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Thailand's March 2019 ballot was the first for the country since 2011, and for many it signaled the potential end of the military junta's five-year rule. But was it truly a return to democracy? This essay argues that the election was far from a democratization event. Instead, it was a highly orchestrated exercise to ensure authoritarian longevity. The junta employed techniques of institutional engineering as well as managing the election's outcomes in an effort to extend the premiership of Prayuth Chan-ocha despite increasing pressure for a return to civilian rule. The results of the election suggest that Thai society continues to exhibit deep divisions between those who support and those who oppose military interventions in politics. I further contend that the election should be seen as part of the continuing struggle by conservative forces in society to maintain their dominance in politics despite demands from other segments of the population for equal representation, a contest which is far from over.

Thailand's March 2019 ballot was the first for the country since 2011, and for many it signaled the potential end of the military junta's five-year rule. But was it truly a return to democracy? This essay argues that the election was far from a democratization event. Instead, it was a highly orchestrated exercise to ensure authoritarian longevity. The junta employed techniques of institutional engineering as well as managing the election's outcomes in an effort to extend the premiership of Prayuth Chan-ocha despite increasing pressure for a return to civilian rule. The results of the election suggest that Thai society continues to exhibit deep divisions between those who support and those who oppose military interventions in politics. I further contend that the election should be seen as part of the continuing struggle by conservative forces in society to maintain their dominance in politics despite demands from other segments of the population for equal representation, a contest which is far from over.

In the aftermath of the 2006 and 2014 Thai coups,observers declared the resurrection of the bureaucratic polity. Bureaucrats,though, remained influential even during the period of 1992-2006, when electedpoliticians were thought to command the Thai state. Bureaucratic involvement inpolitics poses a challenge for dominant political science theories ofpolitician-bureaucrat relationships, which draw heavily from principal-agentframeworks. I apply agency theory to Thailand, testing three differenthypotheses derived from the theory. Examining legislative productivity andcontrol over bureaucratic career trajectories, I find that elected politiciansincreasingly acted as principals of the Thai state from 1992 through 2006, andto a lesser degree from 2008 to 2013. Thai bureaucrats, though, have frequentlyengaged in the political sphere, blunting political oversight and expandingtheir independence vis-à-vis politicians. This suggests that the principal-agentmodel overlooks the range of resources that bureaucracies can bring to bear indeveloping countries, granting them greater autonomy than anticipated. As such,theories of the politician-bureaucrat relationship in developing states need tobetter account for the mechanisms through which bureaucrats exercise autonomyand political influence.

Despite the Thai state's long record of rice market interventions, historically politicians failed to leverage rice subsidies in their pursuit of political support, notwithstanding the large number of farmers in the country. Since Thaksin Shinawatra's election in 2001, though, each government has subsidised rice producers, although at varying degrees. What explains this change? This article traces the four-decade history of rice price support programmes. It is proposed that these policies be interpreted through the dual lens of institutionalism and public choice theory, demonstrating how political institutions have shaped incentives for politicians to cater to different constituencies. During the pre-1980 period, under authoritarian regimes, Thai leaders applied rice price policies to benefit urban consumers and the government. From 1979 through 2000, following implementation of the block-vote system, rice interventions were used to appeal to voting intermediaries like rice millers, as bargaining chips among competing parties and as stopgap measures to diffuse farmer protests. Since 2001, responding to the electoral system created by the 1997 constitution, politicians have appealed directly to the voting public, seeking broad-based support via subsidies. The analysis highlights the impact that shifting institutional incentives have on politicians' actions and thus the emergent policies.

Thailand is one of the most coup-prone countries in the world, having experienced no less than 19 coup attempts since 1932. The prevalence of military interventions casts doubt on whether Thai politicians will ever be able to reign in their armed counterparts. One prominent response to this concern claims that through increasing the level of military professionalism, or expertise, social responsibility, and organizational unity, Thai troops could be tamed and the Army's propensity to intervene in politics curbed. This, though, is a false hope.

On 10 February 2015, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, with his usual candor, told reporters that "Thailand is different from other countries. If something cannot be solved [by the government], the military will solve it."[1] This statement embodies a number of assumptions, but perhaps most important for Thailand today is the idea that military intervention is a perfectly legitimate method of overcoming political challenges.

