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AbstractAnalyzing civil society resistance to elite‐led democratic backsliding in Africa, the article argues that the non‐militant, civil society‐based transitions experienced in the 1990s left a legacy of a pro‐democracy cleavage that is mobilized when central constitutional rights are threatened. Building on insights from social movement theory, the paper argues that the conduct of multiparty elections at regular intervals provides an opportunity for contestation over constitutional rules, and the historical legacy of pro‐democracy movements provides a mobilizing structure for civil society to organize for the protection of constitutional rights. The theoretical argument is illustrated by a comparison of the democratic trajectories in Zambia and Malawi. In both countries, incumbent elites' have attempted to remain in power through constitutional revisions. However, processes of executive aggrandizement have been stalled by civil society mobilization that again have resulted in incumbent defeat and electoral turn‐overs. Recent waves of democratic backsliding suggest that the autonomy of civil society from political parties may be a key factor for the ability of civil society to challenge autocratization. Malawi's civil society has maintained a high degree of autonomy but in Zambia, the close cooperation between civil society and the Patriotic Front (PF) and the resulting cooptation of key civil society actors have resulted in a process of autocratization.

"Democratic Rollback in Africa" published on by Oxford University Press.

The study examines Zambia's evolving aid relationship in relation to the country's democratic trajectory. The impact of aid in terms of democratic consolidation is linked to the development of the party system, the efficacy of key democratic institutions, and accountability in relation to tolerance of participation by the media and civil society in the political process. The study suggests that there are many good reasons for so-called traditional donors to phase out aid to Zambia. Zambia has recorded economic growth for the most part of this decade, but poverty levels still stand at near 70 per cent and both equity issues and poor human development indicators provide reasons for concern. The study cautions against an aid exit at a time when economic growth and new foreign partners may strengthen the executive office vis-à-vis civil society, opposition and agencies of restraint. The study argues for an enhanced emphasis on democracy assistance that may strengthen stakeholders and institutions with capacity to hold the executive to account for their policy actions in terms of development.

As one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in 1991 Zambia experienced a peaceful transition to multi-party rule. The new government, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), also committed itself to implementing an economic reform programme. The international donor community in turn generously rewarded the new government's commitment to both political and economic change. Despite the optimistic forecasts in 1991, both the political and economic liberalisation processes in Zambia are today characterised by their partial implementation. Zambia has joined the vast majority of African reforming governments and entered into a 'transitional grey zone' in terms of democratic reforms, and remains stuck in a 'partial reform syndrome' characterised by a permanent economic crisis. What can explain the Zambian development trajectory? Why were some elements of the economic reforms implemented soon after the 1991 elections while other vital reform processes were postponed? To what extent did the processes of political and economic reform reinforce or hinder one another? This book analyses the implementation of political and economic liberalisation in Zambia during the first two election periods (1991-2001). Focussing on the negotiations between government and the key domestic interest groups, as well as the dialogues between the MMD government and the international donor community, the book argues that despite a disastrous socio-economic record, the processes of political and economic liberalisation proceeded concomitantly without seriously affecting or undermining each other. Contrary to expectations linked both to the political and economic reform processes, executive dominance increased in Zambia in the 1990s. Stressing continuity rather than change, the analysis of Zambia's reform processes suggests that the practices of patronage politics associated with authoritarian regimes are compatible with processes of political and economic liberalisation. ; CONTENTS -- REFORM FOR POLITICAL SURVIVAL: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION IN ZAMBIA 1991–2001 -- POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION IN THEORY AND IN AFRICA -- POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN ZAMBIA 1964–1991 -- ECONOMIC REFORMS 1991–2001: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND DOMESTIC INTEREST GROUPS -- POLITICAL LIBERALISATION 1991–2001: THE DECLINE OF INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE -- AID FOR REFORM: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITY -- POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION IN ZAMBIA 1991–2001

New democracies attempting to implement political and economic reform simultaneously are considered to face a dilemma, as democratization may undermine economic reform by encouraging political participation and empowering interest groups that are unlikely to benefit from reform. This article compares relations between interest groups and the government under one‐party and multiparty rule in Zambia. Contrary to the assumptions of pluralist theory, the article argues that the influence of interest groups declined as a result of political and economic liberalization. Political liberalization in Zambia has so far resulted in a proliferation of civic associations and a weakening of corporatist links between the state and economic interest groups that had been granted some real influence in the previous authoritarian regime. This 'pluralist paradox' has meant, at least in the initial phases of multiparty rule, that interest group resistance has not constituted a significant threat to the sustainability of the reform programme, or to the electoral prospects of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).

Draws on the institutional literature derived from Western historical experiences to examine Namibia's postindependence taxation system. The analysis is structured around four constraints believed to affect revenue mobilization: (1) government's bargaining position in relation to its citizens; (2) nature/capability of political institutions; (3) structure of the economy; & (4) international context. It is maintained that institutional theories based on Western experiences are challenged by Namibia's tax policies that are only slightly different 10 years following independence. Namibia's macroeconomic policies & system of taxation are described, & the constraining factors are analyzed within the context of postindependence politics. It is argued that the governing South West Africa People's Organization has been able to maintain liberal economic policies while simultaneously carrying out relatively progressive social policies primarily because of revenue received from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). However, trade liberalization may reduce SACU revenues, challenging Namibia's tax base, & requiring the government to choose between getting more revenues from the mostly white wealthy minority, or taxing a greater share of the population. 35 References. J. Lindroth