Suchergebnisse

This book provides readers with an updated discussion of important and practical social justice issues, presenting issues from a new perspective, based on the author´s research. Coverage includes such concepts as morality, fairness, and self-deception

AbstractAccording to the so-called presumption of equality, a person who does not know whether there is an acceptable reason for differential treatment should just presume the similarity of the cases and treat them equally. If we assume that the presumption of equality is an acceptable moral principle, at least when the allocation cannot be postponed and an equal distribution of goods is possible, then an important question arises: when exactly does the allocator have sufficient reasons for differential treatment and is not relevantly ignorant? This is a question about the required strength of the "acceptable reasons" for differential treatment. It has been commonplace to think that the presumption of equality demands that the reasons that refute the presumption must be very strong and that differential treatment requires that there is a proper justification for the claim that the cases are relevantly different. I will argue, however, that refuting the presumption and solving the issue (of whether the cases are relevantly similar or relevantly different) are two separate matters. A person can have good enough reasons for rejecting the presumption that the cases are relevantly similar without having reasons that she could present as a full justification for the claim that the cases are relevantly different. A precondition of the applicability of the presumption of equality is ignorance, but not ignorance in the sense of "not having a full justification".

I analyze the view that most political conspiracy theories should be rejected on the grounds that they embody "an almost nihilistic degree of skepticism". This view has been widely criticized, but I will aim to show that the objections presented so far are not wholly convincing. I will argue that the claim that most conspiracy theorists end in making claims of larger and larger conspiracies is mistaken, as the empirical evidence concerning conspiracy theories does not support such view. Expanding one's theory in the face of criticism has been only one strategy among many, and conspiracy theorists need not accept skepticism.

This volume gathers together previously unpublished articles focusing on the relationship between preference adaptation and autonomy in connection with human enhancement and in the end-of-life context. The value of individual autonomy is a cornerstone of liberal societies. While there are different conceptions of the notion, it is arguable that on any plausible understanding of individual autonomy an autonomous agent needs to take into account the conditions that circumscribe its actions. Yet it has also been suggested that allowing one's options to affect one's preferences threatens autonomy. While this phenomenon has received some attention in other areas of moral philosophy, it has seldom been considered in bioethics. This book combines for the first time the topics of preference adaptation, individual autonomy, and choosing to die or to enhance human capacities in a unique and comprehensive volume, filling an important knowledge gap in the contemporary bioethics literature

This book provides an in-depth analysis of the ethical, social and philosophical issues related to modern genetic research and gene technology. The aim of the book is to introduce systematic research on the social and ethical impacts of the use and development of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) as well as the acquisition, use and storage of human genetic information (HGI). The book has been written from the viewpoint of social and political philosophy.