Suchergebnisse

Existe una tensión inherente entre el populismo y el constitucionalismo que se materializa, una vez que el populismo está en el poder, en la necesidad de cooptar o al menos neutralizar el poder judicial y los órganos del sistema de justicia que tienen el papel de interpretar la constitución. El poder judicial puede resistir y contribuir a que el populismo revitalice la democracia en lugar de erosionarla. Sin embargo, las posibilidades de hacerlo dependen de su legitimidad entre la ciudadanía y de la composición partidista de los poderes ejecutivo y legislativo. Estos argumentos se ilustran a partir del análisis del caso de México, en particular el primer trienio (2018-‍2021) de la administración del presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador y su Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (MORENA).

AbstractLegal reforms that make judges independent from political pressures and empower them with judicial review do not make an effective judiciary. Something has to fill the gap between institutional design and effectiveness. When the executive and legislative powers react to an objectionable judicial decision, the judiciary may be weak and deferential; but coordination difficulties between the elected branches can loosen the constraints on courts. This article argues that the fragmentation of political power can enable a judiciary to rule against power holders' interests without being systematically challenged or ignored. This argument is tested with an analysis of the Mexican Supreme Court decisions against the PRI on constitutional cases from 1994 to 2002. The probability of the court's voting against the PRI increased as the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997 and the presidency in 2000.

This article maps current constitutional adjudication systems in 17 Latin American democracies. Using recent theoretical literature, the authors classify systems by type (concrete or abstract), timing (a priori or a posteriori), and jurisdiction (centralized or decentralized). This approach captures the richness and diversity of constitutional adjudication in Latin America, where most countries concurrently have two or more mechanisms. Four models of constitutional adjudication are currently in use. In the past, weak democratic institutions and the prevalence of inter partes, as opposed to erga omnes, effects of judicial decisions, prevented the development of constitutional adjudication. Today, democratic consolidation has strengthened the judiciary and fostered constitutional adjudication. After discussing the models, the authors highlight the role of the judiciary in the constitutional adjudication bodies, the broad range of options existing to initiate this adjudication process, and the prevalence of amparo (habeas corpus) provisions.

The Mexican Constitution of 1917 granted the Supreme Court the power to handpick lower court judges and oversee their careers. For almost eight decades this capacity was not regulated. To fill this void, the justices began to take turns filling vacancies which developed into an informal institution – the so-called 'Gentlemen's Pact'. Using original archival data, we document and describe the birth and development of this practice and argue that it consolidated into an informal institution as the judiciary increased in size. We uncover the workings of this social norm that established a patronage model of judicial selection. Our analysis period ends in 1994, when a constitutional reform created a judicial council with the explicit aim of ending patronage and corruption within the judiciary.

[ES] En este artículo se propone un marco teórico para estudiar el comportamiento judicial en relación a la cuestión militar, tanto desde una perspectiva legal como política. La investigación centra la atención en la jurisprudencia sobre el alcance de la jurisdicción militar de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN) de México entre los años 1917 y 2012. Este tema es relativamente limitado, pero constituye una ventana privilegiada para observar la naturaleza dual (legal y política) de la SCJN, dado que captura las respuestas legales ofrecidas ante una materia altamente política, así como los modos en los que el diseño constitucional de las instituciones judiciales ha afectado la jurisprudencia de esta Corte. Se argumenta que el papel de la SCJN en relación al tema analizado se divide en tres períodos marcados por importantes cambios en los roles constitucionales y políticos de la justicia, y que éstos conducen a tres respuestas diferentes a la cuestión legal del alcance adecuado de la jurisdicción militar. Basado en el análisis legal y político, se argumenta que de 1917 a 1934 los jueces de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación jugaron un rol de árbitros; de 1934 a 1994 de partidarios del régimen; y de 1994 a 2012 jugaron en gran medida el rol de intérpretes de la Constitución en la cuestión de la jurisdicción militar. ; [EN] We propose a theoretical framework based on the concept of role that enables analyses of judicial behavior from the legal and political perspectives simultaneously. We focus on the Mexican Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the scope of the military jurisdiction from 1917 to 2012. This topic is a relatively small but privileged window from which to observe the dual legal/political nature of the Supreme Court because it captures the legal responses that it has given on a highly political question, as well as the ways in which the constitutional design of judicial institutions has affected the court's jurisprudence. We argue that our account is divided into three broad periods marked by important changes in the Justices' constitutional and political roles that lead to three different responses to the legal question regarding the proper scope of the military jurisdiction. Based on the legal and political analysis, we argue that from 1917 to 1934 the Supreme Court Justices' played the role of adjudicators; from 1934 to 1994 they played the role of regime supporters; and from 1994 to 2012 they largely played the role of constitutional interpreters in the question of military jurisdiction.