Manipulation and Equity-Based Compensation
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 2, S. 285-290
ISSN: 1944-7981
8 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 2, S. 285-290
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: Journal of political economy, Band 90, Heft 5, S. 1035-1053
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: Oxford scholarship online
In the fully revised second edition of 'Market Liquidity', Thierry Foucault, Marco Pagano, and Ailsa Röell offer a comprehensive take on the liquidity of securities markets, its determinants, and its effects. Including new illustrative examples of market malfunction and novel insights from recent research on security markets, the authors bring readers up to speed on changes in market structures and financial regulation. New chapters cover the relationship between financial instability and market liquidity, as well as the role and effects of algorithmic and high-frequency trading.
SSRN
Working paper
In: Enterprise & society: the international journal of business history, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 197-221
ISSN: 1467-2235
Since the late seventeenth century, trust offices (administratiekantoren) that repackage securities have been a central institution in Dutch finance. Their basic form and functioning have remained largely the same, but over time, the repackaging has come to serve different purposes. Originally set up for administrative convenience, they helped to create liquidity, notably for foreign securities. From the 1930s, their primary purpose became to shield directors of large corporations from shareholder influence and hostile takeover threats. Subsequently, the trust offices evolved from general-purpose administrative units into dedicated foundations closely tied to individual companies and increasingly popular with foreign corporations as cheap anti-takeover devices. Their reincarnation as foundations also turned them into vehicles for the tax-efficient routing of international revenue flows via the Netherlands.
SSRN
Working paper
This paper analyses ownership and control structures of Dutch listed companies. Legislation effective since 1992 mandates all shareholders with holdings of 5 percent or more in Dutch companies to disclose their holdings. Our analysis shows that the average ownership stakes of the largest and the three largest shareholders are 27% and 41%, respectively. The average ownership stakes of banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions are relatively low. We observe that voting rights are more concentrated than ownership rights the use of a supervisory board representing interests of different stakeholders is ubiquitous; and listed companies use different forms of antitakeover defence measures.
BASE
SSRN