments" to wrongdoers. The right to protection against crime justifies the use of such devices given that they are suitably programmed. It is shown that this justified self-protective system of mechanical punishment is morally equivalent to a justified system of real punishment: the same offenses are properly penalized, & the same penalties properly dispensed, under each system; &, in a real system of punishment, the right to establish the threat of punishment generates a later right to deliver actual punishments. Thus, acts of punishment do not need to be justified by more than the self-protective interest in making deterrent threats. Modified AA