Suchergebnisse

An examination of the findings of the Second Circuit Court case of Shonubi IV challenges the claim that it represents a general rejection of statistical evidence in law. The 1991 case involved a Nigerian resident of the US accused of importing heroin by swallowing it in a sealed balloon. There was overwhelming evidence of Shonubi's guilt & a finding that he had made a total of eight such trips. The appeal did not contest his conviction but focused on the judge's interpretation of federal guidelines that indicated the sentence should depend on the quantity of heroin involved. Shonubi's sentence was based on the total amount of heroin smuggled in all eight episodes. The amount was determined by statistical estimates since physical evidence from the first seven incidents was unavailable. The case's progress through three successive appeals shows that the final decision to vacate the sentence was fair because of the dubious nature of the statistical evidence based on quantities other balloon smugglers had carried, rather than on what Shonubi himself smuggled. 24 References. J. Lindroth

AbstractNatural ecosystems are fundamental to local water cycles and the water ecosystem services that humans enjoy, such as water provision, outdoor recreation, and flood protection. However, integrating ecosystem services into water resources management requires that they be acknowledged, quantified, and communicated to decision-makers. We present an indicator framework that incorporates the supply of, and demand for, water ecosystem services. This provides an initial diagnostic for water resource managers and a mechanism for evaluating tradeoffs through future scenarios. Building on a risk assessment framework, we present a three-tiered indicator for measuring where demand exceeds the supply of services, addressing the scope (spatial extent), frequency, and amplitude for which objectives (service delivery) are not met. The Ecosystem Service Indicator is measured on a 0–100 scale, which encompasses none to total service delivery. We demonstrate the framework and its applicability to a variety of services and data sources (e.g., monitoring stations, statistical yearbooks, modeled datasets) from case studies in China and Southeast Asia. We evaluate the sensitivity of the indicator scores to varying levels data and three methods of calculation using a simulated test dataset. Our indicator framework is conceptually simple, robust, and flexible enough to offer a starting point for decision-makers and to accommodate the evolution and expansion of tools, models and data sources used to measure and evaluate the value of water ecosystem services.

Voting systems aggregate preferences efficiently and are often used for deciding conservation priorities. Desirable characteristics of voting systems include transitivity, completeness, and Pareto optimality, among others. Voting systems that are common and potentially useful for environmental decision making include simple majority, approval, and preferential voting. Unfortunately, no voting system can guarantee an outcome, while also satisfying a range of very reasonable performance criteria. Furthermore, voting methods may be manipulated by decision makers and strategic voters if they have knowledge of the voting patterns and alliances of others in the voting populations. The difficult properties of voting systems arise in routine decision making when there are multiple criteria and management alternatives. Because each method has flaws, we do not endorse one method. Instead, we urge organizers to be transparent about the properties of proposed voting systems and to offer participants the opportunity to approve the voting system as part of the ground rules for operation of a group.

Voting systems aggregate preferences efficiently and are often used for deciding conservation priorities. Desirable characteristics of voting systems include transitivity, completeness, and Pareto optimality, among others. Voting systems that are common and potentially useful for environmental decision making include simple majority, approval, and preferential voting. Unfortunately, no voting system can guarantee an outcome, while also satisfying a range of very reasonable performance criteria. Furthermore, voting methods may be manipulated by decision makers and strategic voters if they have knowledge of the voting patterns and alliances of others in the voting populations. The difficult properties of voting systems arise in routine decision making when there are multiple criteria and management alternatives. Because each method has flaws, we do not endorse one method. Instead, we urge organizers to be transparent about the properties of proposed voting systems and to offer participants the opportunity to approve the voting system as part of the ground rules for operation of a group.