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Science diplomacy recently has gained a remarkable foothold in European policymaking. Both the European Commission and many Member States use the term to label a whole range of issues and activities in their respective policies. This prompts the question what exactly is the current role of the European Commission in the field of external research policies as compared to the Member States traditionally in charge of it. The article draws on the conceptual framework of multi-level governance, in particular the distinction between Type I and Type II governance systems. The aim is to show that the well-established setups for science policy and foreign affairs in the EU at present channel most of the Commission's activities in ways that not run counter to the interests of the Member States. The institutionally set parameters entail a focus on existing programs and activities. However, the Type II character of science diplomacy governance in principle leaves room for changes in jurisdictions and the division of labor, which are subsequently discussed. The paper's argument rests upon the qualitative analysis of expert interviews conducted with representatives from Member States, the Commission, Switzerland, and the US.

Science diplomacy recently has gained a remarkable foothold in European policymaking. Both the European Commission and many Member States use the term to label a whole range of issues and activities in their respective policies. This prompts the question what exactly is the current role of the European Commission in the field of external research policies as compared to the Member States traditionally in charge of it. The article draws on the conceptual framework of multi-level governance, in particular the distinction between Type I and Type II governance systems. The aim is to show that the well-established setups for science policy and foreign affairs in the EU at present channel most of the Commission's activities in ways that not run counter to the interests of the Member States. The institutionally set parameters entail a focus on existing programs and activities. However, the Type II character of science diplomacy governance in principle leaves room for changes in jurisdictions and the division of labor, which are subsequently discussed. The paper's argument rests upon the qualitative analysis of expert interviews conducted with representatives from Member States, the Commission, Switzerland, and the US.

The last decade has seen the emergence of several organisations dedicated to pursue national science diplomacy agendas. Among others, countries like the UK, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark established science and innovation diplomacy agencies. We comparatively examine three cases: The UK's Science and Innovation Network, the Swiss SWISSNEX, and the Danish Innovation Centre Denmark. We look for similarities and dissimilarities in terms of organisational setup, locations, governance and funding, topics and objectives, and tasks. We put forward three analytical dimensions that shape the organisations' activities. Tensions between headquarters and periphery determine the range of possible activities on the ground. Agencies have to deal with challenges arising from the different mind-sets of diplomats and scientists. Last, but not least, the organisations have to decide whether to primarily engage either in the promotion of (basic) science or in the commercial application of research. The three cases each feature distinct characteristics. While SWISSNEX and Innovation Centre Denmark have a strong take on the promotion of domestic research, innovation, and products, UK's network engages in a broader spectrum of activities and topics at the nexus of science, economics, and foreign policy objectives. Despite differences in their objectives and organisational setup, all agencies have established offices at hotbeds of science and innovation—particularly in the BRICS—, carry out similar tasks on the ground, and focus on comparable topics. A lack of reliable performance indicators hampers the assessment of individual agencies and outposts, thus making it difficult to judge the success of the respective agencies. While the agencies have developed an integrative narrative of innovation as encompassing all activities from basic research to commercial application, officers on the ground predominantly pursue their goals against the backdrop of a linear model of innovation, focusing either on fundamental research or on applying scientific insights into business opportunities. It is unlikely that many new offices will be established in the near future. Most likely, additional growth will be triggered when emerging economies like Brazil, India, or China start to establish their own science diplomacy agencies.

The last decade has seen the emergence of several organisations dedicated to pursue national science diplomacy agendas. Among others, countries like the UK, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark established science and innovation diplomacy agencies. We comparatively examine three cases: The UK's Science and Innovation Network, the Swiss SWISSNEX, and the Danish Innovation Centre Denmark. We look for similarities and dissimilarities in terms of organisational setup, locations, governance and funding, topics and objectives, and tasks. We put forward three analytical dimensions that shape the organisations' activities. Tensions between headquarters and periphery determine the range of possible activities on the ground. Agencies have to deal with challenges arising from the different mind-sets of diplomats and scientists. Last, but not least, the organisations have to decide whether to primarily engage either in the promotion of (basic) science or in the commercial application of research. The three cases each feature distinct characteristics. While SWISSNEX and Innovation Centre Denmark have a strong take on the promotion of domestic research, innovation, and products, UK's network engages in a broader spectrum of activities and topics at the nexus of science, economics, and foreign policy objectives. Despite differences in their objectives and organisational setup, all agencies have established offices at hotbeds of science and innovation—particularly in the BRICS—, carry out similar tasks on the ground, and focus on comparable topics. A lack of reliable performance indicators hampers the assessment of individual agencies and outposts, thus making it difficult to judge the success of the respective agencies. While the agencies have developed an integrative narrative of innovation as encompassing all activities from basic research to commercial application, officers on the ground predominantly pursue their goals against the backdrop of a linear model of innovation, focusing either on fundamental ...

- Both practitioners and scholars tend to regard Science and Technology Agreements (STA) to be important, prominent, and highly effective tools for science diplomacy (SD). Yet it is far from clear whether they form an integral part of strategic approaches toward SD or mostly remain rather erratic ad-hoc agreements with more probably vague or even insignificant roles. Since we know but little about the development of STA over time, it is very difficult to get data and a valid picture on what is going on there at all and what impact STA might have. - Based on a working definition of STA, we conducted a quantitative study to map the STA that six countries (DK, FR, DE, CH, UK, U.S.) and the European Union have signed between 1961 and 2016. In addition, through a range of expert interviews, we tried to capture practitioners' views on the role and workings of STA in the realms of international science policy and SD in particular. - What we see is a large increase in the number of concluded STA over time. While some of the countries in our sample made extensive use of STA, others were more hesitant or even reluctant to do so. Still, we witness a strong integration of G20-states in a network of bilateral STA. To illustrate the highly diverse uses and importance of STA, we present four cases of negotiations that point to their limited strategic use. From our expert interviews, we could differentiate between four types of views or opinions with regard to the uses of STA. - If we view STA in their respective political context, some apparently erratic provisions turn into meaningful strategic instruments. Overall, STA may carry different meanings to different stakeholders engaged in the negotiations; this is why they always serve as boundary objects. - For future research, it would be worthwhile to look into the interconnections, or interplays, between STA and other tools of SD on the one hand and contextual variables like geopolitical shifts and organisational backgrounds that shape negotiations and appraisal of STA on the other.

