Suchergebnisse

Requiring political disclosure would increase trust in the university system at relatively low cost. Rather than massive cutbacks in funding, it is better to let the light of day restore faith in US higher education.
The post Increasing Transparency Can Restore Trust in Higher Education appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.

The Biden Administration recently proposed new restrictions requiring the removal of almost all the country's lead water pipes. The EPA estimates the program's cost at an eye-popping $20 billion to $30 billion over a decade.
The post The Biden Administration's Mandate on Lead Pipes appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.

Anticompetitive behavior by state-owned enterprises : incentives and capabilities / David E.M. Sappington, J. Gregory Sidak -- Case studies of anticompetitve SOE behavior / R. Richard Geddes -- Applying the Microsoft decision to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac / Peter J. Wallison -- Anticompetitive behavior in postal services / R. Richard Geddes

Origins of and justifications for regulating utilities, particularly the natural monopoly behind extensive price and entry regulation; US.

Asset recycling (AR) has gained attention in the United States as a way of improving life cycle asset maintenance and realizing maximum value from existing public infrastructure. In an AR program, proceeds from leases or sales of mature, underutilized public assets are reinvested in much-needed infrastructure improvements. Although the benefits of AR are often noted in both academic and policy circles, the academic literature on AR has not yet explored AR's application to social infrastructure. To address this gap, we explore the concept of AR and its relevance for U.S. social infrastructure. We first examine the steps and conceptual features of a "fix-it-first" AR approach to social infrastructure. We then use Infrastructure Ontario's Capital Planning Program as a case study to highlight the potential viability of such programs. Finally, we conclude by discussing the benefits and challenges of adopting AR policies in the United States.

ABSTRACTStreet lighting is a classic example of a public good, and governments are extensively involved in its provision. Adequate lighting facilitates both car traffic and personal safety while improving an urban area's character. However, many systems are mismanaged and obsolete, incurring high energy costs and emissions with relatively low lighting quality. Public authorities facing budget constraints often find retrofitting old street‐lighting systems challenging. They have two options: either direct in‐house, public‐authority renovation or contracting with a private company through a public–private partnership (PPP). Although private‐sector‐participation approaches vary, most public authorities can now enter into a street‐light modernization PPP agreement. That can be a win‐win option for both the public and private sectors. The upfront investment is small and operational expenses outweigh capital expenses, generating lower payback periods and energy‐cost reduction with light‐emitting diode (LED) technology. Little public expenditure is necessary when private partners are compensated via shared energy savings. We analyze the Detroit street‐light PPP – the United States' first – and find that PPPs are practical for retrofitting US street lights and in other countries where they are antiquated.

Public provision of water and wastewater services in urban India has been a noteworthy failure, often providing service that ranges from non-existent to unreliable. Over the past decade, a number of reforms were undertaken that focused on infrastructure construction and urban governance, including broader use of public–private partnerships (PPPs). We examine a new data set of 163 water and wastewater PPP contracts initiated during 1999-2012 to study the determinants of a city's decision to invite varying amounts of private participation though a PPP agreement. Cities with larger populations, better PPP regulatory environments, regional party rule, and lower sanitation scores are associated with higher levels of private participation through PPPs. Indian municipalities have often failed to engage the public before and during contract discussions, sometimes resulting in lukewarm public support for PPPs. Our findings highlight the role of cities' socioeconomic indicators in determining the type of PPP contract undertaken.