Politicians have long engaged in marketing themselves by employing distinct speaking styles to signal social standing, competence, or a shared background with their audience. What effect does this use of different language appeals have on voter opinion? Utilizing a survey experiment in Thailand, I test a set of hypotheses about the effect of language on respondent opinions. Relying on three distinct treatments, a formal language register, an informal language register, and an ethnic language, I demonstrate the multiple effects of language on political appeal. The use of a formal register has mixed effects, signaling both high education as well as preparation for national office while also creating social distance between the speaker and audience. An informal register and the ethnic tongue both signal kinship ties to listeners, with the ethnic tongue having a much more profound effect. The results also show that an ethnic overture has greater electoral appeal than formal speech. These findings highlight the causal effect language has in shaping political opinions and illustrate the varied impacts of linguistic hierarchies on political appeal. [Data available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZX4HGA]

In contrast to the veneer of a homogenous state-approved Thai ethnicity, Thailand is home to a heterogeneous population. Only about one-third of Thailand's inhabitants speak the national language as their mother tongue; multiple alternate ethnolinguistic groups comprise the remainder of the population, with the Lao in the northeast, often called Isan people, being the largest at 28 percent of the population. Ethnic divisions closely align with areas of political party strength; the Thai Rak Thai Party and its subsequent incarnations enjoy strong support from Isan people and Khammuang speakers in the north while the Democrat Party dominates among the Thai- and Paktay-speaking people of the central plains and the south. Despite this confluence of ethnicity and political party support, we see very little mobilization along ethnic cleavages. Why? I argue that ethnic mobilization remains minimal because of the large-scale public acceptance and embrace of the government-approved Thai identity. Even among the country's most disadvantaged, as are Isan people, support is still strong for "Thai-ness." Most inhabitants of Thailand espouse the mantra that to be Thai is superior to being labelled as an alternate ethnic group. I demonstrate this through the application of large-scale survey data as well as a set of interviews with self-identified Isan people. The findings suggest that the Thai state has successfully inculcated a sense of national identity among the Isan people and that ethnic mobilization is hindered by ardent nationalism. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

Thailand's March 2019 ballot was the first for the country since 2011, and for many it signaled the potential end of the military junta's five-year rule. But was it truly a return to democracy? This essay argues that the election was far from a democratization event. Instead, it was a highly orchestrated exercise to ensure authoritarian longevity. The junta employed techniques of institutional engineering as well as managing the election's outcomes in an effort to extend the premiership of Prayuth Chan-ocha despite increasing pressure for a return to civilian rule. The results of the election suggest that Thai society continues to exhibit deep divisions between those who support and those who oppose military interventions in politics. I further contend that the election should be seen as part of the continuing struggle by conservative forces in society to maintain their dominance in politics despite demands from other segments of the population for equal representation, a contest which is far from over. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

Underneath the veneer of a homogenous state-approved Thai ethnicity,Thailand is home to a heterogeneous population. Only about one-thirdof Thailand's inhabitants speak the national language as their mothertongue; multiple alternate ethnolinguistic groups comprise the remainderof the population, with the Lao in the northeast, often called Isan people,being the largest at 28 percent of the population. Ethnic divisions closelyalign with areas of political party strength: the Thai Rak Thai Party and itssubsequent incarnations have enjoyed strong support from Isan people andKhammuang speakers in the north while the Democrat Party dominatesamong the Thai- and Paktay-speaking people of the central plains and thesouth. Despite this confluence of ethnicity and political party support, wesee very little mobilization along ethnic cleavages. Why? I argue that ethnicmobilization remains minimal because of the large-scale public acceptanceand embrace of the government-approved Thai identity. Even among thecountry's most disadvantaged, such as Isan people, support is still strongfor "Thai-ness." Most inhabitants of Thailand espouse the mantra that tobe Thai is superior to being labelled as part of an alternate ethnic group. Idemonstrate this through the application of large-scale survey data as wellas a set of interviews with self-identified Isan people. The findings suggestthat the Thai state has successfully inculcated a sense of national identityamong the Isan people and that ethnic mobilization is hindered by ardentnationalism.