The research on cross-national research cooperation, including the categories of Global South/North, tends to leave out the issue of research funding. However, research funders are no neutral infrastructure by and for the scientific community, but represent societal, political, or economic stakeholders, whose expectations shape funding policy goals and practices. In consequence, funders need to be integrated as intermediary organization when discussing the ideology and effects of geographic pairing. In our article, we develop and sustain the proposition that an analysis of funders' views is imperative to understand the ways international research collaborations of unequally equipped participants are perceived, maintained, and sometimes reframed over time. Building on interview data and policy documents from six countries, we analyze the semantics employed to make sense of North–South relationships. We find that narratives from development cooperation complement and sometimes supersede the traditionally liberal meta-narrative of scientific collaborations.

The research on cross-national research cooperation, including the categories of Global South/North, tends to leave out the issue of research funding. However, research funders are no neutral infrastructure by and for the scientific community, but represent societal, political, or economic stakeholders, whose expectations shape funding policy goals and practices. In consequence, funders need to be integrated as intermediary organization when discussing the ideology and effects of geographic pairing. In our article, we develop and sustain the proposition that an analysis of funders' views is imperative to understand the ways international research collaborations of unequally equipped participants are perceived, maintained, and sometimes reframed over time. Building on interview data and policy documents from six countries, we analyze the semantics employed to make sense of North–South relationships. We find that narratives from development cooperation complement and sometimes supersede the traditionally liberal meta-narrative of scientific collaborations.

Both practitioners and scholars tend to regard Science and Technology Agreements (STA) to be important, prominent, and highly effective tools for science diplomacy (SD). Yet it is far from clear whether they form an integral part of strategic approaches toward SD or mostly remain rather erratic ad-hoc agreements with more probably vague or even insignificant roles. Since we know but little about the development of STA over time, it is very difficult to get data and a valid picture on what is going on there at all and what impact STA might have. • Based on a working definition of STA, we conducted a quantitative study to map the STA that six countries (DK, FR, DE, CH, UK, U.S.) and the European Union have signed between 1961 and 2016. In addition, through a range of expert interviews, we tried to capture practitioners' views on the role and workings of STA in the realms of international science policy and SD in particular. • What we see is a large increase in the number of concluded STA over time. While some of the countries in our sample made extensive use of STA, others were more hesitant or even reluctant to do so. Still, we witness a strong integration of G20-states in a network of bilateral STA. To illustrate the highly diverse uses and importance of STA, we present four cases of negotiations that point to their limited strategic use. From our expert interviews, we could differentiate between four types of views or opinions with regard to the uses of STA. • If we view STA in their respective political context, some apparently erratic provisions turn into meaningful strategic instruments. Overall, STA may carry different meanings to different stakeholders engaged in the negotiations; this is why they always serve as boundary objects. • For future research, it would be worthwhile to look into the interconnections, or interplays, between STA and other tools of SD on the one hand and contextual variables like geopolitical shifts and organisational backgrounds that shape negotiations and appraisal of STA on the ...

AbstractHow do members of parliament of different political parties discuss 'science diplomacy' – broadly speaking all activities at the intersection of science and foreign policy – on the parliamentary floor over time? We address this question against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and analyse 72 speeches on science and Russia from the German and British parliament between February 2014 and December 2022. Our analysis reveals similarities and differences in how science diplomacy is discussed in the German Bundestag and the British House of Commons, how party views on science diplomacy in relation to Russia differ and how said views change over time. In so doing, our study shows that national science and policy ecosystems with their specific institutions and actors shape science diplomacy debates, including in times of war.

The B-STA-R dataset provides information on more than 1138 bilateral agreements on cooperation in matters of science and technology, mostly concluded by countries of the G20 and OECD in the period between 1937 and 2020. These science and technology agreements (STA) are intergovernmental treaties in which the participating countries establish a framework for bilateral cooperation in science and technology (S&T). The files associated with the dataset contain information on the concluding countries, dates of signing, and entry into force. Moreover, links to the full texts of the agreements are provided where possible. B-STA-R is meant to inform studies from the social sciences and humanities that deal with the topic of international science policy, science diplomacy, innovation studies, foreign policy analysis, history of S&T, globalization and diffusion studies, etc.

Abstract
Intergovernmental science organizations (IGSOs) address many challenges of the 21st century. Several countries of the Global South have joined established IGSOs or have created new ones. Yet we know little about their interests in IGSOs. Our study addresses this blind spot by investigating which objectives Southern actors pursue in IGSOs and under which conditions they are likely to achieve their objectives. Using insights from three strands of literature, we compare four IGSOs with Southern participation: the European Organization for Nuclear Research, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, the Square Kilometer Array, and the African Lightsource. We show that countries of the Global South pursue a multitude of political and scientific objectives in IGSOs, ranging from capacity-building to casting off political isolation. Moreover, we demonstrate that Southern countries have varying chances of attaining these objectives, depending on their scientific community, domestic politics, industrial capacities and in some cases geographic location as well as an IGSO's maturity.